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framework, shapes immigration discourse and policy and, in 
turn, how the welfare state, as an ideal and as an arrangement 
of policies, is shaped by immigration.
The six chapters of this volume examine a variety of 
encounters between migrants and welfare states, ranging from 
the Swedish multicultural immigrant policy of the 1970’s to 
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All of these studies further ongoing discussions on the theme 
of the relationship between welfare states and migrations, 
making this volume a timely and relevant contribution to an 
important contemporary topic.
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7Preface
When Heidi Vad Jønsson e-mailed Saara Pellander in January 2009 to con-
nect with a fellow PhD-student researching topics related to migration and 
the welfare state within the Nordic Centre of Excellence NordWel, neither 
of them anticipated that this e-mail exchange would grow into an active 
and inspiring network of young scholars, nor that the outcome of the net-
work’s activities would develop into a book. After Heidi Vad Jønsson had 
been the primus motor in the first year of the network’s activities, Saara Pel-
lander became the next coordinator at the first network meeting of the PhD 
Network for Research on Immigration, Integration and Welfare (WelMi) in 
Odense in the spring of 2010. In May 2011, Saara Pellander coordinated a 
WelMi conference in Helsinki, which included very inspiring public lectures 
by Professor emeritus Rosemary Sales, Professor Anette Borchorst, Profes-
sor Bo Bengtsson, and Associate Professor Peo Hansen. WelMi network 
members also had the opportunity to present papers at the conference and 
receive comments by the senior scholars. It was on this occasion that the 
idea to compile a book out of the seminar presentations came up, and with 
Marjukka Weide as the next coordinator and the book project manager, this 
goal was pursued at two subsequent book seminars in the autumn of 2011 
and the spring of 2012. 
The project benefitted greatly from scholars who generously shared their 
time and expertise by acting as reviewers for this refereed publication. For the 
book seminar in the spring, WelMi was lucky to have some of these scholars 
present at the seminar; the participation of Professor Rinus Penninx, Pro-
fessor Pasi Saukkonen, Professor Sirpa Wrede, Dr. Johanna Leinonen and 
Dr. Johannes Kananen inspired intense debates about the book chapters. 
These debates and all of the reviews were invaluable to the development 
8of this book. We would like to thank these scholars for their participation 
and for sharing their valuable time, especially Professor Rinus Penninx, who 
travelled all the way from the Netherlands to share his insights with us. We 
are also very grateful for the other reviewers who provided their comments 
on the book chapters in written form, and would like to thank all of them 
– Professor Helena Blomberg-Kroll, Professor Anette Borchorst, Professor 
Patrick Emmenegger, Dr. Camilla Nordberg, Dr. Karina Horsti, Professor 
Pauli Kettunen, Professor Will Kymlicka, Professor Klaus Petersen, and Dr. 
Rosa Sanchez-Salgado. This book would not have been possible without the 
support and encouragement we received from this group of experts. The 
book would also certainly not have been possible without the NCoE Nor-
dWel (The Nordic Welfare State – Historical Foundations and Future Chal-
lenges) which supported WelMi from the very beginning. All activities have 
been funded by NordWel, and the NordWel director Pauli Kettunen and 
vice director Klaus Petersen have shown their continuous support for the 
further development of WelMi. A special thanks goes to both of them. 
This provision of funding and an academically rich environment has 
made it possible for young scholars to meet and connect across countries, 
continents, and disciplines. We have received immense support from the 
NordWel-coordinator Heidi Haggrén, as well as her substitutes Anna Al-
anko and Jussi Vauhkonen. For our meetings in Odense, Mai Hostrup 
Brunse and Jakob Sinding Skött helped us with practical arrangements and 
we would like to express our gratitude to all these colleagues. Last, but not 
least, we are thankful for the great work on the professional language editing 
provided by Paul Wilkinson, the layout provided by Timo Jaakola, and the 
bibliography editing provided by Anniina Vainio.
WelMi, the network that was first established by PhD-students, has now 
developed into a network of young scholars and early career researchers. 
The list of network members has grown since the network was established 
and is an excellent example of transnational networking at its best. WelMi 
is guided by a steering group consisting of previous coordinators and is 
currently coordinated by Elizabeth Onasch. She has been tying the strings 
together at the crucial stage of this book project and pushing the other edi-
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tors to keep our deadlines and timetables. We are looking forward to future 
projects and hope that this book inspires scholars of various disciplines to 
consider and re-think the various connections between migrations and the 
welfare state.
Odense, Chicago, Helsinki, and Åbo, July 2012
Heidi Vad Jønsson, Elizabeth Onasch, Saara Pellander, Mats Wickström
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Introduction
Immigration and welfare are two salient yet charged themes in today’s po-
litical discussions within national, Nordic, and international or global con-
texts. State and non-state actors have worked to expand, retrench, and ex-
tensively reform welfare states in the years following World War II; these 
struggles have coincided with the thorough politicisation of immigration. 
Borders and barriers have been torn down and re-built at an increasing 
tempo over the last 20 years as migration has risen to the top of the politi-
cal agenda. The aim of this volume is to examine how the welfare state as a 
normative and institutional framework shapes immigration discourse and 
policy and, in turn, how the welfare state as an ideal and as an arrangement 
of policies is shaped by immigration. In this introduction, we discuss the 
main concepts that appear within the volume and outline how the chapters 
engage with these concepts while addressing the aim of the volume.
Welfare states
Welfare states have historically emerged within national contexts, which 
varied in a number of important ways. Some of the states that built welfare 
systems were small nation states, whereas others were colonial powers, and 
some were old reformed monarchies, while still others were new republican 
states. Despite these many different outsets, most western states developed 
institutions that provided some kind of social and economic security for 
their inhabitants during the 20th century, especially in the post-war period. 
In 1990, Gøsta Esping-Andersen developed his influential and contro-
versial typology, which placed the many different welfare states in three wel-
fare state regimes: a liberal/residual regime, with a relatively low degree of 
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de-commodification1 based on minimum benefits; a conservative or corpo-
rative welfare regime, where social security involves relying upon families; 
and finally, a social democratic or universal welfare regime with the gen-
eral ambition of providing a high level of social security though the state 
financed by taxes.2
These regimes, or ideal type clusters, of welfare states have been criti-
cised for neglecting a variety of different parameters, including, for example, 
gender3 and ethnicity4. In the decades following the publication of Esping-
Andersen’s welfare paradigm, social scientists have set out to create alter-
natives or update it.5 For example, the anthology Changing Social Equality: 
The Nordic Welfare Model in the 21st Century6 uses different perspectives, 
including a focus on immigration, to bring the analytical concept of the 
universal welfare regime up-to-date. While the authors affirm that the key 
features identified by Esping-Andersen in 1990 are still part of the universal 
welfare model, they point out that immigration, along with other factors like 
globalisation, have led to an increasing emphasis on rights and duties as core 
elements of the model. 
1 Esping-Andersen uses the term de-commodification to ‘capture the degree to which welfare states 
weaken the cash nexus by granting entitlements independent of market participation.’ Esping-An-
dersen, Gøsta (1999) Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 43. 
2 Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press.
3 Borchorst, Anette & Birte Siim (2002) ‘The women-friendly welfare states revisited’. NORA: Nordic 
Journal of Women’s Studies Vol. 10, Issue 2, 90–98; Lewis, Jane (1992) ‘Gender and the Development 
of Welfare Regimes’. Journal of European Social Policy Vol. 2, Issue 3, 159–173; Orloff, Ann (1993) 
Gender and the social rights of citizenship: the comparative analysis of gender relations and welfare 
states. American Sociological Review, Vol 58, Issue 3, 303–328. 
Esping-Andersen responded to the feminist critique of his work by assessing ‘defamilisation’ in 
addition to ‘decommodification’. While he defines a familiastic welfare regime as one that ‘assigns 
a maximum of welfare obligations to the household’; he uses defamilisation ‘to capture policies 
that lessen individuals’ reliance on the family; that maximise individuals’ command of economic 
resources independently of familial or conjugal reciprocities’. Esping-Andersen 1999, 45. Yet, as crit-
ics such as Clare Bambra state, Esping-Andersen’s use of defamilisation is problematic, as it does not 
examine women’s autonomy and independence from the family, but only focuses on the assessment 
of support by the welfare state to the family. Bambra, Clare (2007) ‘Defamilisation and welfare state 
regimes: a cluster analysis.’, International Journal of Social Welfare, Vol. 16, Issue 4, 326–338.
4 Banting, Keith, Richard Johnston & Stuart N. Soroka (2007) ‘Ethnicity, Trust and the Welfare State’. 
In Johnston, Richard & Fiona Kay (eds) Social capital, diversity, and the welfare state. Vancouver: 
UBC Press; Morissens, Ann & Diane Sainsbury (2005) ‘Migrants’ Social Rights, Ethnicity and Wel-
fare Regimes’. Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 34, Issue 4, 637–660.
5 See, for example, the Social Citizenship Indicator Program database stored at Stockholm University.
6 Kvist, Jon, Johan Fritzel, Bjørn Hvinden & Olli Kangas (eds) (2012) Changing Social Equality: The 
Nordic Welfare Model in the 21st Century. Bristol: Policy Press.
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Although updated and elaborated ideal type regimes are useful, they are 
still limited in how they represent empirical reality. Kettunen and Petersen 
have recently stressed this point, arguing that ‘there seems to be a growing 
awareness that regime or model typologies cannot be more than analytical 
ideal types or crude generalisations […]’7 Such models tend to conceptu-
alise the welfare state only on a national level; although welfare states are 
indeed composed of national legislations and institutions, it is important to 
consider how they are also transnational constructions. States may borrow, 
translate, and implement ideas for social policy solutions that originated 
within other national contexts. Ideal type models also necessarily neglect 
the historical contingencies at play in the development of different welfare 
states. Thus, this volume, without abandoning the analytical ideal types, un-
derlines the importance of analysing the transnational movement of people 
and ideas and the particular histories behind the development of different 
welfare states.
Both welfare state research and welfare states themselves are in a state 
of flux. The current political and scientific discourses on welfare include a 
tangible social phenomenon that, although old and common in human his-
tory, has only recently moved into the centre of welfare politics and research: 
migration. Migrants might still be excluded from or live on the margins 
of the welfare states, but the issue of immigration is no longer considered 
marginal.
Immigration and welfare states
During the last two decades, scholars have increasingly acknowledged that 
immigration is an important parameter when analysing welfare states.8 
Some scholars claim that the diversity created by immigration erodes the 
solidarity and reciprocal trust that supposedly undergird public support 
7 Kettunen, Pauli & Klaus Petersen (2011) ‘Introduction: Rethinking Welfare State Models’. In Ket-
tunen, Pauli & Klaus Petersen (eds) Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspec­
tives on Social Policy. Cheltenham & Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1–15, 3. 
8 See, among others, Bommes, Michael & Andrew Geddes (2000) Immigration and Welfare: Chal-
lenging the Borders of the Welfare State. London/New York: Routledge; Clarke, John (2004) Chang-
ing Welfare, Changing States. New directions on social policy. London: Sage Publications; Schierup, 
Carl-Ulrik, Peo Hansen & Stephen Castles (2006) Migration, citizenship, and the European welfare 
state: a European dilemma PLACE: Oxford University Press.
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for welfare states.9 This argument holds that majority hosts will not support 
social benefit programmes that they perceive to disproportionately ben-
efit immigrants rather than natives.10 Empirical work on this problem has 
reached mixed conclusions. Some research has found that ethnic diversity 
does not undermine social cohesion, national solidarity, or trust,11 or even 
that a greater number of foreigners is correlated with more positive atti-
tudes towards redistribution.12 Other research has found smaller historical 
growth rates of welfare spending in countries that experienced significant 
increases in their foreign-born populations,13 and a (weak) negative rela-
tionship between support for the welfare state and the perceived presence 
of immigrants.14 Furthermore, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in these 
relationships across countries.15 
These mixed findings may be partly explained by variations in elements 
of the relationship between immigration and the welfare state, includ-
ing the nature of the welfare institutions themselves. A number of studies 
have found that Europeans may attach negative images to immigrants and 
9 Freeman, Gary P. (1986) ‘Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State’. The ANNALS 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 485, Issue 1, 51–63; Goodhart, David 
(2004) Too diverse? London: Prospect Publishing Limited. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.
prospectmagazine.co.uk/2004/02/too-diverse-david-goodhart-multiculturalism-britain-immigra-
tion-globalisation/> (accessed 14.3.2012). 
10 For an elaboration of this argument, see, e.g., Glazer, Nathan (1998) ‘The American Welfare State: 
Exceptional No Longer?’. In Cavanna, Henry (ed.) Challenges to the welfare state : internal and 
external dynamics for change. Cheltenham, UK ; Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar; Kymlicka, Will 
& Keith Banting (2006a) Multiculturalism and the welfare state : recognition and redistribution in 
contemporary democracies. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
11 Hooghe, Marc, Tim Reeskens, Dietlind Stolle & Ann Trappers (2009) ‘Ethnic Diversity and General-
ized Trust in Europe’. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 42, Issue 2, 198–223; Kymlicka, Will & Keith 
Banting (2006b) ‘Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State’. Ethnics and National Affairs, 
Vol. 20, Issue 3, 281–304; Parsons, Craig & Timothy M. Smeeding (2006) Immigration and the trans­
formation of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
12 van Oorschot, Wim (2006) ‘Making the difference in social Europe: deservingness perceptions 
among citizens of European welfare states’. Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 16, Issue 1, 23–42; 
Blomberg, Helena (2008a) ‘Public discourses on immigrants and the labour market in two Nordic 
welfare states’. Blomberg, Helena, Annika Forsander, Christian Kroll, Perttu Salmenhaara and Matti 
Similä Sameness and Diversity. The Nordic Welfare State Model and the Integration of Immigrants on 
the Labour Market, SSKH Skrifter No. 21, Helsinki, 37–69.
13 Soroka, Stuart, Keith Banting & Richard Johnston (2006) ‘Immigration and Redistribution in a 
Global Era’. In Bardhan, Pranab, Samuel Bowles & Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein (eds) Globaliza­
tion and Egalitarian Redistribution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
14 Senik, Claudia, Holger Stichnoth & Karine Straeten (2009) ‘Immigration and Natives’ Attitudes 
towards the Welfare State: Evidence from the European Social Survey’. Social Indicators Research, 
Vol. 91, Issue 3, 345–370.
15 Ibid.
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perceive them to be less deserving of social benefits than natives,16 or that 
ethnic diversity17 negatively affects social cohesion and trust for all groups. 
These negative attitudes towards immigrants, and the relationship between 
these attitudes and support for social spending, may be mediated by the 
institutional context; different welfare institutions may be able to create 
trust and reduce ‘nativist resentment’.18 Comprehensive welfare states may 
encourage the social incorporation of diverse populations created through 
immigration by demonstrating impartiality and equality through universal 
benefits. In contrast, liberal states may foster distrust and stigma for im-
migrant recipients of welfare, because access to social benefits is limited 
through means-testing.19 Indeed, respondents in social democratic (uni-
versal) welfare states tend to be more in favour of granting equal rights to 
foreigners than people in continental or liberal welfare states.20  
In addition to mediating the effects of diversity resulting from immigration, 
welfare states may shape immigration policy itself. During the last ten years, in-
creasing attention has been given to the policies that welfare states develop in 
relation to immigration. Two types of interconnected immigration policies are 
central for these analyses: entrance policies and integration policies. 
Alien acts, EU treaties, and UN conventions address entrance policies. 
These types of policies are not directly connected to the internal policy 
framework of the welfare state. Rather, the relationship between entrance 
policies and national welfare policies manifests in the debates over the ef-
fect of immigration on social cohesion in welfare states, as well as political 
16 Alesina, Alberto & Edward L. Glaeser (2004) Fighting poverty in the US and Europe : a world of dif­
ference. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Bay, Ann-Helén & Axel West Pedersen (2006) ‘The limits 
of social solidarity – Basic income, immigration and the legitimacy of the universal welfare state’. 
Acta Sociologica, Vol. 49, Issue 4, 419–436. 
17 Putnam examines the context of the United States, and measures ‘ethnic diversity’ according to 
‘percent black’ and ‘percent immigrant’. Putnam, Robert D. (2007)‚ E pluribus unum: Diversity and 
community in the twenty-first century the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture‘. Scandinavian Political 
Studies, Vol. 30, Issue 2, 137–174.
18 Crepaz, Markus M. L. (2008) Trust beyond borders : immigration, the welfare state and identity in 
modern societies. Ann Arbor Mich: Univ. of Michigan Press.
19 Banting, Keith (2000) ‘Looking in Three Directions: Migration and the European Welfare State in 
Comparative Perspective’. In Bommes, Michael & Andrew Geddes (eds) Immigration and welfare : 
challenging the borders of the welfare state. London ; New York: Routledge.
20 Mau, Steffen & Christoph Burkhardt (2009) ‘Migration and welfare state solidarity in Western 
Europe’. Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 19, Issue 3, 213–229.
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discussions about the economic effect of immigration on welfare budgets. 
In many cases, ‘welfare’ and ‘nationalism’ come together to draw up bound-
aries based on the perceived scarcity of welfare resources and the need 
to reserve and preserve welfare for those belonging to the nation. While 
this interconnectedness of nationalism and welfare is a well-known social 
phenomenon, it had received very little scholarly attention beyond simple 
observation until recently, when scholars began to expand theoretically on 
the concept of ‘welfare nationalism’. The previous volume in the NordWel 
Studies in Historical Welfare State Research series, Welfare citizenship and 
welfare nationalism, tackles the issue of welfare nationalism head on and is a 
step forward in its investigation.21 This volume, particularly in the chapters 
of Pyrhönen and Paul, also explores welfare nationalism. 
Integration policies are generally a type of immigration policy that aims 
to regulate immigrants’ behaviour and relationships with the state, labour 
market, and natives once they have entered the welfare state. These poli-
cies, especially in the form of current activation programmes, tend to be 
directly linked to welfare state policies. The form and contents of integra-
tion policies have varied over time and, often, according to the welfare state 
type, with the greatest variation historically existing between residual and 
universal regimes. Residual regimes are usually more ‘liberal’ and their in-
tegration policies tend to be less regulated than the universal welfare state 
regime.22 However, welfare regimes and immigration regimes do not al-
ways sync neatly; there is a good deal of within-regime variation, especially 
in terms of the amount of ‘substantive social rights’ states provide to immi-
grants.23 When analysing the connection between welfare and immigration 
qualitatively, the variations within the regime clusters sometimes become 
more prominent than the similarities, thus, bringing forth another critical 
challenge to the industry of regime/model classifications. In this volume, 
21 Suszycki, Andrzej Marcin (ed.) (2011) Welfare citizenship and welfare nationalism. Helsinki: Nordic 
Centre of Excellence NordWel.
22 See Hammar Tomas (2008) ‘Immigration to a Scandinavian welfare state: the case of Sweden’. In: 
Blomberg Helena, Annika Forsander, Christian Kroll, Perttu Salmenhaara & Matti Similä, (eds) 
Sameness and Diversity. The Nordic welfare State Model and Integration of Immigrants on the 
Labour Market, SSKH Skrifter nr 21, Helsinki.
23 Morissens & Sainsbury 2005.
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we acknowledge the importance of attending to variations within regime 
clusters, but this does not, of course, mean that we disregard the similari-
ties. Rather, we take a different approach and focus on the complexities of 
the different case studies, which reveal both differences and similarities 
between different welfare states and immigration and integration policies. 
This volume brings together a selection of highly interesting chapters 
that employ a variety of methodological and disciplinary approaches. The 
research findings presented in these chapters further the investigation of the 
relationship between welfare states and immigration by addressing the role 
of the normative and institutional framework of the welfare state in shaping 
immigration and integration policies and discourses. The chapters exam-
ine discourses related to immigration and integration within many different 
arenas— parliamentary debates, political party platforms, public discussion 
of politics, legislation, and documents related to integration policy— and 
shed light on how the idea of the welfare state is employed for different 
ends. While the volume’s comparisons between Nordic as well as Western 
European countries allow for insights on how the welfare framework affects 
policy and discourse across different welfare states, we also pay attention to 
transnational ideas on multiculturalism, human rights, welfare nationalism, 
and civic integration. 
The order of the volume’s chapters broadly reflects the different stages 
of the relationship between immigrants and the welfare state, moving from 
ideas and discourse, to entrance policies, to integration, and finally, to the 
civic participation of immigrants. The first half of the volume focuses prin-
cipally on Nordic countries, while the second half expands to consider 
Western European cases and provide a broader context. 
Overview of the chapters 
In the first chapter, Mats Wickström takes us back to the Sweden of the 
1970’s. His analysis of the development of multiculturalism sheds light on 
the historical interplay of immigration and the welfare state within the realm 
of ideas. While the multicultural turn in Sweden was conditioned by the in-
stitutions of the Swedish welfare state, the institutions themselves were not 
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the prime movers in this development. Using comparisons with the emer-
gence of multiculturalism within Canada, and the lack of such policy devel-
opment in Denmark, Wickström argues that the Swedish multicultural turn 
is primarily the result of white ethnic activism. The successful delegitimising 
of assimilation and the official recognition of ethnocultural groups within 
Sweden also came partly as a result of the perception that the immigrants 
in Sweden, who were largely white, were relatively culturally similar to the 
Swedes. In contrast, in Denmark, where there was a larger population of 
non-white immigrants, there were many more concerns about immigrants’ 
potentially incompatible cultures. Furthermore, the perception of immi-
grants’ temporariness within Denmark led to the establishment of introduc-
tion classes, rather than truly multicultural policies. 
The ethnic activists and the Swedish politicians who took up the cause 
of multiculturalism also mobilised Swedish values and institutions linked 
to the expanding welfare state project. For example, the overarching goal 
of equality, the ‘spirit of internationalism’, and the idea of Sweden as a role 
model to the rest of the world were now re-identified as national ideals that 
supported multiculturalism. The advocates of multiculturalism also drew 
upon transnational ideals, like anti-racism and anti-nationalism, as well as 
Canadian multiculturalism to frame and support their cause. 
In the second chapter, where Amanda Nielsen examines the contempo-
rary discourse surrounding irregularity in the Swedish parliament, similar 
appeals to international ideals are apparent. Public and political attention 
to irregular migrants, and their social rights and access to welfare state ser-
vices is, as Nielsen argues, part of the discovery of a ‘crisis’ that challenges 
the public understanding of Sweden as an inclusive and immigrant-friendly 
welfare state. Demands on behalf of irregular migrants are framed as human 
rights questions and linked to central welfare state ideals. Irregular migrants 
are either positioned as victims in need of protection, or as potential con-
tributors to the welfare state. Nielsen posits that these arguments contribute 
to establishing an understanding of irregular migration as policy failure and 
may pave the way for an opening up to policy change. Thus, the potential 
inclusion of irregular immigrants into the Swedish welfare regime is an ex-
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ample of how the concept of the universal welfare state can provide a politi-
cal platform for immigration policy change. 
Niko Pyrhönen’s analysis of rhetorical manifestations of anti-immigra-
tion sentiment in Finnish and Swedish right-wing party programmes and 
the grass root level of Finnish public online-debates, demonstrates that the 
idea of the welfare state can also be employed to argue for increasing exclu-
sion, rather than inclusion, of immigrants. Instead of an ethnocultural or 
xenophobic rhetoric, Pyrhönen finds that the economic sustainability of the 
welfare state features as a key rhetorical construction in anti-immigration 
debates. The arguments of economic welfare sustainability relate immigra-
tion to the threat of a cheap work force that would undermine national 
workers’ interests, and stress the financial burden of humanitarian migra-
tion and integration measures to the welfare state. These findings challenge 
the conception that economic arguments are of secondary importance for 
populist right-wing parties24 and highlight the potency and flexibility of the 
idea of the welfare state in political debates.
Politicians may also employ the institutional frameworks of the welfare 
state to influence immigration policy. On the basis of her comparison be-
tween current discourses and policies on labour immigration in France and 
Germany—two countries with different welfare regimes but very similar 
policy goals when it comes to labour migration—Regine Paul argues that 
the political and administrational elite use the welfare state in different ways 
in the two countries to attract highly-skilled labour immigrants. The Bis-
marckian logic of the German welfare state frames German labour admis-
sion policies; as work is the pathway to rights in Germany, the immigrant 
who can be assumed to contribute is given special treatment in entrance 
policy. The immigrant who might not have been seen as a net contributor 
when entering, e.g. (former) asylum seekers, but that has shown she is ca-
pable of working, can also ‘earn’ admission into the warmth of the German 
welfare state. Of course this emphasis on work can also discriminate—those 
that cannot be expected to work must be denied admission. 
24 Mudde, Cas (2007) Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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Post-colonial France also gives ‘wanted,’ highly-skilled, immigrants the 
red carpet treatment in admissions. Due to the lack of a perceived labour 
shortage and the attention to post-colonial population management, the ad-
mission policies in France are not as governed by the perceived need to at-
tract immigrants as the German polices. The French concept of immigration 
choisie has as much to do with keeping the ‘wrong’ immigrants out as it does 
with getting the ‘right’ ones in. The historical institutional structures of the 
welfare states matter in French and German admission policies, but the way 
they matter is highly contextual and contingent on the prevailing percep-
tions of migration among the political and governmental elite. 
Elizabeth Onasch and Marjukka Weide explore the extent of national 
differences in the perceptions of immigrants and the nation in their com-
parison of the national discourse within French and Finnish civic integra-
tion programmes. The authors argue that although civic integration pro-
grammes have proliferated across Europe and have been the subject of 
increased coordination and soft policy development at the level of the Eu-
ropean Union, it is possible to identify distinct national models within the 
French and Finnish policy discourses. In line with theories about policy 
convergence, the French and Finnish cases have developed roughly simi-
lar policy tools for integration, despite very different histories of immigra-
tion and national institutions. Accordingly, the authors identify similarities 
in the discourse surrounding the civic integration programmes in the two 
countries, specifically in terms of the programme justifications and the rep-
resentations of national values and the targeted immigrant groups. Weide 
and Onasch suggest that the role of distinct national models becomes ap-
parent in the way French and Finnish programme discourses frame and 
interpret the similar discursive elements, such as representations of targeted 
immigrant groups as being traditional and having unequal gender relations, 
in nationally-specific ways. The figure of the Finnish welfare state and a 
particular brand of multiculturalism specific to an extensive welfare state 
define, to a large extent, the Finnish national model, in contrast to that of 
France, which emphasises various interpretations of republican assimilation 
and ‘civic’ political belonging. 
introduction
21
Roberto Scaramuzzino’s chapter on the participation of immigrant or-
ganisations in the Equal programme in Italy and Sweden addresses the in-
terplay between the local, national, and supranational contexts. Scaramuzz-
ino utilises the concept of political opportunity structures, as specified in 
relation to immigrant organisations by Bengtsson (2007), and analyses the 
factors that determine immigrant organisations’ access to the opportunity 
structure of the Equal programme within Italy and Sweden. He argues that 
the type of organisation and its initial level of resources, skills, and connec-
tions determine how an immigrant organisation will be able to take advan-
tage of the opportunities provided by Equal. While the Equal programme 
seems to have offered new political opportunities and access to new re-
sources, it leaves most immigrant organisations in a position of dependence 
on stronger actors. Scaramuzzino finds that the activities of the immigrant 
organisations that were carried out in Italy and Sweden were surprisingly 
similar, and thus suggests that the Equal programme has contributed to a 
Europeanisation of national civil societies.
Concluding remarks 
This volume adds to a growing corpus of research literature25 that exam-
ines the multifaceted relationship between migration and the welfare state. 
It does not answer the normative question of whether immigration is ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ for the welfare state, a political question that has gained much trac-
tion in current research on migration and integration. Instead, it challenges 
this question by showing the complex interplay of migration, welfare state 
structures, ideas and diverse political actors. The welfare state model is not 
an empirical entity as such and as an abstraction, it cannot be harmed by 
immigration through a process of simple causality. Politicians and other po-
litical actors can make changes to those socio-political arrangements that 
25 In addition to the literature referenced above, see, e.g., Brochmann, Grete & Anniken Hagelund 
(2010) (eds) Velferdens grenser. Innvandringspolitikk og velferdsstat i Skandinavia 1945–2010. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget; Carmel, Emma, Alfio Cerami & Theodoros Papadopoulos (eds) (2011) Migra­
tion and welfare in the new Europe: social protection and the challenges of integration. Bristol: Policy; 
Bommes, Michael & Giuseppe Sciortino (eds) (2011) Foggy social structures: irregular migration, 
European labour markets and the welfare state. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
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are considered foundational to the (historical) welfare state while referring 
to migration and immigrants as the reason for these changes. However, 
immigration can also, perhaps paradoxically, strengthen welfare states by 
providing an electoral platform for welfare nationalism. Furthermore, the 
welfare state, as a normative and institutional framework, can shape im-
migration policy. 
The entangled relationship of migration and welfare regimes depends 
on the political process, even if migration ultimately springs from a de-
mographical change in any given society. This volume shows the political 
nature of the relationship to be transnational, discursive, institutional, and 
open to the agency of organisational and individual actors. The chapters 
in this volume also highlight the versatility of the welfare state as a symbol 
within discourse surrounding immigration; the ideals of welfare states can 
be used to justify the exclusion of immigrants as well as support multicul-
tural policies and the expansion of rights to irregular migrants. It is also 
important to remember that migrant groups – people crossing the highly 
regulated borders of the globalised world – are heterogeneous and diverse 
categories that, to a great extent, are products of political, social and cultural 
constructions and re-constructions. These constructions and re-construc-
tions are also conditioned by the actions of the migrants – beginning with 
the act of emigration, whatever its final outcome. 
The chapters in this volume make apparent that immigration seemingly 
has an effect on the welfare state as a whole, from how it is conceptualised in 
political discourse to how its institutional arrangements are re-configured, 
and that the welfare state, in turn, has an effect on the reception of immi-
grants. These relations are, however, hardly surprising considering that im-
migration lays bare the fundamental question of inclusion that lies at the 
heart of the national welfare state project(s): who is to be included in the 
project and through what means? Gary Freeman also made this point in his 
seminal article on the welfare state and migration: ‘When the welfare state is 
seen as something for “them” paid by “us”, its days as a consensual solution 
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to societal problems are numbered.’26 The key word here is ‘seen’; how ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ are conceptualised in public and political discourse matters in 
everyday life as much as it does in the formulation and implementation of 
policy. The case studies within this volume demonstrate how the ideals and 
institutions of the welfare state itself can provide frameworks for defining 
the contents and boundaries of belonging, as well as the possibilities for in-
clusion. The current salience of the ‘threat’ discourse or framing is evident in 
many of the chapters, but the volume also includes chapters that show that 
the construction of a ‘them’ is not always done in order to demonise and os-
tracise. The construction of collectives for progressive policy purposes is, of 
course, nothing new when considering the history of welfare state regimes: 
it is a constitutional feature, at least of the universal welfare regimes.
The post-war welfare state in all its manifestations might be crumbling 
under the pressure of globalisation and neoliberalism, but many welfare re-
gimes are still standing and their relationships to migration and immigrants 
are, as this volume shows, a politically open affair. Academics stressing the 
need for more research is somewhat of a cliché, yet this is precisely what the 
findings presented in this volume indicate; what is now needed is not over 
generalised dichotomies, but diligent and varied research on the different 
aspects of the welfare state and migration that avoids the conceptual pitfalls 
of contemporary political discourse. More studies of the welfare state’s con-
struction and re-construction of immigrants and the creation of immigrant 
policies on the basis of these constructions are likely to come in the near 
future. We look forward to reading them.
26 Freeman 1986, 62.
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CHAPTER 1
The difference white ethnics made:
The multiculturalist turn of Sweden 
in comparison to the cases 
of Canada and Denmark
mats wickström
In 1975, the Swedish parliament unanimously accepted a new immigrant- 
and minority policy centred around three general policy aims: equality, 
freedom of choice and co-operation. The term multiculturalism1 was not 
used to describe the new policy, but the policy goals embodied the meaning 
of the concept as it later has been defined in regards to policy: a policy or 
body of policies that specifically recognizes and promotes the unique cul-
tural characteristics of all ethnic groups in a society and promotes the idea 
that the maintenance of ethnocultural groups enriches the whole of society. 
According to this definition, Sweden officially introduced a number of mul-
ticulturalist declarations and policies (MCPs) in the middle of the 1970’s, 
thus the country turned to multiculturalism. Not only did Sweden adopt a 
multiculturalist integration policy in 1975, the tenants of the idea of multi-
culturalism were also inscribed into the Swedish constitution in 1976 as a 
direct consequence of the new general policy: ‘Opportunities should be pro-
moted for ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities to preserve and develop 
a cultural and social life of their own’2. The idea of multiculturalism there-
fore included a normative rejection of what was and is conceptualized as its 
1 Mångkulturalism or multikulturalism in Swedish.
2 Regeringsformen, SFS 1974:152 (as amendend by SFS 1976: 871), Chapter 1, Article 2, Paragraph 4. 
Stockholm: Sveriges Riksdag.
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opposite; the ideal of homogeneity and all the social and political ills that 
are perceived to steam from this ideal, e.g. assimilationist policies. Follow-
ing this shift, the idea of multiculturalism became, at least in the sphere of 
public rhetoric, the dominant idea in the governance of ethnic relations. The 
idea or concept of multiculturalism is manifested in the definition of multi-
culturalist policy made above and it’s primarily the emergence of the idea of 
multiculturalism in Sweden that will be explored in this chapter – how did 
the idea emerge and why did Sweden ‘choose’ to base its new policies on it? 
The MCPs themselves and their implementation is therefore not included in 
this study, which focuses on the ideational and ultimately ideological shift 
to multiculturalism from earlier, more assimilationist, ideas and the policies 
– or lack thereof – that had manifested these ideas. 
Four years before the Swedish turn, a similar turn had taken place in 
Canada when the Policy of Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework 
was introduced, making Canada the first country to adopt a general mul-
ticulturalist policy. The Canadian turn also precipitated similar, officially 
marked, turns in two other British settler countries, Australia and New Zea-
land, in the 1970’s.3 Sweden was, however, the first non-settler country to 
officially declare a policy of multiculturalism. This chapter will analyze the 
Swedish turn first by mirroring it to the Canadian turn, then by contrast-
ing it to a case where the dog (of multiculturalism) did not bark, even if the 
multiculturalist bark of Sweden could be heard across the strait of Øresund: 
Denmark. The Swedish turn to multiculturalism was not simultaneous with 
or followed by a Danish turn, even though Denmark had also become ‘mul-
ticultural’ in a descriptive sense due to labour immigration during in the 
1960’s and 1970’s. Historian Ulf Hedetoft has emphasized the similarities 
of Sweden and Denmark when discussing the lack of historical path depen-
dency in regards to multiculturalism:
3 Banting, Keith, Will Kymlicka, Richard Johnston & Stuart Soroka (2006) ‘Do Multiculturalism 
Policies erode the welfare state? An empirical analysis’. In Banting, Keith & Will Kymlicka (eds) Mul­
ticulturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Advanced Democracies. Oxford: 
Oxford University, 55.
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The point is […] to demonstrate that in spite of similar historical 
paths towards modernity and similar political and social structures, 
small welfare-states based on culturally homogenous histories do 
not necessarily spawn assimilationist integration policies.4 
Hedetoft argues that Sweden, with its official multiculturalism, is a di-
verging case. In a more historical and a comparative perspective, it is easy 
to agree with this assessment; the divergent paths of the two neighbouring 
countries, or, for that matter, the divergent path of Sweden compared to 
most of the rest of Western Europe, in embracing the idea of multicultur-
alism, would have been nearly impossible to predict in the middle of the 
1960’s. Homogeneity, or even uniformity, was an uncontested political norm 
in both countries at the time, perhaps more so in Sweden than in Denmark.5 
The multiculturalist turn in Sweden also stands out when compared to 
the other multiculturalist turns of the 1970’s. Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand were all British settler societies and not ‘old’ ethnically-homoge-
nous nation-states like Sweden. Sweden is, then, an outlier in both Scandi-
navia and the rest of Western Europe, where the labour immigration period 
ended without any implementation of (immigrant) multiculturalism.6 By 
comparing the Swedish case with the Canadian and Danish cases this chap-
ter hopes to shed new light on the multiculturalist turn in Sweden and bring 
into view some significant historical contingences that have been over-
looked in previous, nationally- centred, research. The comparison between 
Denmark and Sweden is particularly salient, as Denmark and Sweden are 
traditionally assumed to be structurally and historically similar. Contempo-
rary public and academic discourse on migration and integration often con-
4 Hedetoft, Ulf (2010) ’Denmark versus multiculturalism’. In Verovec, Steven & Susanne Wessendorf 
(eds) The Multiculturalism Backlash: European discourses, policies and practices. London & New York: 
Routledge, 112.
5 This tentative assessment of the political cultures in postwar Sweden and Denmark is primarily 
based on the fact that the social democrats did not become as dominant in Denmark as they were in 
Sweden. Cf. e.g. Christiansen, Niels Finn & Klaus Petersen (2001) ‘The Dynamics of Social Solidar-
ity. The Danish Welfare State 1900–2000’. Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 26, Issue 3, 177–196.
6 During the 1970’s, The Netherlands adopted a semi-segregationist policy in line with the Dutch tra-
dition of pillarization in order to facilitate a return of the labour immigrants, not to integrate them 
as part of a (new) multicultural society. 
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structs Denmark and Sweden as sibling opposites, and perhaps this chapter 
can provide some historical insight on this particular aspect of the sibling 
difference. The comparative perspective in this chapter is not limited to a 
comparison of analytically un-entangled cases; it also includes a tentative 
analysis of the transnational features of the emergence of the idea multi-
culturalism in Sweden. As historians Haupt and Kocha have convincingly 
argued, transnational or entanglement history and comparative history are 
not at odds with each other but, rather, complementary ways of conducting 
historical research. Transfers and entanglements cannot be properly under-
stood without comparisons and comparative history should consider the 
connections and entanglements between the units of comparison.7 
The multiculturalist turn of Sweden
The multiculturalist turn in Sweden has been covered— albeit, often su-
perficially— by many researchers in different fields since its political for-
malization in 1975. The turn has garnered the most attention among social 
scientists, but when it comes to the actual mapping of historical process, 
one work, which most social scientific accounts also refer to, stands out: 
historian Lars Erik Hansen’s dissertation on the postwar history of Swed-
ish immigrant policy.8 Hansen’s work provides an important outline of the 
development of Swedish policy and public debate from the end of WWII 
to the adaptation of the MCPs in 1975. However, even though the book is a 
fine empirical work, it does not track the process in any great depth and is 
theoretically sketchy. In a recent publication, political scientist Karin Borevi 
tried to answer why the multiculturalist turn took place based on the expla-
nations forwarded in the Swedish literature and argued that one answer can 
be found in the radical Zeitgeist (‘the spirit of the times’) of the 1960’s and 
7 Kocka, Jürgen & Heinz-Gerald Haupt (2009) ‘Comparison and Beyond: Traditions, Scope and 
Perspectives of Comparative History’. In Kocka, Jürgen & Heinz-Gerald Haupt (eds) Comparative 
and transnational History : Central European approaches and new perspectives. New York: Berghahn 
Books, 9. 
8 Hansen, Lars-Erik (2001) Jämlikhet och valfrihet: en studie av den svenska invandrarpolitikens fram­
växt. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
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1970’s.9 Although an understanding of the Zeitgeist or public philosophy 
of the time is of utmost importance when considering context, we cannot 
leave our search for answers at this somewhat metaphysical level of analysis. 
Borevi also refers to another explanation related to the catch-all concept of 
Zeitgeist, the hypothesis of political scientists Demker and Malmström that 
the active foreign policy of Sweden largely determined Swedish integration 
policies.10 This is an anachronistic argument that, among other things, dis-
regards the fact that what is now called multiculturalism was not in any way 
established as an international norm in the 1970’s, least of all in regards to 
immigrant groups or minority groups of recent immigrant origin.11 A more 
empirically and historically based explanation is Borevi’s own argument, re-
lying on a first hand observation made by the Swedish immigration scholar 
and government expert Tomas Hammar, about the pivotal role of experts in 
shaping Swedish policies. This argument can be empirically explored and 
combined with another explanation Borevi briefly touches upon: the role 
of ethnic activism in facilitating the multiculturalist turn.12 These two ex-
plaining factors, ethnic activism and experts, will, along with the idea of 
multiculturalism that bound them together, constitute the analytical focal 
point of this chapter. In short: the existing research on the multiculturalist 
turn in Sweden has almost exclusively focused on Swedish structural condi-
tions and the agency of established Swedish institutions and organizations. 
Ideas and ‘external factors,’ like the composition of postwar immigration, 
and the agency of the ‘objects’ of multiculturalism, i.e. ethnic groups and 
members of these groups, in advancing the idea of multiculturalism, have 
been overlooked. Parliament and the political parties were, to be sure, for-
mally the prime determinants of policy, but the ideas that influence and 
legitimatize policy changes are not always generated within the government, 
9 Borevi, Karin (2010b) ’Sverige: mångkulturalismens flaggskepp i Norden’. In Brochmann, Grete 
& Anniken Hagelund (eds) Velferdens grenser. Innvandringspolitikk og velferdsstat i Skandinavia 
1945–2010. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 68.
10 Demker, Marie & Cecilia Malmström (1999) Ingenmansland? Svensk immigrationspolitik i utrikes­
politisk belysning. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 150. 
11 Kymlicka, Will (2007b) Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity. 
Oxford: Oxford University, 176.
12 Borevi 2010b, 69–70.
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in the halls of administration, or in the research-policy nexus. The make-up 
of immigrant groups and the political agendas of the groups (sometimes 
transnational and/or deeply dependent on the perceived status of the group 
in the host society) are also important factors to assess when studying the 
ideational side of ethno-politics. 
The argument presented here, that the postwar immigrants themselves 
were important in facilitating the multiculturalist turn through the intro-
duction of new ideas and agenda setting, does not preclude the analysis and 
findings of existing research but complements it. By examining multicul-
turalism as a political idea that, like all political ideas, has a history that 
is constituted by the agency of actors advancing or opposing it and by the 
historical contexts associated with and framing the advancement of the 
idea, it is possible to gain a more empirically underpinned and analytical 
understanding of the history of multiculturalism. The emergence of the idea 
of multiculturalism is a historical phenomenon and can therefore be stud-
ied using the methods and theoretical perspectives of historical research as 
well as insights from the field of ideational research. Historians have for a 
long time known that ideas matter and the theoretical concepts of ideation-
ally- oriented social science can, perhaps, provide historians with tools for 
explaining how ideas matter and also help translate the results of historians 
into an idiom understood by all scholars of ideas and politics. Theoretical 
concepts of ideational research like ‘framing’, ‘agenda setting’ and ‘opportu-
nity’ will therefore be tentatively used in order to refine the arguments made 
in this chapter and to convey its results.13 
Sources and methodological tools
The Canadian and Danish cases which are contrasted to the Swedish case 
will primarily be presented using research literature on ethnicity and poli-
tics in the two countries. The presentation of the Swedish case will combine 
research literature and a selection of primary sources in order to empirically 
13 For a theoretical discussion on these concepts and ideational research in general, see, e.g. Béland, 
Daniel & Robert Henry Cox (eds) (2010) Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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ground the thesis about the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in 
Swedish that is forwarded. The primary sources used in this chapter have 
been selected from a large body of source material collected for the author’s 
dissertation project. Even though this source material has been selected in 
order to carry the narrative, or process tracing, it is representative of the 
larger body of source material14.
The source material, as it pertains to the emergence of the idea of mul-
ticulturalism in Sweden, has been primarily analyzed using methodological 
tools developed by Quentin Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock.15 This means that 
an actor-centred analysis of the textual material has been employed and the 
following heuristic questions asked: Who tried to do what through the use 
of (political) language? What authorial intentions can be inferred from an 
intertextual analysis of a text or recorded speech act? How have the claims 
and ideas presented through speech-acts been received and how have they 
spread? The comparative method deployed in the chapter also takes a cue 
from ideational scholars Béland & Cox, who argue that one way forward 
for ideational analysis is to not only select cases based on the outcome, but 
to also include cases with similar starting conditions in order to strengthen 
the inferences made by ideational researchers.16 Their suggestion for the ad-
vancement of comparative ideational analysis is taken up in this chapter by 
selecting two comparison cases for the Swedish case; one (Canada) with a 
similar outcome, and one with similar starting conditions (Denmark). 
White ethnics and the multiculturalist turn of Canada 
The introduction of the policy of multiculturalism by Prime Minister 
Trudeau in the Canadian parliament on the 8th of October, 1971, was not a 
dramatic event. The new policy was supported across party lines and largely 
came about as a bi-product of the most significant Canadian  political con-
14 This body includes archival material, published and un-published governmental reports, books, 
debate articles (newspaper and journal), news articles and interviews.
15 See, e.g., Skinner, Quentin (2002) Visions of politics. Vol. 1: Regarding method. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press; Pocock, J. G. A. (2009) Political thought and history: essays on theory and 
method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
16 Béland & Cox (2010), 16–17.
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flict of the 1960’s: the status of Quebec and francophone Canada in the Ca-
nadian federation. Tellingly, the ideational basis for the policy was formu-
lated ad hoc in the last report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism 
and Biculturalism (the B&B commission). The B&B commission had been 
established in 1963 to defuse the tension created by the Quiet Revolution 
in Quebec and it is worth noting that the policy of multiculturalism was 
explicitly placed ‘within a bilingual framework’. However, the policy of mul-
ticulturalism did not solely materialize in a top-down effort stemming from 
a sudden concern on the part of the Anglophone and Francophone Canadi-
an elite for the ethnocultural identity of the non-charter groups of Canada. 
Canada’s policy of multiculturalism was demanded by Canadians who Will 
Kymlicka has categorized as ‘white ethnics’; people of Ukrainian, Polish, 
Finnish, German, Dutch and Jewish descent. According to Kymlicka, the 
political process during the formative period of multiculturalism in Canada, 
1963–1971, was ‘driven by white ethnics’.17 
In fact, the first person to use the concepts multicultural and multicul-
turalism in the Canadian parliament was not PM Trudeau, but Canadian-
Ukrainian senator Paul Yuzyk. In his 1964 maiden speech in the senate, 
Yuzyk made a strongly-worded plea for the cultural recognition of what he 
called ‘the third element’ of Canadian society: 
The third element ethnic or cultural groups should receive the sta-
tus of co-partners, who would be guaranteed the right to perpetuate 
their mother tongues and cultures [---].18 
Several scholars have pinpointed the Canadian-Ukrainian claims for 
recognition and a more multiculturalistic conception of Canada during 
the 1960’s as the most influential of the claims made by the white ethnic 
groups.19 There were several reasons for the activity and influence of the Ca-
nadian-Ukrainian group and its lobbyists. The Canadian-Ukrainian com-
17 Kymlicka, Will (2007a) ‘The Canadian Model of Diversity in a Comparative Perspective’. In Stephen 
Tierney (ed.) Multiculturalism and the Canadian Constitution. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 70.
18 Yuzyk, Paul (1965) ‘Canada: A Multicultural Nation’. Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. 7, 23–31. 
19 Pal, Leslie A. (1993) Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism and Feminism in 
Canada. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 210.
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munity was well established and could present itself as one of the groups 
that had settled the prairie during the end of the 19th century and early 20th 
century when the first wave of Ukrainians arrived in Canada. The group 
argued that it had contributed and continued to contribute to Canadian 
society. The group was also relatively large; 2.59 per cent of the Canadian 
population was registered as being of Ukrainian origin in the 1961 census.20 
The group’s most important characteristic in terms of being able to advance 
the idea of multiculturalism was, however, its strong (in relation to other 
white, non-charter, groups) sense of ethnic/national identity. The group 
also included politically active elements as a direct consequence of the third 
wave of Ukrainian immigration during and after the Second World War 
and following the re-establishment of Soviet hegemony over Ukraine. Com-
pared to other white ethnic groups in Canada, a significant proportion of 
Ukrainian-Canadians displayed a Diaspora mentality that was strengthened 
by religious and anti-communist sentiment. The homeland was existential-
ly threatened by anti-religious Soviet imperialism, and it was therefore a 
Ukrainian duty to keep the nation alive in the Diaspora.21 
Canadian multiculturalism, then, grew out of a political climate in which 
the relationship between Francophone and Anglophone was at the forefront 
of the political agenda. According to Kymlicka, multiculturalism was ‘a way 
of deflecting opposition for the apparent privileging of French and English 
that was implicit in the introduction of official bilingualism’.22 This opposition 
was carried out mainly by Ukrainian-Canadians looking for recognition and 
support, in the (from the end of the 1960’s) officially bilingual country. It was 
probably no coincidence that PM Trudeau announced the policy of multicul-
turalism on the 8th of October 1971, – he addressed the tenth Ukrainian-Ca-
nadian Congress the next day and was, according to one of the leading Ukrai-
nian-Canadian activists, Manoly Lupul, ‘hailed as a messiah at the banquet’.23 
20 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1969) Book IV The Cultural Contribution of 
the Other Ethnic Groups (1969). Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 248. 
21 Lalande, Julia (2006) ‘The Roots of Multiculturalism: Ukrainian-Canadian Involvement in the Mul-
ticulturalism Discussion of the 1960s as an Example of the Position of the “Third Force”’. Canadian 
Ethnic Studies, Vol. 38, Issue 1, 47–64. 
22 Kymlicka, Will (1998) Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada. Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 40.
23 Lupul, Manoly R. (2005) The Politics of Multiculturalism: Ukrainian­Canadian Memoir. Edmonton: 
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 169. 
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The history of Canada as a settler country and the tradition of conceptu-
alizing Canada as pluralist in contrast to the American melting-pot, suggest 
that the historical conditions were favourable for some sort of official recog-
nition of ethnocultural groups at a time when the reformist welfare state was 
expanding.24 However, the impact of ethnic lobbying, and the characteristics 
of the lobbying ethnic group, must still be emphasized in the birth of Ca-
nadian multiculturalism. Most of the white ethnics were Canadian citizens 
with the concomitant right to vote (incidentally the policy received bi-parti-
sanship support) and were, according to Kymlicka, seen to be ‘fully commit-
ted to the basic liberal democratic principles’ of Canada, and as belonging to 
‘Western civilization’, which, in this context, did not include communism.25 
For instance, Senator Yuzyk emphasized the democratic and Christian na-
ture of all Canadians in his speech on multiculturalism in 1964.26 
The introduction of multiculturalism in Canada was, to conclude, facili-
tated by ethnic activism of the ostensibly ‘white’, ‘Christian’, and anti-com-
munist non-charter groups of Canada during the 1960’s. The Francophone 
claims for recognition were echoed in the claims of the ‘third element’ and 
the introduction of official bilingualism and later multiculturalism is a testa-
ment of not only the politically reformist climate of the 1960’s and 1970’s, 
but also the impact of the politically charged calls for recognition in an eth-
noculturally diverse country. In hindsight, the introduction of multicultur-
alism in Canada can appear almost pre-determined – the settler country 
lacked a strong (ethno) national identity and had a tradition of pluralism 
and of successful immigrant integration – why would a number of relatively 
modest claims for recognition not have been met by the (liberal) govern-
ment in an age of reform and economic prosperity? Keeping this case in 
mind, we now turn to Sweden and Denmark, which were both quintessen-
tial ethnically and religiously homogenous, ‘old’, European nation-states at 
the end of the Second World War. Both countries experienced historically 
24 Breton, Raymond (1986) ‘Multiculturalism and Canadian Nation-Building’. In Cairns, Alan & 
Cynthia Williams (eds) The Politics of Gender, Ethnicity and Language in Canada. Tornoto, Buffalo, 
London: Toronto University Press, 40. 
25 Kymlicka 2007a, 71.
26 Yuzyk 1965, 31. 
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high levels of labour immigration during a period of high economic growth 
in the 1960’s and early 1970’s, which, like in Canada, was also a period of 
major political reforms and value liberalization. However, only Sweden 
would follow a path similar to that of Canada, which shows us that in uni-
versal welfare states, the official implementation of multiculturalism did not 
and does not automatically follow from an increase in ethnic diversity. 
 
Sweden before the turn 
Both Denmark and Sweden received a large number of war refugees dur-
ing and after the Second World War; however, almost all of the refugees in 
Denmark, who were mostly Germans, left the country during the 1940’s. 
Returning home was not an option for the Baltic refugees in Sweden, and 
although some of the Baltic refugees were forced to return to the Soviet 
Union, ca. 30  000 remained in Sweden. In contrast, there were ca. 6 000 
Baltic refugees in Denmark in 1945, but only 400 stayed.27 Most of these 
refugees came from Estonia and while in the Swedish refugee camps, the 
Estonians already established schools and a network of organizations, which 
were initially met with Swedish resistance. The Estonians did not heed the 
exhortation of the Swedish authorities and press and persevered in their ef-
forts to establish an Estonian community in exile. Estonians and their Swed-
ish supporters continuously lobbied the government and the Minister of 
Education, Tage Erlander, who eventually granted them their wish to estab-
lish schools of their own outside of the camps. The schools, most of which 
were provisional, were not supported financially by the state and were only 
allowed on the condition that the Estonians would be able to support and 
run the schools themselves.28 The Diaspora mentality of the Estonians in 
Sweden and the commitment to maintain the Estonian language and culture 
in exile, played an important part in the emergence of Swedish multicul-
turalism, just like the Diaspora mentality of similarly displaced Ukrainian 
27 Persson, Hans-Åke & Håkan Arvidsson (2011) Med kluven tunga – Europa, migrationen och integra­
tionen. Malmö: Liber, 213. 
28 Rebas, Aho (1986) ’Skolans roll i samspelet mellan minoritets- och majoritetssamhället’. In Eriksson, 
Lars-Gunnar (ed.) De första båtflyktingarna: en antologi om balterna i Sverige. Norrköping: SIV, 
157–158. 
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refugees played its part in the introduction of Canadian multiculturalism. 
Sweden also received 10 000 Jewish refugees as a result of the war, which 
increased the Jewish population by 65 per cent compared to its pre-war size 
and revitalized Judaism in Sweden. In 1955, the Hillel School was founded 
by the refugees in order to offer the Jewish children of Stockholm a more 
traditional and Zionist education, and in 1963, the Jewish Centre of Stock-
holm was established.29 
When considering the establishment of the Estonian schools and the 
Hillel School, it is important to remember that the Swedish comprehensive 
school system, one of cornerstones of postwar social democratic Sweden, 
was not fully implemented until the early 1960’s. When the nine year com-
prehensive school system was finalized in 1962, the Estonian schools and 
the Jewish Hillel School became visible anomalies in the eyes of the Swed-
ish social democratic elite and the supporters of the comprehensive school 
system in the other parties. When labour immigration increased during the 
1960’s, the Jewish and Estonian schools, and the provisional support that 
was granted to them on a yearly basis, became even more ‘problematic,’ as 
many politicians saw them as a dangerous precedent that other, larger, im-
migration groups might try to follow.30 Until the multicultural reforms of 
1975, the stance of the Swedish social democratic party (which ruled Swe-
den from 1932 to 1976) on the Estonians and Jews was not one of active 
assimilation, but rather tolerance with the expectation of assimilation. 
The war time immigration of refugees that refused to quietly assimilate 
brought not only, from a social democratic viewpoint, a breach in the long 
nourished dream of a uniform and equality-producing school system, but 
also the question of (minority) ethnic identity into Swedish politics, albeit 
on its margins. Although the ethnic identity of the majority had been po-
liticized before and during the war, in the intellectual climate of the postwar 
period, concepts like nationalism and conservatism quickly lost ground. 
29 Elazar, Daniel J., Adina Weiss Liberles & Werner Simcha (1984) The Jewish Communities of Scandi­
navia. Lanham: University Press of America [for the] Center for Jewish Community Studies of the 
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 35.
30 Gür, Thomas (1996) Staten och nykomlingarna. En studie av den svenska invandrarpolitikens idéer.  
Stockholm: City University Press, 152–159.
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The key concepts of the Swedish postwar intellectual elite included univer-
salism, equality, progressivism, and internationalism.31 As a consequence 
of the war, a newly organized ethnic group, the Estonians, was established 
in Sweden and an old ethnic group, the Jews, was revitalized. By the time 
historically large numbers of labour immigrants started arriving, primar-
ily from the neighbouring country of Finland in the 1960’s32, many of the 
Estonian and Jewish refugees had become integrated into Swedish society in 
such a way that it was possible for them to voice demands for cultural rec-
ognition in Swedish and in the political language(s) of Swedish society. This 
was an important development, for without sufficient language skills (in a 
broad sense) it is nigh impossible to try to set an agenda, even if the society 
is democratic and influential public arenas are formally available. 
The introduction, promotion and impact of the idea of 
multiculturalism in Sweden 
In 1964 Sweden’s biggest and most influential daily Dagens Nyheter pub-
lished the article ‘Utlänningsproblemet i Sverige’ (The problem of foreigners 
in Sweden) by the Jewish refugee David Schwarz. With this article Schwarz 
became the first person to question the concept of assimilation in a promi-
nent public forum in the postwar immigration era.33 The article sparked a 
debate in Dagens Nyheter about the ‘foreigners’, a category that in this con-
text included every non-ethnic Swede in Sweden, and their social and cul-
tural needs. Other immigrants joined Schwarz in his plea for recognition 
and tolerance of non-Swedish groups in Sweden. According to one of the 
activists, Estonia-born Sven Alur Reinans, the debate in Dagens Nyheter in-
cluded, like subsequent debates, coordination on the part of at least some 
of the participants who were in favour of what, at roughly the same time, 
31 Östling Johan (2008), Nazismens sensmoral: svenska erfarenheter i andra världskrigets efterdyning. 
Stockholm: Atlantis, 192–193.
32 The labour immigration of Finns, and later of Yugoslavs, Greeks and Turks, was caused by the labour 
demand of the Swedish economy which was growing rapidly during this time and facilitated, in the 
case of the Finns, by the common Nordic labour market which had been established in 1954 with 
concomitant intra-Nordic labour and social rights. 
33 Schwarz, David (1964) ’Utlänningsproblemet i Sverige’. Dagens Nyheter (DN) 21 Oct. 
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was called multiculturalism by senator Yuzyk in Canada.34 This first seri-
ous attempt at agenda setting was, however, not an instant success. When 
Dagens Nyheter summarized the debate in an editorial, the paper professed 
sympathy for the calls for tolerance, but rejected the idea that the Swedish 
state had any responsibility for the maintenance of ‘traditional culture’. The 
state did not assist the nonconformist farmer from the rural parts of Swe-
den in maintaining his way of life when he moved to the city in search of 
work and neither should the state provide this service for his non-Swedish 
equivalents. According to the paper, modernization and the march of prog-
ress were unavoidable facts of life for both native and foreign born.35 Still, 
by giving the activists space to air their claims and proposals and by treating 
these concerns as valid, the debate in Dagens Nyheter set in motion a change 
in political discourse that would be fulfilled to such a degree that the rebut-
tal made by Dagens Nyheter in 1964 would seem politically reactionary and 
morally inappropriate just a few years later. This discursive change was, to 
be sure, made possible by the reality of historically large-scale immigration 
to Sweden: an ‘immigration field’ was being constituted by and within the 
administrative structures of the welfare state and as long as immigration 
levels remained high the ‘immigrant question’, which by government deci-
sion had gained status as a pertinent social question in 196636, was not going 
to disappear. 
The advocacy of Schwarz and the other activists kept the idea of multi-
culturalism alive both in the public sphere and in the halls of government. 
When assessing the impact of the activists, particularly Schwarz, one has 
to keep in mind that Sweden was a small country and its public and po-
litical arena was physically much smaller during this time than it is today, 
even if it might have been intellectually broader. In the middle of the 1960’s 
Sweden had one TV-channel, three national radio channels (no local radio 
stations) and the home and office phone numbers of the members of cabi-
34 Author’s interview with Sven Alur Reinans 17 Dec. 2009.
35 ’Att vara utlänning’ [Unsigned editorial] (1964). DN 24 Dec.
36 The Working Group on Immigrant Issues (Arbetsgruppen för invandrarfrågor), the precursor to the 
Swedish Immigration Board, was established in 1966.
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net were listed in the phone book.37 The Government Offices also employed 
a fraction of the people it does today. When Schwarz at the beginning of 
1966 wanted to pitch his case for multiculturalism to the Prime Minister he 
simply called Olle Svenning, one of only four state secretaries at the Prime 
Minister’s Office, who then arranged a meeting.38 
In 1965 Schwarz introduced the term ‘the multicultural society’39, which 
he embedded with notions of ethnocultural recognition, progress and so-
cietal harmony. The multicultural society, conceptually equivalent to the 
term multiculturalism as it is defined in this chapter, was contrasted to the 
reactionary concept of assimilation and old-fashioned notions of Swedish 
homogeneity. Swedish assimilationism was, according to Schwarz and the 
other activists, an unfortunate product of Sweden’s insular history and it 
would have dire consequences if it was not eradicated and replaced by the 
new political ideal of the multicultural society, i.e. multiculturalism. As-
similationism would produce mentally unstable immigrants in both the 
first and second generation and conflict between the oppressed minority 
groups and the Swedish majority. For the sake of the immigrants and for the 
whole of Swedish society, general political reforms that recognized and sup-
ported the culture of non-ethnic Swedes in Sweden were needed.40 In 1965 
Schwarz also personally influenced future PM Olof Palme, then Minister 
of Education, who subsequently incorporated the multiculturalist idiom of 
the ethnic activists into his political discourse. It had, since the 1930’s, been 
customary for a prominent Swede to hold a radio speech on Christmas day 
to the Swedes abroad, but Palme broke with this tradition by nominally di-
recting his speech to the foreigners in Sweden, although the speech was in 
fact aimed at the Swedish majority. In the speech Palme stressed the need for 
the Swedes to make the spirit of internationalism, which according to Palme 
was especially strong in Sweden, a reality also in daily life by accepting and 
37 Hägg, Göran (2005) Välfärdsåren. Svensk historia 1945–1986. Stockholm: Månpocket, 45. 
38 Svenning, Olle (1996) ‘Han har levt ett liv i kamp’. Aftonbladet 20 Oct. 
39 Det flerkulturella samhället or, synonymously, det mångkulturella samhället. Both were used from 
this moment on. 
40 Wickström, Mats (forthcoming) ‘Conceptual change in postwar Sweden: the marginalization of 
assimilation and the introduction of integration’. In Kivisto, Peter & Östen Wahlbeck (eds) Debating 
Nordic Multiculturalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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helping the ‘harbingers of internationalism’, i.e. the immigrants. Palme 
also told the Swedish people that the immigrants should not be forced to 
‘become just like us’, as they wanted to, and would always be, different.41 
The immigrants would become ‘different Swedes’ Palme claimed, using an 
expression coined by the refugee worker Inga Gottfarb in her support of 
Schwarz in 1964.42 Palme combined one of the key concepts of his political 
life, internationalism, with the multiculturalist idiom of the ethnic activists 
and thus embedded their arguments in a persuasive ideational framework. 
Ten years later Palme, who was now PM, oversaw the introduction of the 
multiculturalist policy. A statement also made in 1965 by Palme’s mentor 
and boss, PM Tage Erlander, on the racial upheavals in the US, was probably 
more in line with the general assumptions about the blessings of homoge-
neity within the social democratic party and the Swedish mainstream: ‘We 
Swedes live in an infinitely more happy condition [than Americans]. The 
population of our country is homogenous, not only in regards to race but 
also in many other aspects.’43 
In 1966 Schwarz published the anthology Svenska minoriteter (Swedish 
minorities) which included articles written by experts, mostly social scien-
tists, on immigration and ethnic groups in Sweden. The title of the book 
contained a political statement as the concept of (ethnic) minority, which 
historically carried international judicial and political connotations that a 
term like immigrant group lacked, was applied to all non-Swedish groups 
in Sweden. The ethnic activists tried to appropriate the concept of minority 
in order to advance their cause by arguing that the established and growing 
(both in size and in quantity) ethnic minorities in Sweden needed recog-
nition and support. The immigrants were framed as minorities or at least 
as minorities in the making by the activists. The minority concept did not, 
however, have any judicial bearing in Swedish law44 even if Sweden was 
41 A letter from David Schwartz (sic) 10 Dec. 1965, Talet till utlandssvenskarna 25 Dec. 1965 (Volym 
2.4.0: 006, Archive of Olof Palme, Labor Movement Archives and Library [Arab] Stockholm).
42 Gottfarb, Inga (1964) Utlänningarnas anpassningsproblem, DN 28 Oct. 
43 Quoted in Catomeris Christian (2004) Det ohyggliga arvet : Sverige och främlingen genom tiderna. 
Stockholm: Ordfront, 7. 
44 The status of the Sámi was primarily regulated by laws pertaining to reindeer keeping, not de jure 
minority rights. 
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home to two de facto minority groups in the North: the indigenous Sámi and 
the Finnish speaking Tornedalians. Svenska minoriteter was the first publi-
cation of its kind and it became a standard work in the field of immigration 
and minorities research in Sweden. 
Social scientists were at the time highly regarded as scientific experts 
and they could therefore influence policy making, particularly through the 
Swedish Commission System. Both the leading social scientists attached 
to the Commission of Immigration as experts, Arne Trankell and Harald 
Swedner, had taken up multiculturalist positions by the turn of the decade, 
even if they had started out as assimilationists in the universalist, Myrda-
lian, mould when they began their research on the Swedish Roma and the 
immigrants in the mid-1960’s. The emerging field of immigration and mi-
norities research was deeply influenced by the multiculturalist ideas initially 
emanating from the ethnic activists in Sweden.45 This development was also 
reinforced by the so-called ethnic revival of the postwar period which influ-
enced – and was influenced by – ideas on ethnicity in the transnational so-
cial scientific community.46 It is, however, important to note that the multi-
culturalist turn in the Swedish social sciences preceded the high-water mark 
of the ethnic revival in the West in the 1970’s. In the Danish social sciences, 
multiculturalist perspectives and rejections of assimilationism became in-
fluential in the 1980’s47, but this turn in Danish academia did not have the 
same influence on Danish policy as the Swedish turn had, even if it might 
have had some influence on practices on the local level and public discourse. 
The research-policy nexuses of Sweden and Denmark have been shown to 
be remarkably different in immigration matters for the last 20 years48, and 
this time period can be stretched back even further. The impact and influ-
ence of the Swedish research-policy nexus was probably at its peak during 
the tail end of the uninterrupted social democratic reign from 1932 — 1976, 
45 Wickström, forthcoming.
46 Van Den Berghe, Pierre L. (1981) The Ethnic Phenomenon. London: Praeger. 4. 
47 Schierup, Carl-Ulrik (1993) På kulturens slagmark : mindretal og størretal taler om Danmark. Esb-
jerg: Sydjysk Universitetsforlag, 166.
48 Jørgensen, Martin Bak (2011) ‘Understanding the Research–Policy Nexus in Denmark and Sweden: 
The Field of Migration and Integration’. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, Vol. 
13, Issue 1, 93–109.
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i.e. the time when the ‘immigrant question’ became part of the nexus and 
formed its own sub-nexus within it. When similar sub-nexuses were formed 
in Denmark, immigration had already become party-politicized, which 
meant that the Danish experts were much more politically curtailed than 
their Swedish counterparts, at least until the mid-2000’s.49 
1967 was a breakthrough year for the idea of multiculturalism in public 
discourse. Political pressure to deal with the ‘immigration problem’ had start-
ed to mount, mainly due to the influx of a large number of Finnish and Yugo-
slavian labour immigrants. These immigrants were de facto ‘foreign workers’ 
in the sense that they were foreign citizens who had come or been brought 
to Sweden to work. It was at the time of course unclear how many of these 
labour immigrants would stay in Sweden and, like the labour immigrants in 
Denmark, many of the immigrants expressed, both in action and in speech, 
their intention of returning. The presence of the labour immigrants, who the 
government from 1966 onwards started to conceive of as settling immigrants, 
brought a sense of urgency to the debate on non-Swedes in Sweden which the 
activists tried to capitalize on. In 1967 plans were even made to form a party 
of the ‘minorities’, which would represent both the naturalized and the, as of 
yet, non-naturalized labour immigrants. The leading spokesperson for the 
Finns in Sweden, meteorologist Artturi Similä, who had come to Sweden in 
the 1950’s, was to helm the project. According to Similä, the potential party 
would not participate in daily politicking or position itself on a right-left axis 
of Swedish politics, but act as a pure interest party for the advancement of 
the ‘minorities’. The party would primarily pursue state supported minority 
schools, extensive public service in the languages of the minorities and of-
ficial political recognition of the minorities. The project quickly collapsed in 
the face of intensive critique from social democratic Finns in both Sweden 
and Finland who saw the project as an attempt at destabilizing the labour 
movement.50 Similä was subsequently ousted from his position in the na-
49 Jørgensen 2011. 
50 Korkisaari, Jouni & Kari Tarkiainen (2000) Suomalaiset Ruotsissa. Turku: Siirtolaisinstituutti 212–213. 
According to Korkisaari & Tarkiainen, the plans to establish a political party for the immigrants were 
made on the initiative of Baltic refugees, but this information is derived from a contemporary actor, the 
social democrat Ylärakkola, who probably had political reasons to claim that the idea was of exile Bal-
tic origin, i.e. rightist or even fascist according to socialist rhetoric of the time. In an interview with the 
author, the Estonian-Swedish activist, Sven Alur Reinans, claimed that the idea for a party originated 
from Schwarz, who in spite of Reinans’ objections pursued it for some time together with Similä. 
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tional association of Finnish associations by the social democratic Finns in 
1970 and the new leadership firmly rejected the idea of multiculturalism as 
threatening to the cohesion and struggle of the labour movement well into 
the 1970’s.51 This development within the main Finnish political organization 
in Sweden, which, semi-formally, represented all (Finnish speaking) Finns in 
Sweden, accentuates the importance of the Diaspora groups, the Estonians 
and the Jews, and the agency of the activists in using these groups both as 
bases and as positive examples in advancing the idea of multiculturalism. It 
also gives evidence to the impact of ideas and experts – the multiculturalist 
turn took place even if the idea of multiculturalism was seen as incompatible 
with the (perceived) interests of the labour movement as they were inter-
preted by the new, social democratic, leadership of the Finns in Sweden. That 
the democratically elected leadership of the, by far, largest immigrant group 
rejected multiculturalism and the concept of minority it rested on while the 
Commission of Immigration was still working on its policy proposals is in-
dicatory of the usefulness of the ideational approach in explaining the multi-
culturalist turn. The multiculturalist agenda had taken root where it mattered 
and the experts who had accepted the idea of multiculturalism now believed 
they knew the real interests of the immigrants. The tables on what was ‘reac-
tionary’ and what was ‘progressive’ had been turned and the, now outdated, 
views of the social democratic leadership of the Finns mattered little. Then 
again, it can be argued that the social democratic co-optation of the Finnish 
leadership facilitated the turn: there was no longer a risk of ‘nationalistic’ 
Finns using multiculturalism as a platform for political mobilization that 
could have been harmful to the social democrats. 
Despite the setback in organizing a political coalition made up of all 
non-Swedes residing in Sweden, the activists made other inroads into the 
established political centres of Swedish society. The powerful Swedish Trade 
Union Confederation (LO) adopted a very multiculturalist ‘minority pro-
gramme’ in 1967 and submitted an official demand to the social demo-
cratic government to take action in line with this programme. The author 
51 Hormia, Osmo (1972) ’Suomalaiset Ruotsin yhteiskunnassa’. In Ruotsin Suomalaiset: tutkimuksia, 
puheenvuoroja, kannanottoja. Stockhom: Tidens förlag, 68–78. 
mats wickström
44
of the programme, ombudsman Lars Ahlvarsson, had extensive contact 
with Schwarz, who he regarded as a teacher in these matters, before sub-
mitting the programme to the National Executive Council of the Swedish 
Trade Unions Confederation, which accepted it and forwarded it to the gov-
ernment.52 The programme was basically a copy of a similar programme 
that Schwarz and Svenning had earlier, unsuccessfully, tried to get passed 
through the political machine of the social democratic party.53 
In its petition to the government, LO demanded that the government 
should announce an official minority policy that should include a clearly 
stated recognition of the cultural aspirations of all of the ethnocultural mi-
nority groups. LO also demanded that the government convene representa-
tives of the minorities in an advisory capacity. This ad hoc advisory body of 
minority leaders could later be transformed into an official advisory board. 
Commissions with minority representatives should be set up and minority 
representatives should be added to existing commissions that dealt with is-
sues concerning the minorities.54 All of these demands, and the explanations 
justifying them, had been made earlier by the ethnic activists. LO repeated 
the argument of the activists that Sweden pursued a policy of total assimila-
tion that was no longer viable. In adopting the claims and rhetoric of the 
activists, as well as their framing of the ‘problem’, LO facilitated the normal-
ization of the idea of multiculturalism and paved the way for the marginal-
ization of (explicit) assimilationism.
When Swedish public radio aired its first educational serial on the immi-
grants in 1967, Schwarz was involved in its making as an ‘expert’, and Swed­
ish minorities was picked as the self-study book for the course. Although 
this series also included voices in favour of assimilation, 1967 was the last 
year that any sustained support for assimilationism was heard in Swedish 
public discourse for years. The leading critic of the ethnic activists, Michael 
Wächter, a pre-war refugee from Germany, signed off with a general plea for 
tolerance in the middle of 1967. In this about-turn, Wächter, who had previ-
52 Author’s interview with Lars Ahlvarsson 26 Feb. 2010. 
53 Schwarz, David (1971) Svensk invandrar­ och minoritetspolitik 1945–1968. Stockholm: Prisma. 
54 Ahlvarsson, Lars (1967) ’Vi behöver en klar målsättning för svensk minoritetspolitik’. Fackförening­
srörelsen, Issue 14/15, 47–48.
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ously criticized the claims of state sponsored discrimination made by the 
activists, proclaimed assimilation an impossibility as long as the Swedes dis-
criminated against non-Swedes.55 Symbolically, the same issue that featured 
Wächter’s withdrawal also included an article by Schwarz and Svenning that 
advocated for the introduction of multiculturalism and with it a new, civic, 
conception of citizenship in Sweden and described the immigrant critics of 
multiculturalism, e.g. Wächter, as pathological.56 
Parts of the Estonian-Swedish community had strong ties to the Con-
servative party, which, in 1968, became the first political party in Sweden 
to release a multiculturalist policy programme. One of the leading Swedish-
Estonian activists, Voldemar Kiviaed, had functioned as the secretary for 
the working group that had produced the programme. In the programme, 
the Conservative party stated that the aim of the party was the freedom of 
each and every minority member to choose however they wanted to assimi-
late into the majority population or retain their ethnic identity. Freedom of 
choice, which also included the freedom to choose on the behalf of one’s 
children, was to be guaranteed by the state through its support of the eth-
nocultural groups. The state was to therefore provide financial assistance 
to minority institutions, including church communions and schools, and 
guarantee mother tongue education in the public schools. The establish-
ment of new minority schools and extensive support to all minority schools, 
as well as the establishment of a new radio channel devoted to the minori-
ties, were also part of the programme.57 The fact that the idea of multicul-
turalism found its first party political home in the Conservative party again 
testifies to the role played by the activists, in this case Estonian, who were 
able to promote the idea from within the party organization. It also supports 
the more general argument forwarded in this chapter: who the immigrants 
were and how they interacted with and were perceived by the established 
political organizations mattered profoundly. 
55 Wächter, Michael (1967) ‘Att stå utanför...’. Sociala Meddelanden, Issue 3/4, 42–48.
56 Schwarz, David & Olle Svenning (1967) ’Svensk invandrings- och minoritetspolitik’. Sociala Med­
delanden, Vol. 56, Issue 3–4/1967, 25–40. 
57 Högerpartiets kommitté för minoritets- och invandringsfrågor (1968) Minoritets­ och invandring­
spolitik. Stockholm: Högerpartiet. 
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In the election year of 1968, the social democratic government intro-
duced a new immigration bill that established regulated immigration and 
social equality between immigrants and citizens as official policy aims.58 The 
government also headed the calls for the establishment of a commission on 
the ‘immigrant question’ and set up the Royal Commission on Immigration. 
The name is misleading, as the commission was not to deal with the regula-
tion of immigration, only the societal position of resident immigrants. Swe-
den has an almost 100-year-old tradition of establishing government com-
missions when a ‘social problem’ emerges (or is constructed) in order to first 
examine the problem scientifically and then to establish political consen-
sus on the proposed solutions to the problem. The commission system has 
been an important arena for the interaction between the interests groups of 
Swedish society. The commissions have been appointed to deal with specific 
issues and they have had a consensus-building role in Swedish politics, at 
least up until the late 1970’s. The government commissions have also func-
tioned as important knowledge-producing institutions as the commissions 
were supposed to base their proposals on scientific research and findings.59 
The Commission on Immigration was, according to the directives of the 
government, tasked to study the position of immigrants in Swedish soci-
ety and propose policy measures for the improvement of their adjustment 
to Swedish society. Most of the seven members that formally made up the 
Commission were MPs and the Commission was always chaired by a so-
cial democrat. The Commission employed a full time secretariat and also 
enlisted the services of various external experts, primarily social scientists 
Trankell and Swedner mentioned above.60 
In 1974, the Commission on Immigration put forward the proposal for 
a new comprehensive immigrant and minority policy based on the concepts 
of equality (between Swedes and immigrants), freedom of choice (to retain 
58 Hammar, Tomas (1985) ‘Sweden’. In Hammar, Tomas (ed.) European immigration policy. A 
comparative study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 34.
59 Helander, Voitto & Jan Johansson (1998) Det statliga kommittéväsendet: en jämförelse mellan Sverige 
och Finland. Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 14–18.
60 Invandrarutredningen (1974) 3, Invandrarna och minoriteterna: huvudbetänkande. Stockholm: 
LiberFörlag, 24. 
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ethnocultural identity), and co-operation (between Swedes and immigrant/
minority groups). The establishment of the Commission in 1968 had not 
abated the activities of the ethnic activists who continuously tried to in-
fluence the Commission. In fact, one of the leading activists of the 1960’s, 
Sven Reinans, worked as an assistant secretary in the Commission and his 
co-activist from the 1960’s, David Schwarz, was a frequent visitor at its of-
fices.61 Still, the ideational leg work for making the political shift possible 
seems to have been successfully done by the end of the 1960’s. By the early 
1970’s, no leading political figure in Sweden assumed an assimilationist po-
sition, at least not in public. The famous Swedish social scientist Gunnar 
Myrdal, one of the deans of postwar universalist assimilationism62, did, in 
1974, criticize what he called ‘voluntary ethnics’ for advancing harmful ‘ro-
mantic ethnicity’ in the US in the wake of the so-called ethnic revival, but 
apparently Myrdal did not realize, notice, or care that what he pejoratively 
called ‘romantic ethnicity’ in the US was becoming official policy in his na-
tive country.63 
In the early half of the 1970’s, the question was no longer whether the 
ethnic identities of the non-ethnic Swedish residents of Sweden should 
be recognized and supported, but to what extent. The Canadian policy of 
1971 certainly provided transnational inspiration for the Commission on 
Immigration,64 but the Commission was by then open to the Canadian ex-
ample. At least some of the persons involved with the Commission had as-
sumed multiculturalist positions even before the B&B Commission released 
its final report, The Cultural Contributions of Other Groups, which would 
form the basis for the new Canadian policy, in 1969.65 By 1971, all three of 
the centre-right parties in the Swedish parliament had, ostensibly without 
knowledge of the Canadian multiculturalist turn, already expressed sup-
61 Author’s interview with Sulo Huovinen 22 Dec. 2010. Huovinen was an under-secretary at the Com-
mission. 
62 Jackson, Walter A. (1994) Gunnar Myrdal and America’s Conscience: Social Engineering and Racial 
Liberalism, 1938–1987 The University of North Carolina Press, 370. 
63 Myrdal, Gunnar (1974) ‘The Case Against Romantic Ethnicity’. Center Magazine, Vol. 7 Issue 4, 
26–30.
64 Samuelsson, Wivi (1999) Det finns gränser. Stockholm: Sveriges Utbildningsradio AB, 168. 
65 E.g. commission member Ingrid Diesen, MP for the Conservative party, scientific expert Harald 
Swedner and secretary Sven Alur Reinans. 
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port of multiculturalist policies to varying degrees.66 And it was only after 
the policy of multiculturalism was introduced in Canada that the Swedish 
policymakers in the Commission really started paying attention to Canada; 
Chairman Yngve Möller and head secretary Jonas Widgren made a study 
visit to Canada in December 1971.67 
Denmark – postwar immigration without a multiculturalist turn
It has been suggested that the Swedish turn to multiculturalism was partly 
due to the increasing ‘non-Western’ origins of the immigrants.68 The ratio-
nale behind this argument is that the host nation deems multiculturalism 
necessary to introduce because of the large cultural differences between the 
immigrants and the majority population. However, a historical analysis of 
the rise of multiculturalism shows that the purported causal link between 
‘non-Western’ or ‘non-white’ immigration and the introduction of multicul-
turalism cannot be established. As a matter of fact, the proportion of ‘non-
Western’ immigrants69 was roughly the same in Denmark and Sweden in 
1974, ca. 39 000 in Denmark and approximately 90 000 in Sweden. There 
were, for instance, more Turkish citizens in Denmark (8138) than in Swe-
den (5601), and there was not even a significantly higher total amount of 
adult non-Europeans in Sweden than in Denmark, even though Sweden’s 
total population was almost twice as large.70 On the face of it, then, the same 
necessary condition (historically large-scale immigration, whatever the ‘co-
lour’) for the introduction of multiculturalism was in place in Denmark. 
In contrast to Sweden, neither the immigrants nor the small domestic 
minorities in Denmark participated in the public debate about immigration 
and the position of the immigrants in Danish society to any great extent. A 
66 E.g. Folkpartiet (1971) Motion 134, angående invandrarnas situation. Centerpartiet (1970) Jämlikhet 
och trygghet i ett decentraliserat samhälle. Partiprogram antaget av riksstämma i Göteborg den 5–6 
mars 1970. 
67 ’Invandrare i Kanada får kulturstöd’ (1972). Ny i Sverige Vol. 1, Issue 2, 24. 
68 E.g. Runblom, Harald (1994) ‘Swedish Multiculturalism in a Comparative European Perspective’. 
Sociological Forum, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 629–630. 
69 This category here includes, for the sake of argument, immigrants from South and East Europe. 
‘Non-Western’ is of course a fluid and contested concept. 
70 Coleman, David & Eskil Wadensjö (1999) Immigration to Denmark. Aarhus: Aarhus University 
Press, 154; Invandrarutredningen (1974), 63. 
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Danish Guest Worker’s Council, which regarded itself as an interest group 
for the immigrants, was established in 1976, but its impact was limited.71 The 
name and purpose of the council is quite telling in comparison with the eth-
nic organizations in Sweden. In Sweden the established immigrant organi-
zations acted as interest groups for the respective ethnocultural minorities, 
not as some general category of immigrant workers belonging to the (in-
ternational) labour movement. The immigrants who mobilized politically 
in Denmark during the 1960’s and 1970’s did so primarily as workers and 
not as minority members72. The lack of interest on the part of immigrants 
together with the lack of resources, both economic and social, limited the 
influence of immigrant organizations and initiatives73. This was probably 
a result of three factors: time spent in the country, socioeconomic status 
(class) and self-identification. It was difficult to be politically active in a 
new polity without knowledge of the language and the political culture. The 
thought of political activity in a foreign country directed at the domestic 
politics of that country probably seemed remote even if the immigrant had 
an interest in politics. Even if the immigrant was educated and had politi-
cal experience, his/her priorities did not necessarily include ‘identity poli-
tics’ in the country of residence, especially during this time of radical leftist 
politics in Western Europe, and in light of the serious political conflicts in 
many of the sending countries (e.g. the Junta in Greece). General pleas for 
tolerance, equal treatment by the judicial system and perhaps some targeted 
social policy measures in housing and health care might have been enough 
for the immigrant who was able to voice his/her concerns in public, just as 
it was for some of the intellectual social democratic Finns in Sweden. This, 
however, does not mean that the immigrants in Denmark were not con-
cerned with ‘ethnic identity’ or ‘culture’. The Pakistanis sent their daughters 
back to Pakistan in order to avoid the corruption of Danish society and 
71 Jønsson, Heidi Vad & Klaus Petersen (2010) ’Danmark: den nationale velfærdsstat møder verden’. In 
Brochmann, Grete & Anniken Hagelund (eds) Velferdens grenser. Innvandringspolitikk og velferdsstat 
i Skandinavia 1945–2010. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 149.
72 Mikkelsen, Flemming (2011) Transnational identitet under forandring. Indvandrernes sociale, 
religiøse og politiske mobilisering i Danmark 1965–2010. København: Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 
100. 
73 Vad Jønsson & Petersen 2010, 149. 
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many Greeks and Turks were also worried about their children becoming 
too Danish.74 Some Danish politicians were also concerned about the ‘cul-
ture’ of the immigrants but from an opposite standpoint – they claimed that 
there were negative, ‘primitive’, aspects of immigrant culture in comparison 
to modern Danish culture.75 However, the culture of the immigrants was not 
a salient political issue in Denmark as long it was officially assumed that no 
permanent immigration had occurred and the immigrants were conceptu-
alized as temporary residents. The foreign workers would take their ‘culture’ 
with them when they left. In Sweden the ‘culture’ of the immigrants could 
be framed as an important question because the immigrants were officially 
conceptualized as permanent residents – problems related to the ‘culture’ of 
the immigrants (and their children) would therefore be Swedish problems 
for the foreseeable future. 
During the 1980’s, when the culture of the guests who stayed (the perma-
nent immigration of the former guests became publically affirmed from the 
middle of the 1970’s onwards76) became a contentious political issue in Den-
mark, the question of ethnocultural difference between ‘Danes’ and ‘non-
Danes’ was framed in the following way: if the culture of the immigrants 
was parochial, chauvinistic and generally un-Western or un-Danish and 
therefore incompatible with the modern Danish culture, then why should 
it be recognized and supported by the state?77 This rhetorical question was 
also a central argument of the short lived public critique of the idea of mul-
ticulturalism in Sweden during the 1960’s. The early critiques of multicul-
turalism claimed that what the advocates of multiculturalism were in fact 
advancing was tolerance of intolerance: ethnocentrism, sexism and religious 
fundamentalism.78 Charges of immigrant illiberalism were, perhaps, harder 
to make in Sweden in the 1960’s and 1970’s than, for instance, in the 1980’s 
74 See articles on the groups in Blum, Jaques (ed.) (1975) Minoritetsproblemer i Danmark: en samling 
artikler om etniske minoriteter. København: Gyldendal. 
75 Jørgensen, Lars (2006) Hvad sagde vi – om “De Andre”. Den udlændingepolitiske debat i Folketinget 
1961–1999. Roskilde: RUC, 72.
76 Jønsson, Heidi Vad (2011) ‘In the Borderland of Welfare State: Danish Integration Policy – the 
early Years’. In Suszycki, Andrzej Marcin (ed.) Welfare citizenship and welfare nationalism. Helsinki: 
Nordic Centre of Excellence NordWel, 251. 
77 Jørgensen 2006, 129–131.
78 E.g. Wächter, Michael (1966) ’Invandrare och minoriteter’. Ord & Bild, Vol. 75, Issue 3, 206–210.
the difference white ethnics made: the multiculturalist turn of sweden …
51
in Denmark. The example of well-integrated Estonians and Jews and cultur-
ally similar and ‘hardworking’ Finns could be brought to bear against those 
that argued in a way that today is common place in all of Western Europe. 
The Finns, who mainly emigrated from the peripheral parts of Finland, may 
have been unruly and unsophisticated in the eyes of the ‘modern’ Swedes, 
but in principle these ‘cousins from the countryside’ shared the same basic 
culture with the Swedes even if there were concerns about the communist 
activities of some of the Finns, which testifies to principal ‘civilizational’ di-
vide of the Cold War period. The Finns were not dangerous because they 
were Finns, but because they could spread communism.79 The immigrants 
in Sweden needed to be and were culturally ‘othered’ by the ethnic activists 
and the experts in order to gain support for and legitimize ethnocultural 
recognition, but the differences that needed to be recognized were framed 
as benign. Ethnocultural recognition could also, according to the advocates 
of multiculturalism, prevent marginalization and radicalization among the 
immigrants, which could provoke negative reactions among the majority 
population and thus lead to a vicious cycle of ethnic tension. Ethnocultural 
recognition was therefore presented as being in the interest of the Swedish 
state and both wings of the labour movement. The main issue of public con-
testation, the upbringing of children, could also be defended by invoking 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which, according to the activ-
ists, gave the family prerogative over the state when it came to the educa-
tion of children.80 However, the Swedish brand of the popular sovereignty 
principle cancelled out any outright constrictions on domestic politics by 
international conventions in this period, if the labour movement regarded 
an implementation as incompatible with its general aims. In Sweden, the 
people were to rule and the people’s rule should not be constricted by any, 
ostensibly conservative, and definitely metaphysical, judicial ideology.81 
79 Östberg, Kjell (2009) När vinden vände: Olof Palme 1969–1986. Stockholm: Leopard förlag, 35. 
80 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2, Protocol 1 (Paris 1952): No person shall be de-
nied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education 
and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in 
conformity with their own religions and philosophical convictions.
81 Östling 2008, 192–193. 
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The most important difference between Denmark and Sweden in the 
1970’s is, then, to be found in the conceptualization of the immigrants. In 
Denmark, the general line of thinking was, as in most of Western Europe, 
centred on the return of the foreign worker to his native country. This line 
of thinking was easily ‘confirmed’ by the immigrants themselves, who often 
expressed their intentions of returning. The immigrants did not consider 
themselves as settlers; they were simply guest workers who would return 
as soon as they had earned enough money. Hence, the immigrants in Den-
mark did not just lack resources and an ‘acceptable’ Western culture; they 
did not have a claimed or ascribed minority identity like many of the ethno-
cultural groups in Canada and Sweden. Consequently, there was no group 
in Denmark that displayed a strong Diaspora identity like the Ukrainians 
in Canada and the Estonians and Jews in Sweden; it was these Diaspora 
groups which formed the political spearhead for advocacy of multicultural-
ism in Canada and Sweden. The Eastern Europeans, mainly Poles and Rus-
sian Jews, who had immigrated to Denmark at the end of the 19th century 
and during the first decades of the 20th century had, according to historian 
Søren Kolstrup, been assimilated by the 1960’s. For instance, the Yiddish 
organizations and cultural institutions established by the first generation of 
Russian Jewish immigrants had all withered away by the end of the 1960’s.82 
This can be contrasted to the re-vitalization of the Jewish community in 
Sweden during the same decade and the buzzing organizational life of the 
Estonians, which were the result of the aspirations of the first generation of 
immigrants. The difference between the immigrant groups who had arrived 
in Sweden and Denmark before the labour immigration period was that 
the aspirations to maintain ethnocultural identity were still strong among 
the two first-generation groups in Sweden compared to the second and 
third generation of pre-war ‘immigrants’ in Denmark, when the labour im-
migrants became a, at least minor, ‘social problem’, that had to be ‘solved’ 
by a welfare state in its prime. In contrast, labour immigration during the 
reformist period of the welfare state opened a window of opportunity in 
82 Kolstrup, Søren (2010) Polske stemmer. Polske indvandringsbølger 1892–2008. København: Fryden-
lund, 381–384. 
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Sweden for immigrant groups who were more ethnoculturally active and 
mobilized than the older immigrant groups in Denmark. 
The stance of the respective Conservative parties in Sweden and Den-
mark is a case in point of how the characteristics of the groups and the 
agency of individual actors mattered. After it became clear around the mid-
1970’s that foreign workers were going to stay, the Danish Conservative 
party took an explicitly assimilationist position, whereas the conservative 
party in Sweden, as has been shown, was the most multiculturalist party in 
Sweden in the late 1960’s. And the stance of the Conservative party in Swe-
den can partly be explained by its ties to the Estonian organization, Esternas 
representation (The Estonian Representation), since the end of the 1950’s. 
The support for minority institutions, especially schools, went hand in hand 
with the party’s general opposition to the comprehensive school-system, but 
it is unlikely that the Conservative party would have embraced the idea of 
multiculturalism so wholeheartedly without the internal advocacy of the Es-
tonians. When the immigrants in Denmark demanded, or Danish activists 
demanded on their behalf, policies and services that, in hindsight, could 
be categorized as multiculturalist, the demands were grounded in the pre-
sumed return of the immigrants.83 The children of the immigrants should 
be taught the language of their native country so that the whole family could 
move back when the time came. Thus, the ‘multiculturalist’ educational pol-
icies (e.g., mother tongue education for migrant children) implemented in 
Denmark at the municipal level in the 1970’s were not motivated and legiti-
mized by the idea of multiculturalism as they were in Sweden, but instead, 
by the idea of return. The free-school system of Denmark, which included 
constitutionally guaranteed support for non-publically run schools, also di-
minished the incentive for coalition-building and intra-ethnic demands for 
official multiculturalism, because the different non-majority groups in the 
country were formally free to pursue the continuation of the culture of the 
83 E.g. Hammer, Ole (1973) Fremmedarbejder. København: Høst, 16.
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group through state-subsidised private schools.84 A research-policy nexus 
in the field of immigration comparable to that of Sweden was also never 
formed in Denmark. Furthermore, while a strong research-policy nexus can 
be regarded as a necessary condition for the introduction of multicultural-
ism in Sweden, it was not a sufficient condition; the players in the nexus still 
had to embrace the idea of multiculturalism. 
Another important difference between Denmark and Sweden was the 
position of the trade unions. In Sweden, the powerful Trade Union Con-
federation provided strong support for multiculturalism with its 1967 peti-
tion, whereas the Danish unions did not divert from their ‘equal treatment’ 
position until the late 1990’s.85 In 1970 DASF, one of Denmark’s largest trade 
unions, published the report Same vilkår (Equal conditions) in which the 
union demanded that measures be taken to ensure equality between Danish 
workers and foreign workers. The report was not explicitly assimilationist 
in its policy proposals, but neither was it multiculturalistic like the 1967 
petition of the Swedish LO.86 Again, this is hardly surprising considering the 
lack of ethnic activists in Denmark and the general conceptualization of the 
immigrants as temporary residents. There were no activists in Denmark that 
informed, and, more importantly, convinced the Danish trade union offi-
cials, social scientists or politicians that the foreign workers were minorities 
in the making and as such were in need of special, multiculturalistic, policy 
measures. The dog of multiculturalism did not bark in Denmark because 
no-one unleashed it – the idea could not have an impact when there was no 
advocacy for it. 
84 Due to space limitations this important institutional difference between Denmark and Sweden and 
the different histories of pluralism in the political cultures of the two countries can’t be explored 
further, but the first minority school established by postwar labour immigrants was established in 
Denmark in 1978. This highlights the ambiguities of excluding de facto and historical expressions of 
‘multiculturalism’, or in this case institutional pluralism, in favour of explicit manifestations of mul-
ticulturalism expressed in policy and public discourse in studies on multiculturalism. The Danish 
free-school system can, from a contemporary perspective, be categorized as ‘multiculturalistic’ even 
if it was not established to enable the ethnocultural emancipation of immigrant groups. 
85 Wrench, John (2004) ‘Trade Union Responses to Immigrants and Ethnic Inequality in Denmark and 
the UK: The Context of Consensus and Conflict’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol 10, 
Issue 1, 11.
86 Schwartz, Jonathan Matthews (1985) Reluctant Hosts: Denmark’s Reception of Guest Workers. Køben-
havn: Akademisk Forlag, 15–16. 
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Conclusion
The importance of white ethnic advocacy in the emergence of multicul-
turalism in Canada has been noted by several scholars. Multiculturalism 
in Canada was introduced as the formal recognition of the ‘third element’ 
of Canadian society, those of non-English and non-French descent, who, 
unquestionably, could be deemed as contributing to Canadian society or 
even of having contributed to the settling of Canada. Multiculturalism could 
therefore be advanced with the argument that the state should recognize the 
past and present contributions of hitherto neglected groups of citizens and 
their ethnocultural heritage. In postwar Sweden, where the past primarily 
functioned as a negation in the legitimization of contemporary policy re-
forms, the emphasis was squarely placed on contemporary and presumed 
future contributions of the non-Swedish groups. There was, for instance, 
no discussion about recognizing the Finnish group based on the histori-
cal contributions made by the Finns in the kingdom of Sweden87. Still, the 
Finns and the other labour immigrants, as well as the former refugees, were, 
at the time, net providers to the coffers of the Swedish Welfare State; thus, it 
was argued that it was only fair that their special ethnocultural needs were 
recognized, as long as this did not threaten the social cohesion of the (social 
democratic) People’s Home. Multiculturalism was not introduced and ac-
cepted because the immigrants were radically different from the Swedes; it 
was accepted because they were perceived to be sufficiently similar. 
To be sure, immigration levels mattered, but the relationship between 
the amount of immigration and policy ideas is highly contextual. Switzer-
land received (per capita) more labour immigrants from a neighbouring 
country than Sweden and reacted politically in a diametrically opposite way 
with the Überfremdung referendum in 1970. But Switzerland and Sweden 
do not share, again in the words of Hedetoft, ‘similar historical paths to-
wards modernity and similar social and political structures’88, like Denmark 
and Sweden do. However, despite the historical and structural similarities of 
87 The territory of modern day Finland was an integrated part of the Kingdom of Sweden from the 
13th century to the beginning of the 19th century. 
88 Hedetoft 2010, 112. 
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Denmark and Sweden, the labour immigration period of the 1960’s and 70’s, 
which brought historically unprecedented numbers of foreign citizens to the 
two countries, did not result in the same political or ideological outcome in 
how these newcomers should be handled. Immigration in itself did not bring 
about the introduction of multiculturalism in Denmark, or in any other of 
the west European welfare-states for that matter. The sources of immigration 
to the rest of Western Europe were predominately more ‘non-Western’ than 
those of Sweden, and it could be argued, in line with Kymlicka’s assessment 
of the lack of a perceived societal threat as a prerequisite for the introduc-
tion of multiculturalism in Canada, that it would have been more difficult to 
officially affirm the idea of multiculturalism if the groups demanding it were 
numerous, growing in size and in some way perceived as threatening. When 
the multiculturalist policy of Sweden was introduced in 1975, non-Nordic 
labour immigration had been halted and immigration from Finland had 
been significantly reduced, thereby limiting the increase in ethnic diversity. 
The size of labour immigration, both factual and perceived, facilitated the 
politicization of the issue in the end of the 1960’s, making it possible to ad-
vance new ideas, but without the activists’ promotion of multiculturalism, 
Sweden might never had diverged from the assimilationist path.
The comparison undertaken between Sweden and Denmark, following 
the comparison between Canada and Sweden, also shows the importance of 
ideas, the agency of the actors that promote ideas, and the context in which 
these actors operate and frame their ideas. Although, the idea of multicul-
turalism was first introduced by ethnic activists trying to set an agenda, it 
was only when this agenda gained traction among key actors in the Swedish 
corporate political system that the idea moved into the formal institutional 
policy process, and ultimately, led to the official introduction of multicul-
turalism. The conceptual figures of ‘the immigrant’ (as opposed to ‘the for-
eigner’ or ‘the guest worker’) and the ethnoculturally ‘non-Swedish’ citizen 
were crucial conceptual stepping stones in the advancement of multicul-
turalism. In 1966, immigrants were already formally conceptualized as new 
permanent residents of Swedish society, and this provided a formal political 
platform for the promotion of multiculturalism. In Denmark, the notion 
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of temporariness was embedded in the labelling of immigrants as guests, 
even though the official treatment of the immigrants was roughly the same 
as in Sweden, striving for formal equality in labour and social rights. This 
difference in the conceptualization of labour immigration seems to, at least 
partly, stem from the activities of the former war time refugees. There were 
already established and organized ethnic communities existing in Sweden 
when labour immigration picked up the pace in the 1960’s; activists from 
these communities could speak on behalf of all non-ethnic Swedes in the 
country, no matter whether they were citizens or potential citizens. Unlike 
the recently arrived labour immigrants, these ‘non-Swedish’ citizens of Swe-
den could voice demands on behalf of all immigrants and ethnocultural mi-
nority groups in Sweden and prescribe solutions to the perceived problems 
of these groups which went beyond the basic equal treatment formula that 
had been the (unwritten) rule up to that point.
The current differences in immigration and integration policies between 
Denmark and Sweden cannot, of course, be solely attributed to the existence 
or absence of white ethnic activism during the foundational years of policy 
making. It can, however, be argued, as Borevi convincingly has, that Swe-
den, on an integration policy level, has retreated from multiculturalism and 
that this retreat was already under way in the mid-1980’s.89 Still, the Swed-
ish state currently fully supports ethnoculturally oriented free-schools, e.g., 
Islamic and Finnish schools. Finnish, as well as Romani, Yiddish, Sami, and 
Meänkieli (Tornedal Finnish) were also recognized as official minority lan-
guages in 1999. The normative proclamation of the basic tenants of the idea 
of multiculturalism is still strong in public discourse, the policies of pub-
lic institutions (e.g., public broadcasting and the museum field), and even 
in constitutional law. For instance, the new Swedish constitution of 2010 
strengthened the wording in the paragraph concerning the state’s respon-
sibility for the preservation of minority cultures in Sweden from ‘should’ 
to ‘shall’. The current discursive divergence between Denmark and Sweden 
89 Borevi, Karin (2010a) ‘Dimensions of Citizenship: European Integration Policies from a Scandina-
vian Perspective’. In Bengtsson, Bo, Per Strömblad & Ann-Helén Bay (eds) Diversity, Inclusion and 
Citizenship in Scandinavia. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 19–46. 
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can, therefore, partly be traced to the formative period of the 1960’s and 
70’s, which put the way in which immigration and ethnicity are addressed 
in public on two remarkably different paths. Sweden exhibits a public ethos 
of multiculturalism similar to that of Canada, much more than Denmark or 
any other Western European country, even if Sweden’s current integration 
policy is not as group-oriented as the policy introduced in 1975.
Multiculturalism has recently been declared dead by many political 
leaders and public intellectuals in the West, whereas in Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Sweden, it remains a guiding principle in the manage-
ment of ethnic relations. The fact that multiculturalism is still alive, at least 
as an officially affirmed idea, in the first countries to introduce it, highlights 
the significance of the time when multiculturalism was introduced and how 
it was conceptualized at the moment that set it on its path-dependent way. 
State-sponsored multiculturalism was a response to claims-making by eth-
nic minority citizens and citizens-to-be for support and just treatment with-
in the frame of liberal-democratic welfare states. Furthermore, these claims-
makers were both contributing to and integrating within the welfare state, as 
shown, for instance, by their ability to make reformist claims in the public 
sphere. The multiculturalist turn of Sweden was ultimately legitimized by 
a unanimous parliament and implemented by the expanding welfare state, 
but the idea manifested in the turn was initially formulated and advanced 
by white ethnic activists seeking ethnocultural recognition for (some of) the 
non-Swedish minority groups in Sweden. 
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CHAPTER 2
 
Rightlessness as welfare state disruption 
and opening to change:
Analysing parliamentary debates 
on irregular migration as a negotiation 
of the demarcation of the welfare state
amanda nielsen
The 2000’s has seen intense political debates in Sweden following the ‘dis-
covery’ of a group of people staying irregularly in the country. The group, 
whose existence was brought to public awareness as a result of persistent 
NGO campaigning, was commonly portrayed as lacking all social rights, 
being exploited in the labour market and living in constant fear of deporta-
tion. Consequently, their appearance in the public has challenged the often 
held understanding of Sweden as an immigrant-friendly and inclusive state. 
On the contrary, Sweden has been held out as one of the most restrictive 
countries when it comes to access to public services for irregular migrants1. 
The presence of a group of people, living in society without any rights, has 
thus ruptured the understanding of the Swedish welfare state and triggered 
discussion about both asylum policy and migration policy in general, as well 
as their links to welfare policy.
The term irregular migrants is often used to refer to noncitizens that have 
either crossed state borders or remained within state territory without sanc-
tion from the host state2. In the Swedish case, an irregular status is almost 
1 Düvell, Franck (2010) ‘Foreword’. In Thomsen, Trine Lund, Martin Bak Jørgensen, Susi Meret, Kirsten 
Hviid & Helle Stenum (eds) Irregular Migration in a Scandinavian Perspective. Maastricht: Shaker, 7. 
2 McNevin, Anne (2011) Contesting Citizenship. Irregular Migrants and New Frontiers of the Political. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 18. 
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exclusively a result of the latter, as it is generally assumed that the bulk of 
those staying irregularly in the country are former asylum seekers. Histori-
cally, as well as comparatively, the term has however tended to be linked to 
the former and often invokes associations with (labour-driven) immigration 
to Southern European countries with large informal sectors of the economy. 
From this perspective, Sweden, like the rest of the Nordic countries, has 
generally not been considered an attractive destination for irregular mi-
grants, because it has a reputation for being highly regulated3. The character 
of irregular migration in the Swedish context thus differs from that in many 
other countries of Europe. 
Correspondingly, from the outset, the Swedish debate has been strong-
ly linked to an ongoing political debate about the alleged shortcomings of 
Swedish asylum policy. The conditions of irregular migrants first became 
the subject of major political debate in 2005 when, in connection to a major 
restructuring of both the asylum body of regulation and the framework for 
decision-making4, a campaign for general amnesty was initiated. The am-
nesty, suggested by a broad coalition of NGO’s, religious communities and 
political parties, was aimed both at those asylum seekers that were waiting 
for an assessment and those who had had their applications turned down 
but had chosen to stay irregularly. The demands for a general amnesty were 
voted down in parliament but the campaign was partly victorious in the 
sense that it opened up a space for the regularization of some irregular mi-
grants through a provisional legislation5. Furthermore, the campaign was 
successful because it raised awareness of the precarious circumstances of 
irregularity and initiated a continued debate. In the aftermath of the debate, 
public investigations have been put in place to overhaul present legislation 
that regulates irregular migrants’ access to public services, such as school 
and medical care6. 
3 Düvell 2010, 4.
4 More precisely, the former order where appeals were handled by a special board, Utlänningsnämnden, 
was replaced by an order where appeals are handled, within the judiciary, by three courts that have 
been assigned the responsibility to try appeals that are related to migration. 
5 Sager, Maja (2011) Everyday clandestinity: experiences on the margins of citizenship and migration 
policies. Lund: Lund University, 37–39.
6 SOU 2010:5. Skolgång för alla barn. Stockholm: Fritzes and SOU 2011:48. Vård efter behov och på lika 
villkor- en mänsklig rättighet. Stockholm: Fritzes.
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This chapter provides an analysis of parliamentary plenary debates7 that 
followed on the ‘discovery’ of irregular migrants in Sweden. I start from the 
assumption that this moment can be conceptualized as a kind of crisis, in 
that the current circumstances clashed with commonly held understandings 
of an inclusive and comprehensive welfare state. Consequently, it spurred a 
debate over how to understand the occurrence of irregular migrants in society 
as well as over how society ought to respond to it. The aim of this chapter 
is twofold; first, I study the discursive articulations that attempt to estab-
lish an understanding of the problem. These attempts, in essence, consist 
of struggles over categorization and over the interpretation of the situation 
in relation to current policy as well as circumstances in the surrounding 
world. Second, I study the (diverse) discursive articulations that, allegedly, 
are made in attempts to advance the interests of irregular migrants. 
I take my overall starting point in theorization on citizenship. More spe-
cifically, I draw upon the duality of the concept of citizenship to account for 
the dynamics at work in struggles over the demarcation of the welfare state; 
i.e. the attempts to establish the group of people to include in the rights-
bearing community that the welfare state constitutes. Thus, the emphasis 
on duality serves to shed light on the simultaneous processes of inclusion 
and exclusion that are interwoven with the national welfare state as a po-
litical project. The starting point for my analysis is that this demarcation of 
the welfare state is open to contestation and, further, that it is continuously 
being negotiated in debates on migration. In this study I investigate how 
this process of negotiation is played out in Swedish parliamentary debates 
throughout the 2000’s. 
A number of recent studies have explored the circumstances of irregu-
lar migrants in Sweden8 and Scandinavia9. These studies shed light on the 
7 The minutes from parliamentary sessions where such debates have taken place have been located 
using a number of search strings (such as papperslös [‘without papers’] and amnesty) in the online 
archive of the Swedish parliament. Henceforth, I will refer to these debates as parliamentary debates 
and political debates. 
8 Khosravi, Shahram (2006) ’Territorialiserad mänsklighet: irreguljära immigranter och det nakna 
livet’. In de los Reyes, Paulina (ed.) Om välfärdens gränser och det villkorade medborgarskapet. Stock-
holm: Fritzes; Björngren Cuadra, Carin (2010) Policies on Health Care for Undocumented Migrants 
in EU27. Country report Sweden. Nowhereland; Holgersson, Helena (2011) Icke­medborgarskapets 
urbana geografi. Göteborg: Glänta; Sager 2011. 
9 Thomsen, Trine Lund, Martin Bak Jørgensen, Susi Meret, Kirsten Hviid & Helle Stenum (eds) (2010) 
Irregular Migration in a Scandinavian Perspective. Maastricht: Shaker. 
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discrepancy between the conception of the inclusionary welfare state and 
the experiences of irregular migrants from different angles. In this chapter 
I build on insights generated in these studies as well as in previous research 
on the connection between conceptions of the welfare state and migration 
policy more generally10. While I share a theoretical point of departure in 
critical citizenship theory with several of the scholars who have conducted 
research on irregular migration in the Swedish context, my study approaches 
the topic somewhat differently. In contrast to many previous studies, which 
have relied on ethnography and interviews and focused on the everyday 
lives of irregular migrants, I have chosen to focus on how the phenomena 
in question have been understood and discussed in the political debate. My 
overall analytical framework is discourse theoretical and my analysis centres 
on the attempts to establish a certain understanding of how to interpret and 
act upon the presence of irregular migrants. Particular emphasis is put upon 
those discursive articulations that challenge the present order through at-
tempts to secure rights for those staying in the country irregularly. 
In addition to providing an empirical account of how the issue of ir-
regular migration has been debated in the Swedish context, I consider the 
relationship between these debates and overarching conceptions of citizen-
ship. My analysis is inspired by the growing field of research that emphasizes 
how the mobilization of irregular migrants contests prevailing conceptions 
of citizenship and, in doing so, opens up a space to make claims for rights11. 
My study however differs from these in that it is parliamentary debates– 
and the stances taken by politicians– that are the object of my investigation 
rather than the actions and claims of irregular migrants themselves12. It is 
10 See for instance Öberg, Nils (1994) Gränslös rättvisa eller rättvisa inom gränser? Om moraliska dilem­
man i välfärdsstaters invandrings­ och invandrarpolitik. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis; Bor-
evi, Karin (2002) Välfärdsstaten i det mångkulturella samhället. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsalien-
sis; Johansson, Christina (2005) Välkomna till Sverige? Svenska migrationspolitiska diskurser under 
1900­talets andra hälft. Malmö: Bokbox.
11 See, for instance, Sassen, Saskia (2005) ‘The Repositioning of Citizenship and Alienage: Emergent 
Subjects and Spaces for Politics’. Globalizations, Vol. 2, Issue 1; Sassen, Saskia (2009) ‘Incompleteness 
and the Possibility of Making: Towards Denationalized Citizenship?’. Cultural Dynamics, Vol. 21, Issue 
3; Nyers, Peter (2010) ‘No One is Illegal Between City and Nation’. Studies in Social Justice, Vol. 4, Issue 
2; McNevin 2011. 
12 I regard it as likely that the positions taken by politicians to some extent have been influenced by the 
political mobilization of both irregular migrants themselves and NGO’s claiming to speak on their 
behalf; however, an investigation into the discursive overlaps and a tracing of their origins fall outside 
the scope of this study. 
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important to stress this significant difference, because the scholars associ-
ated with this approach tend to put their emphasis on precisely the impor-
tance of the acts of those involved rather than on the attempts to advocate 
on their behalf. 
Methodological framework 
The analysis in this chapter starts from a discourse analysis framework. 
Discourse theory is, broadly defined, concerned with the constitution of 
meaning. It entails a relationist, contextual, and historicist view on iden-
tity formation. Accordingly, it advocates an understanding that identity is 
shaped through a series of relations and in correspondence to other mean-
ings. Furthermore, it considers meaning to be embedded in particular dis-
cursive contexts that condition its construction and interpretation. Within 
this paradigm, then, all social practice is considered to be conditioned by 
discourse. That is, things said, thought, or done are all dependent on the 
existence of a (constantly modified) system of meaning13.
Discourse theory stresses that meaning is always both contingent and 
partially fixed14. This is the precondition of political struggle, in the sense 
that political conflicts are played out in attempts to stabilize meaning15. 
Hence, discourses are forged and expanded through practices of articula-
tion16. Attempts to stabilize meaning are particularly urgent in circumstanc-
es of dislocation, where the contingency of the discursive structures has been 
made visible17. A discourse becomes dislocated when it is confronted with 
events that can’t be integrated, i.e. explained or represented, into its system 
of meaning. This failure leads the way for political struggles, entailing at-
tempts to define and find solutions to the problem that has arisen, which 
13 Torfing, Jacob (2005) ‘Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges’. In Howarth, 
David & Jacob Torfing (eds) Discourse Theory in European Politics. Identity, Policy and Governance. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 14. 
14 Howarth, David & Yannis Stavrakakis (2000) ‘Introducing discourse theory and political analysis’. In 
Howarth, David, Aletta J. Norval, & Yannis Stavrakakis (eds) Discourse theory and political analysis. 
Identities, hegemonies and social change. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 7. 
15 Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000, 15. 
16 Torfing 2005, 15. 
17 Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000, 13.
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eventually result in the articulation of a new discourse18. Dislocation should 
thus be understood as a process that disrupts identities and discourses and, 
in doing so, triggers the rise of new discourses19. In the analysis, I treat the 
discovery of irregular migrants in Sweden as an instance of dislocation. The 
appearance of people without rights, living within the boundaries of the state 
yet excluded from the community of rights bearers, constitutes an anomaly 
that cannot be accommodated within current understandings of a welfare 
state marked by inclusion and equality. The presence of irregular migrants 
thus poses a challenge to the demarcation between different categories of 
residents and the corresponding allocation of rights, which destabilizes the 
current discursive formation and stimulates an intense political debate. 
This chapter provides an analysis of these debates. More specifically, it 
provides an analysis based on a reading of minutes from parliamentary de-
bates where the topic has been discussed throughout the 2000’s. The analyti-
cal strategy is threefold and corresponds with a division of the analysis into 
three sections. In the first section I trace the imperatives behind categoriza-
tion, i.e. the attempts to sort out the statuses of different individuals and 
groups in relation to current policy, as a central process in the debate. In 
the second section I map how irregular migration is constructed as a policy 
‘problem’; i.e. the understanding of what constitutes the problem and how it 
relates to current policy. In the third section I identify the discursive strate-
gies employed to mobilize support for an enhancement of rights; i.e. the 
different discursive articulations that seek to establish the irregular migrants 
as rights-bearers.
The duality of citizenship
The analysis in this chapter utilizes insights from different strands of citizen-
ship theory to shed light on the inherent duality in the ideals and practices 
of the welfare state. In the following section I will provide a brief introduc-
tion to how notions of citizenship are linked to the welfare state and how the 
duality of the concept can be used as a starting point for contestation. 
18 Torfing 2005, 16
19 Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000, 13.
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The welfare state, understood as a discursive formation, is held together 
by a social imaginary that invokes the image of a society based on freedom, 
equality and solidarity, where people are protected by means of social citi-
zenship. Citizenship, in this context, refers to a status in a community that 
grants everyone some basic economic, political and social rights20. This is 
the idea of inclusive citizenship, most often associated with T. H. Marshall21, 
who emphasized the social dimension of citizenship and its link to the wel-
fare state. Internally, then, citizenship is connected to the welfare state and 
widely considered to be ‘an inherently egalitarian ideal’, in the sense that it 
‘implies full legal and political equality among citizens’22. However, as has 
been pointed out by Linda Bosniak, while the idea of citizenship is often ‘in-
voked to convey a state of democratic belonging or inclusion’ the inclusion 
envisioned presumes a bounded and exclusive community. Consequently, 
she argues, it is also characterized by a ‘basic ethical ambiguity’. This means 
that while the ideal of citizenship can be mobilized against subordination, it 
also represents an axis of subordination itself23. Rogers Brubaker has made 
the same point, emphasizing that citizenship is simultaneously internally in­
clusive and externally exclusive24. This basic ambiguity arises from the fact 
that the articulation of citizenship requires the marking of its exterior, its 
constitutive outside, in the form of the noncitizen. Correspondingly, the 
rights and opportunities that follow from citizenship are enjoyed in the con-
text where they are denied to noncitizens25. 
The irregular status of certain categories of migrants has its origin in 
this system that designates some as citizens of a bounded and territorial-
ized state. There is, thus, an integral connection between the constitution of 
the irregular migrant and the constitution of the citizen26. The demarcation 
20 Torfing, Jacob (1999) New Theories of Discourse. Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek. Oxford: Blackwell, 229. 
21 Marshall, T.H. & Tom Bottomore (1992) Citizenship and Social Class. London: Pluto Press.
22 Brubaker, Rogers (1989) ‘Introduction’. In Brubaker, Rogers (ed.) Immigration and the politics of citi­
zenship in Europe and North America. Lanham: University press of America, 17. 
23 Bosniak, Linda (2006) The Citizen and the Alien. Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership.Princeton: 
Princeton university press, 1,4. 
24 Brubaker, Rogers (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 21. 
25 McNevin 2011, 16.
26 McNevin 2011, 20,23.
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between different categories of residents, and the corresponding allocation 
of rights, is however fragile and potentially open for negotiation, and in this 
process, the ambiguity of citizenship can be mobilized. As emphasized by 
Bosniak, the entry of noncitizens into the ‘spatial domain of universal citi-
zenship’ opens up a space for contestation, as it is not evident which norms 
of citizenship should apply27. That is, the position of migrants, present in the 
state as permanent residents, yet not citizens, and thus, at the interface of 
contradictory understandings of citizenship is the starting point for a dis-
cussion about the rights these migrants should be granted in their society 
of residence. 
This chapter is guided by the conviction that an investigation of current 
principles and practices of migration control through the lens of citizenship 
is beneficial because it illuminates the ambiguous implications of the welfare 
state. The tensions arise from the fact that while citizenship signifies a nor-
mative ambition to guarantee all citizens an equal status, these inclusionary 
objectives tend to bring about the exclusion of those regarded as ‘alien’ to the 
community because these objectives, so far, have been framed in bounded 
communities. Theorization on the duality of citizenship provides two differ-
ent kinds of insight relevant to my analysis. First, it sheds light on the logic 
of migration control in the national welfare state; that is, attempts to secure 
a comprehensive social citizenship, the key feature of the welfare state, tend 
to result in restrictive positions on migration. Second, it highlights the con-
tingency of the current order and, further, how the notions of inclusiveness 
associated with citizenship can be mobilized in an attempt to contest this 
order. Theorization on citizenship can thus also be drawn upon to show 
that the demarcation between different categories of residents, and the cor-
responding allocation of rights, is open to negotiation. In the next section 
I sketch a brief summary of how the Swedish approach to migration and 
integration has developed over time in order to account for how the duality 
of citizenship is played out in this specific context. 
27 Bosniak 2006, 4. 
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Balancing openness and inclusion – 
the duality of the Swedish welfare state 
Large-scale migration to Sweden took off after World War II when, in re-
sponse to labour market demand, large numbers of migrants arrived from 
Finland and, later, southern Europe28. In 1968, what was to become the fun-
damental principles of the Swedish approach to migration and integration 
was first adopted in the wake of this wave of migration. At this point, the 
parliament accepted a government proposal establishing that the overall 
principle of the universal welfare state–equal social rights for all residents– 
would apply to immigrants on the same terms as for citizens. At the same 
time another, equally important, principle was established in the form of 
the overall need for a regulation of migration29. From this point onwards the 
Swedish approach to migration can be characterized as an attempt to find 
a balance between generous policies on entry and comprehensive inclusion 
in society through various welfare institutions30. The implication of this bal-
ancing act has been the establishment of the point of entry as the important 
threshold, so that migrants, once granted a permanent residence permit, 
have been entitled to most of the rights allocated to citizens.
However, the attempts to balance openness and the ability to secure full 
inclusion in the welfare state became more complicated when the patterns 
of migration shifted from labour migrants to refugees. The approach ad-
opted in 1968 presupposed that the state would be able to control migration 
in correspondence with current capacities to provide work, housing, and 
education31. This posed no problem as long as the majority of those arriving 
were labour migrants- when Sweden put a stop to labour migration in 1972 
the primary argument was an inability to secure full inclusion for those ar-
28 Johansson, Chistina (2008) ‘Svensk invandrings- och flyktingpolitik’. In Darvishpour, Mehrdad & 
Charles Westin (eds) Migration och etnicitet: perspektiv på ett mångkulturellt Sverige. Lund: Studentlit-
teratur. 
29 Borevi, Karin (2010) ’Sverige: Mångkulturalismens flaggskepp i Norden’. In Brochmann, Grete & 
Anniken Hagelund (eds) Velferdens grenser. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 59. 
30 Öberg 1994.
31 Borevi 2010, 59.
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riving and a fear of a divided society32. The approach became problematic 
as the character of those arriving shifted. From the 1970’s onwards labour 
migrants were replaced by refugees and people granted resident rights in 
the capacity of close relatives33. With the arrival of rising numbers of refu-
gees the ability to control immigration in order to safeguard equality was 
compromised as other considerations trumped this one. Most importantly, 
the moral imperative and the promise to abide by international conventions 
made it practically impossible to refuse refugees entry or deny family reuni-
fication for those already staying in the country. Consequently, the state’s 
ability to impose restrictions on migration, corresponding to shifts in the 
(perceived) ability to offer comprehensive inclusion, was undermined.
Furthermore, this shift in migration patterns also brought about a shift 
in the way measures of control were carried out. The focus of control thus 
shifted from ensuring that those granted a residence permit had a job offer 
to ensuring that those granted a residence permit had legitimate grounds 
to apply for asylum. That is, the shift in migration patterns resulted in in-
creased preoccupation with establishing that those arriving were in fact 
‘real’ refugees34.
The Swedish approach to migration could, up until 2008, be character-
ized as dual in the sense that it consisted of a combination of a restrictive 
policy on labour migration (entailing that it would only be considered in a 
situation where there was a domestic shortage of labour) and a ‘generous’ 
asylum policy. That is, the integration capacity of the state was openly recog-
nized as a ground for regulation but only for certain categories of migrants. 
Initially, there was wide agreement on the policies adopted in relation to 
migration and integration, but this initial consensus was abandoned with 
the increased politicization of migration that started in the mid 1980’s. Fol-
lowing the rise of right-wing populist mobilization to restrict immigration, 
as well as counter mobilization in the form of the formation of NGO’s de-
32 Johansson 2008; Spång, Mikael (2009) ‘Debating labor immigration and immigration policy in 
Sweden, 1960–2008’. In Mayer, Stefanie & Mikael Spång (eds) Debating migration: political discourses 
on labor immigration in historical perspective. Innsbruck: StudienVerlag.
33 Johansson 2008. 
34 Borevi 2010, 52, 71. 
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fending the right to asylum, migration became a contested political field35. 
Parallel to this, Swedish asylum policy also moved towards greater restric-
tion as a result of a revision of alien legislation and the imposition of stricter 
terms of admittance. These measures were followed by rising rates of refusal 
as well as, consequently, deportations36. It is often claimed by researchers 
that it was this restrictive turn of asylum policy that gave rise to irregularity 
in a Swedish context37 . 
To sum up, the working of the Swedish welfare state has historically had 
two central implications in relation to migration. The first implication is that 
it is crucial to control immigration. That is, the fact that the generous welfare 
model is supposed to incorporate all, yet is considered to be susceptible to 
overload, has been taken to require a selection of and demarcation in rela-
tion to potential new members. The second implication is that it is necessary 
to safeguard the inclusion of newcomers into the labour market as well as 
society at large38. Taken together, these implications attest to the presence of 
an overall constitutive tension between the inclusionary and exclusionary 
dimensions of the Swedish welfare state. This tension is visible in the en-
forcement of strict entry policies in order to uphold the comprehensiveness 
of social citizenship. At the same time, the fact that a strict entry policy is 
legitimized with efforts to secure inclusion makes migration control partic-
ularly susceptible to accusations that the policies accomplish the opposite of 
their goal. Consequently, the coming into existence of a group of residents 
who lack all kinds of rights due to their irregular status poses a challenge to 
the current order of migration control. 
35 Spång 2009, 82–83.
36 Hammar, Tomas (1999) ‘Closing the Doors to the Swedish Welfare State’. In Brochmann, Grete & To-
mas Hammar (eds) Mechanisms of immigration control: a comparative analysis of European regulation 
policies. Oxford: Berg, 199.
37 See, e.g., Schierup, Carl-Ulrik, Peo Hansen & Stephen Castles (2006) Migration, Citizenship and the 
European Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 216–17.
38 Brochmann, Grete & Anniken Hagelund (2010) ’Innledning: Velferdsstat, nasjon, innvandring’. In 
Brochmann, Grete & Anniken Hagelund (eds) Velferdens grenser. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 16. 
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Negotiating the demarcation of the welfare state
The analysis in this chapter thus starts from two set of assumptions. First, 
following the framework provided by discourse theory, it is assumed that 
the meaning of the welfare state is subject to change. Second, following the 
framework provided by citizenship theory, it is assumed that the current 
meaning of the welfare state is built upon a constitutive tension between 
two contradictory logics. In my analysis, I explore discursive articulations 
surrounding irregular migrants in Swedish parliamentary debates as an ex-
ample of the negotiation of the demarcation of the welfare state. The analy-
sis is divided into three sections in which I discuss the imperatives behind 
categorization, how categorization works in the construction of irregular 
migration as a policy ‘problem,’ and the discursive strategies employed in 
the debates. First, however, follows a section in which I provide a short in-
troduction to the overall setting of these debates in order to contextualize 
the discussion in the subsequent sections. 
Contextualizing the debate 
As I have previously stressed, migration and integration became policy 
areas marked by fundamental disagreement in the 1980’s, as the previous 
post-war consensus was abandoned. Subsequently, a dividing line occurred 
between the Social Democrats and the Conservative party, and the other 
parties in parliament. The former two parties formed an alliance and co-
operated in the formation of policy relating to asylum and rules on family 
reunification throughout more than a decade. These policies were heavily 
criticized by members of the other parties on the grounds of being too re-
strictive39. Since the mid 2000’s, the patterns of conflict have grown slightly 
more complicated with the introduction of a new dimension to the debate in 
the form of labour migration. Calls for a more open labour migration policy 
started to be voiced in the early 2000’s and resulted, in 2008, in the (re)
instatement of a heavily disputed labour migration regime. This move was 
supported by the four right-wing parties in parliament and the Green party, 
39 Spång 2009, 74.
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while the Social Democrats and the Left party opposed it40. The discus-
sions of irregular migrants in the Swedish parliament have thus taken place 
against a backdrop of two distinct cleavages related to asylum and labour 
migration policy respectively. Furthermore, throughout the period studied, 
the overall political situation has changed significantly on two occasions; 
the general elections in 2006 and 2010 affected the constellations of parlia-
mentary alliances. The election of 2006 brought about a shift in government 
with two important implications; first, the co-operation between the Social 
Democrats and the Conservatives came to an end and, second, the instate-
ment of the new labour migration regime was made possible. In the election 
of 2010, the Sweden Democrats, a party with an openly anti-immigration 
rhetoric and a platform of severely restricting migration, managed to win 
seats in parliament. This meant that voices openly hostile to immigration, 
as well as to proposals to grant rights to irregular migrants, became present 
in the debate. 
In 2003, when the topic of irregular migrants was first raised in the de-
bate in the form of concern for ‘hidden refugees’, Sweden was run by a Social 
Democratic minority government that generally relied on support from the 
Left party and the Green party. However, in matters of migration, as men-
tioned earlier, the Social Democrats relied on support from the Conserva-
tive party. Following this established pattern, the two parties took a similar 
stance and rejected the demands for a general amnesty that were raised in 
connection to the reformation of the asylum process. Both parties claimed 
that a general amnesty would undermine the right of asylum and the very 
principle of regulated migration. The other five parties in parliament were 
in favour of an amnesty as a way to give restitution to all of those who had 
been mistreated by a failed order that they had consistently criticized over 
the years. 
In 2006, Sweden had a shift in government as the elections resulted in a 
success for the newly-formed alliance between the four right-wing parties 
in Sweden. The election was also followed by a change in positions; those 
40 Spång 2009, 92.
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right-wing parties that had previously been in favour of a general amnesty 
shifted their position with the argument that the demands for amnesty were 
restricted to a certain moment in time, which had passed, with the instate-
ment of the new order. Thereafter, the Left and the Green parties were the 
only parties raising consistent demands for regularization. However, a broad 
alliance, comprising all parties except the Conservative party (and, since 
2010, the Sweden Democrats), has called for an expansion of social rights to 
address the most acute vulnerability of people staying irregularly in Sweden. 
The centrality of categorization 
Categorization of people and phenomena taking place as part of political 
debates is especially prominent in debates on migration, since labels, as 
pointed out by Elspeth Guild, serve a crucial function as instruments to 
sort out different individuals’ relation to citizenship regimes. Categorization 
is also closely linked to legitimacy since the words we use to describe indi-
viduals and groups carry normative loads. The label ‘refugee’, for instance, 
carries a moral imperative and a nonnegotiable right to stay if the status 
is recognized, whereas the label ‘economic migrant’ renders claims to stay 
illegitimate and provides the state with a legitimate reason to renounce re-
sponsibility41. Thus, the labelling of people in contemporary debates on mi-
gration policy serves the function of sorting out who does and does not have 
a legitimate claim to stay, and as such, to be incorporated in the community 
with all it entails in the form of attached rights. 
Distinctions between different kinds of migration and migrants are thus 
constitutive of discourses on migration. Furthermore, this emphasis on 
categorization is closely linked to attempts by states to regulate migration 
flows. Sweden is no exception and, as the following quotes attest, there is an 
overarching agreement on the principle of regulated migration:
41 Guild, Elspeth (2009) Security and Migration in the 21st Century. Cambridge: Polity, 13. 
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An independent country with its own laws and welfare systems must 
have a regulation of migration and be able to decide who is and who 
is not to settle here. 
(Ulf Nilsson (LiP) 42, 2007/08:43)43
One of the most important goals of migration policy is to ensure that 
the regulation of migration is maintained /.../ In order to meet this 
new situation our attitude must be to take our international respon-
sibility at the same time as we defend our own national welfare.
(Anita Jönsson (Soc D), 2004/05:40) 
At the same time, it is generally recognized that the fundamental prin-
ciple of the state’s right to regulate entrance is in tension with another basic 
assumption. As is made evident in the quote below, it is acknowledged that 
the state’s capacity to act is circumscribed by international conventions, as 
well as other agreements, to which Sweden has promised to commit:
We have the goal to stand up for the right for asylum. We shall have 
an open door for all people who are persecuted. At the same time 
we have the goal that we shall have a regulated migration. There is a 
tension between these goals.
(Barbro Holmberg (Soc D), 2004/05:40) 
The quote above summarizes the Swedish approach to migration and 
its adherence to two contradictory aims; while the right of states to control 
migration and the necessity of such controls is a given starting point, there 
is a general consensus that the right to asylum constitutes a restraint on 
42 Since it is not my intention to map out differences in stances between political parties I will not 
discuss which party different Members of Parliament belong to in my analysis. I will, however, mark 
the party membership of each individual being quoted making use of the following abbreviations: 
GP- Green party (Miljöpartiet), LeP- Left party (Vänsterpartiet), Soc D- Social democrats (Socialde­
mokraterna), CP- Centre party (Centerpartiet), LiP- Liberal party (Folkpartiet), MP- Moderate party 
(Moderaterna) and CD- Christian democrats (Kristdemokraterna).
43 All quotes in the paper have been translated from Swedish to English by me. I have tried to remain as 
faithful as possible to the original statements while making some small adjustments in order to make 
the translations comprehensible and (somewhat) grammatically correct.
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the state’s ambition to regulate migration. Consequently, migration policy 
circles around how to balance these two principles. 
It is this tension that gives rise to the preoccupation with categoriza-
tion, because categorization is essential in determining whether prospec-
tive migrants are considered to have legitimate claims to stay in Sweden. As 
previously stressed, efforts to sort out the precise status of those arriving to 
Sweden became increasingly important as opportunities to enter as a labour 
migrant were restricted, and in order to qualify for entry, migrants had to be 
able to show that they were proper refugees and worthy of protection. The 
centrality of attempts at categorization is also visible in the Swedish parlia-
mentary debates on irregular migrants, where it is possible to identify com-
peting interpretations of who constitutes the category of irregular migrant, 
and why they have decided to stay irregularly. Among the most prominent 
features of these discussions have been the attempts to establish the status 
of irregular migrants in relation to the asylum regime; that is, to establish 
whether they are actually ‘real’ refugees or rather, economic migrants. The 
primary importance of categorization is thus due to the fact that it is crucial 
in determining whether migrants’ claims to stay in Sweden are legitimate or 
illegitimate. Historically, being recognized as a refugee has been the princi-
pal path to legitimacy due to a general agreement that those who are refu-
gees according to the criteria spelled out in the Geneva Conventions should 
have an undisputed right to stay. Likewise, in line with recent emphasis on 
the need for labour migration, a new basis of deserving has opened up for 
those passing as hard-working migrants contributing to the advancement of 
the general welfare of society. 
Debating and defining the ‘problem’ of irregular migration
The process of categorization, that is the classification of migrants and the 
supposed causes of their entry, has a privileged position in the debate be-
cause it is crucial to the establishment of a particular understanding of what 
constitutes the problem. As Carol Bacchi has pointed out, it is important to 
investigate how problems are framed, since they are endogenous to, or cre-
ated within, the policy-making process, rather than exogenous and existing 
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outside in the world. That is, policies shape problems rather than simply 
address them44. Consequently, the formulation of policy also gives an in-
dication of how the problem is defined and, thus, leads Bacchi to stress the 
analysis of the problem through the policy solution. Accordingly, in this 
section I investigate how irregular migrants are conceptualized as a problem 
in the political debates with particular emphasis on the solutions offered45.
There has been widespread agreement that former asylum seekers (who 
have had their applications declined) constitute the bulk of those staying 
irregularly in Sweden. However, it is possible to identify competing under-
standings of why their applications were turned down, and consequently, 
what the origin of the phenomena is. The initial mobilization claiming to 
act on behalf of irregular migrants clearly linked the problem to the failures 
of Swedish asylum policy. The first calls for an amnesty appeared at a point 
in time when a consensus on the need for a major reform of the Swedish 
asylum system had been reached. Hence, amnesty was first introduced as 
a practical solution (solving the problem of a large number of open cases 
in need of a final decision) as well as a solution to the moral failure of the 
old order. Similarly, parliamentary debates have tended to circle around the 
alleged failures of Swedish policy and the estimations made in relations to 
people’s claim for asylum. 
In the parliamentary debates analyzed, it is possible to identify a funda-
mental division between those who argue that applications for asylum have 
been turned down because the assessments are too rigid and those who ar-
gue that applications have been turned down because people fail to fulfil the 
criteria spelled out in legislation. The former position can be identified as an 
underlying premise in many of the statements that emphasize the rationality 
of migrants’ decisions to go into hiding: 
44 Bacchi, Carol (2009) Analysing Policy. What’s the problem represented to be? French Forets: Pearson, 
x-xi. 
45 As Bacchi is associated with an elaborated methodological approach to the investigation of how prob-
lems are constituted in the policy-making process, I wish to stress that the analysis in this paper is not 
carried out in accordance with this framework. 
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This politics of asylum forces people to live hidden […] because they 
have no alternative when what is offered is return to a country where 
they run the risk of being persecuted, oppressed and maybe even 
tortured.
(Kalle Larsson (LeP), 2009/10:107) 
To live hidden is associated with the worst form of exposure […] In or-
der to expose oneself and one’s children to this you have to have a very 
marked fear of the alternative, a fear as well-founded as any fear can be.
(Sven Brus (CD), 2005/06:3) 
In emphasizing that the migrants have no choice but to hide from the 
authorities, these debaters indirectly affirm their claims for asylum. Accord-
ing to this understanding, the problem consists in an unduly strict appli-
cation of present regulation. The opposite understanding can be identified 
among those who stress that the rising rates of declined applications are due 
to changing conditions: 
Today fewer people are estimated to have grounds of asylum by re-
sponsible authorities. To an increasing extent, other reasons cause 
people to leave their homeland with the hope that another country will 
offer better conditions. This changed mobility among people […] is by 
many taken as an indicator of harsher policy and a change of praxis.
(Göte Wahlström (Soc D), 2004/05:99) 
There has been no change in legislation. There has been no change of 
praxis. The reality, however, has changed. What we can see today is 
that the number of refugees in the world is decreasing. In the entire 
EU we see that the number of people with claims for asylum actu-
ally has decreased because the world is different. That does not mean 
that people have no reasons. Many have very strong reasons, but not 
always reasons related to asylum.
(Barbro Holmberg (Soc D), 2004/05:99) 
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According to this understanding it is changes in migratory patterns 
rather than Swedish policy and praxis that explain apparently increasing 
‘restrictiveness’. The implication of this conception is that a growing num-
ber of those applying for asylum lack legitimate claims, and thus, are not 
‘proper’ refugees.
A similar understanding of the problem can be identified in the state-
ments made by those representatives who stress that the current predica-
ment is associated with the lack of alternative ways to enter Sweden. These 
participants in the debate share the interpretation that rising rates of refusals 
are due to the fact that more and more people fail to fulfil the criteria for 
asylum, but their understanding of the problem at work differs somewhat 
because they regard this to be due to the absence of a regime of labour mi-
gration:
These problems are, amongst others, due to the fact that we, on the 
one hand, are to receive refugees for the sake of protection while we, 
on the other hand, have created obstacles for people who come here 
as labour migrants […] Unfortunately, it has only become possible to 
come to Sweden as a refugee in need of protection. That means that 
people who otherwise wouldn’t appeal for protection in order to get 
a residence permit have been forced to do so.
(Tomas Högström (MP), 2005/06:3) 
It is probable that increased possibilities [of labour migration] would 
reduce the large influx of asylum seekers without claims for asylum 
or protection to Sweden. You should be directed to the right queue 
from the start. You should be in the queue for labour instead of the 
queue for asylum if you lack grounds to appeal for asylum.
(Tobias Billström (MP), 2004/05:130) 
This kind of argumentation confirms the image that most contemporary 
asylum seekers are, in fact, not refugees in the proper sense of the term. 
Consequently, labour migration can be brought forward as a solution to the 
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problems associated with the processing of appeals for asylum. In corre-
spondence with such an understanding, labour migration can be described 
as a form of ‘relief ’ in relation to the pathway for refugees, because increased 
possibilities to enter as a labour migrant will result in fewer unfounded asy-
lum claims, and thus, shorter waiting periods and greater chances of positive 
rulings in relation to valid asylum applications46. The common denominator 
of these statements is that they, as suggested by the quotes offered above, 
assume that many of the people who apply for asylum are not ‘real’ refugees 
but rather labour migrants.
Throughout the period of investigation there are thus two competing 
conceptions of the origins of the problem of irregular migration: 1) the 
application of asylum policy is unduly strict or 2) people lack legitimate 
grounds to appeal for asylum. Moreover, if these two understandings are 
combined with the policy solutions suggested, it is possible to discern three 
distinct positions depending on how the problem is linked to different 
kinds of policy failure. Those who stress the first understanding link the 
problem to a failure produced by a deficient policy and praxis of asylum, 
whereas those who stress the second understanding disagree on the kind 
of policy failure at hand. Some recognize only minor deficiencies in the 
current system and legislation and stress the lack of ability and ambition 
to enforce the decisions taken in relation to migration (i.e. neglecting to 
enforce refusals and deportations). Correspondingly, they argue in favour 
of an asylum process with a final closure, where those migrants whose ap-
plications have been turned down must leave the country. Other speakers 
who agree that many irregular migrants lack legitimate claim to asylum, 
stress a policy failure in the form of a lack of a path of entry for labour 
migrants. The debates on irregular migration thus become linked to the 
broader struggles of migration policy, as different actors try to promote a 
specific understanding of the problem at hand, as well as suitable solutions. 
Both proponents and opponents of a more flexible regulation of labour 
migration (an issue that was on the agenda throughout the 2000’s, both 
46 (Fredrik Malm (LiP) 2006/07:37)
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preceding and succeeding the instatement of such a regime in 2008) tried, 
in diametrically opposed ways, to link their favoured policy to the discus-
sion on irregular migrants. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the very understanding of what 
constitutes the problem of irregular migration is interesting in a compara-
tive perspective. The Swedish debates circle around the assumption that it is 
irregular migrants’ lack of rights, and the corresponding vulnerability from 
which they suffer that constitute the main problem. A number of scholars 
have pointed to that there has been a tendency within the EU, as well as 
many of its member states, to debate illegal migration as a threat and that 
many politicians have been engaged in a race for taking the toughest stance 
on the matter. Thus, irregular migration has recurrently come to be linked 
to a range of more or less related issues, such as shadow economies and the 
informal labour market47, and framed as a security issue48 in many coun-
tries. Given this context, it is worth mentioning that this tendency remains 
marginalized in the Swedish debate, thus indicating that there are paths not 
taken. Although there are undercurrents pointing in such a direction– this 
position has, admittedly, been properly represented in political debates 
since the entrance of the Sweden Democrats following the 2010 election– I 
contend that the conceptualization of irregular migration as a burden or 
threat is much less prevalent in Sweden.
Discursive strategies
The analysis of discursive articulations that seek to establish irregular mi-
grants as right-bearers shows that several, more or less intertwined, strate-
gies are employed by participants in the debates. These can be distinguished 
according to whether the participants put their emphasis on rights or actions 
in their attempts to secure rights for those staying in the country irregularly. 
Rights are stressed in relation to both claims for regularization and claims 
for an expansion of social rights in the form of access to schooling and sub-
47 Triandafyllidou, Anna (2010) ‘Irregular Migration in Europe in the Early 21st Century’. In Trian-
dafyllidou, Anna (ed.) Irregular Migration in Europe. Myths and realities. Farnham: Ashgate, 1. 
48 Huysmans, Jef (2006) The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, migration and asylum in the EU. Abingdon: Rout-
ledge.
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sidized medical care, whereas actions are primarily stressed in relation to 
claims for regularization.
Stressing rights
Participants in the debate who claim to advance the interests of irregular 
migrants—by arguing for either general amnesty or the granting of ba-
sic social rights—continuously employ different notions of rights. There 
is, most evidently, a recurrent tendency for these debaters to make refer-
ences to international agreements and draw from the discourse of human 
rights in their pleas for policy revision. In the parliamentary sessions I have 
studied, there are repeated references to the different international agree-
ments that Sweden has promised to abide by, such as the UN Declaration 
of Human Rights and the UN Children’s Convention, as well as the Geneva 
Conventions. Swedish policy is held to be unacceptable if it breaches these 
agreements through the denial of either claims for refuge or basic human 
rights. 
Accordingly, the most prevalent discursive strategy in demands for regu-
larization is to claim the victimhood of migrants and call for restitution. The 
first demands for amnesty were initiated against the backdrop of the alleged 
humanitarian failures, which were framed as resulting from Swedish policy 
and praxis. Thus, the target group of the reform was clearly singled out as:
…those who have gone underground because they are afraid of re-
turning to their country of origin. Those who hide fear abuse, rape 
and persecution in their countries of origin more than living under 
miserable conditions somewhere in Sweden.
(Anne-Marie Ekström (LiP), 2005/06:3) 
Through recurring references to ‘hidden refugees’, participants in the 
debate recognized those failed asylum seekers as ‘real refugees’ despite their 
formal lack of such status, thus creating a moral imperative to help them. 
These speakers also established a link between the failure of the (aban-
doned) old system and the need for regularization. This line of argument 
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stresses the victimhood of the irregular migrants by focusing on their suf-
fering and vulnerability. 
It is about people who have had their application for asylum turned 
down, but, who, both in accordance with Swedish law and interna-
tional conventions have reasonable claims for protection in Sweden 
[…] Many of these people live hidden in Sweden and have stayed 
because they, with good reason, fear inhuman treatment, harassment 
and humiliation in the country of origin they have once fled from.
(Sven Brus (CD), 2005/06:26)
Those holding this view repeatedly return to the fact that the irregular 
migrants have been mistreated by the old order. 
Those people who have become victims of an asylum policy char-
acterized by its inhumanity, lack of legal security and arbitrariness 
must be offered restitution and a chance to restart their lives.
(Anne-Marie Ekström (LiP), 2005/06:3)
This discursive strategy ultimately draws on the right to asylum. It is 
based on the recognition of irregular migrants as refugees who, as such, 
should have been granted asylum. It is this assumption that makes it pos-
sible to constitute irregular migrants as victims who have been mistreated 
by the system. 
Notions of human rights are drawn upon by those who make the argu-
ment that there are some basic social rights that should be granted to all 
residents independently of their legal status. According to one interpreta-
tion, as expressed in the quote below, the current denial of basic social rights 
breaches the principle of human rights: 
Are you primarily a human being or are you primarily a citizen? Are 
the human rights supposed to be rights of citizenship, something 
you earn because you are born in a certain country […] or do you 
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have them from birth […] just because you are a human being? My 
answer to that question is: human rights are human.
(Kalle Larsson (LeP), 2007/08:115) 
This radical interpretation draws the conclusion that the rights Sweden 
today reserves for residents with legal status should be granted to everyone 
residing in the country, because everyone, in their capacity as human beings, 
is entitled to these rights. The discursive articulations that seek to secure 
rights through this strategy differ in the scope they accord to human rights. 
A number of contributions to the debate explicitly attempt to problematize 
the distinction between human rights and citizenship rights. They consis-
tently offer the conclusion that the two kinds of rights differ in the sense 
that citizenship rights are linked to citizenship and are national, whereas hu-
man rights are linked to the individual and are universal. Speakers using this 
distinction between citizenship rights and human rights argue that medical 
care is a human right and, as such, should be provided to all people in the 
country. That is, although ‘people who stay here illegally should not have all 
the rights that citizens have’ there still are a number of ‘certain basic human 
rights’ and to these belong ‘the right to life and health’49. Debaters recur-
rently claim that ‘all people should have a right to health and medical care 
as a part of human rights’, and stress that the issue of providing medical care 
should not be used to support more restrictive migration policy50. These 
speakers confront the assumption that improving the conditions of those 
staying irregularly by granting them social rights would make irregular stay 
a more attractive option and undermine the possibility to enforce refusals.
Thus, notions of universal human rights can be mobilized to challenge 
the current system of rights tied to citizenship. Furthermore, in the Swedish 
context, the ideational complex underpinning the welfare state can serve a 
similar function because, as I stressed in the initial discussion, its inherent 
ambivalence can be used as a starting point for contestation. The historical 
efforts to secure inclusion for all through the welfare state open up a space 
49 (Ulf Nilsson (LiP) 2009/10:26)
50 (Gunvor G Ericson (GP) 2007/08:115)
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for critique in relation to the fate of the irregular migrants. In the debates I 
have studied, there is a general agreement that the precarious circumstances 
to which irregular migrants are exposed are unacceptable and that these 
conditions are unworthy of the Swedish welfare state: 
How is it possible that a country that praises itself for being the most 
important outpost of welfare on Earth, as well as a conscience of the 
world when it comes to humanity, treats those most worthy of pro-
tection, and at the same time the most defenceless children, in the 
cruel fashion of today? 
(Inger Davidson (CD), 2004/05:84) 
My interpellation is about people who are in Sweden and work in 
Sweden. As such, they contribute to Swedish welfare. They have jobs 
and apartments, live here […] But they are excluded from what we 
know as the Swedish welfare.
(Gustav Fridolin (GP), 2004/05:61)
A similar thought reappears in another statement which deems it unac-
ceptable that a ‘[labour] market consisting of people who have been labelled 
as ‘illegal’ emerges in a welfare society such as Sweden’51. In the quoted pas-
sages, the circumstances of the irregular migrants are put in contrast with 
the presumed workings of the universal welfare state. Specifically, the group’s 
rightlessness and vulnerability appear as a crisis because these conditions 
are incompatible with the widely shared norms of the welfare state that all 
people are entitled to basic rights and social security. Thus, the norms and 
other ideals of the welfare state can be mobilized to draw attention to the 
unacceptability of the present conditions.
Stressing actions
So far I have discussed how notions of rights can be used to challenge the 
51 (Gustav Fridolin (GP), 2005/06:125)
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rightlessness and precarity that follow from irregularity. Another discursive 
strategy is to stress the actions of irregular migrants. Saskia Sassen has, in 
the US context, argued that the fact that irregular migrants embody citi-
zens in practice opens up a space for claims-making. Sassen stresses that 
the engagement of many irregular migrants who are long-term residents in 
the same practices and routines of everyday life as formally-defined citizens 
produces an informal social contract between the migrants and the commu-
nities in which they live. She argues that it is this social contract, based on 
the demonstration of ‘civic involvement, social deservedness, and national 
loyalty’, which makes it possible for migrants to claim the right of (legal) 
residency52. Hence, irregular migrants gain a platform from which they can 
claim rights, recognition and inclusion in society by embodying citizens, 
despite being formally excluded from citizenship. 
I argue that the continuous references to irregular migrants as tax-
payers, workers, and parents in the Swedish parliamentary debates serve 
a similar function. As exemplified by the next quote, there is a tendency 
in the debates to appeal to the fact that the irregular migrants are already 
integrated into society: 
They know the language and our society. They are in many cases al-
ready well integrated. They have children and family here and social 
networks, and many have jobs […] They are here and they will not 
return to their countries of origin.
(Bodil Ceballos (GP), 2006/07:37) 
This emphasis on the fact that irregular migrants engage in the same 
kind of activities, as citizens, such as working and raising children, serves 
the function of drawing attention to common experiences. As such, these 
references are ultimately an attempt to establish a kind of everyday com-
monality in shared humanity. Although I recognize the important differenc-
es that make simple comparisons with the US context impossible, I suggest 
52 Sassen 2005. 
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that these kinds of arguments can be seen as a parallel to the logic of ‘acting 
as citizens’ that has been identified by Sassen in the US. By performing the 
practices associated with citizenship, whether it refers to formal obligations 
such as paying taxes or the informal everyday acts of providing for one’s 
family, migrants come to embody citizens and gain a claim for legitimacy. 
This discursive emphasis on action differs from the strategies previously 
mentioned, in that it downplays both rights and victimhood and stresses 
the actions of irregular migrants. Discursive articulations that stress how 
irregular migrants contribute to society constitute a particular kind of this 
strategy. The quote below exemplifies the tendency among proponents of 
regularization to argue that irregular migrants could be turned into tax-
paying citizens that contribute to society. 
It is about people who could give a great contribution to Sweden 
and be of great benefit if we made use of the resource these people 
constitute. A great many of these people have jobs and pay taxes, 
their children go to school and we know that Sweden will need more 
people who work in the future.
(Birgitta Carlsson (CP), 2005/06:3) 
The articulations belonging to this category not only emphasize the fact 
that irregular migrants embody citizens through their actions, but also stress 
those actions that establish irregular migrants as productive and contribut-
ing members of society. This can be linked to the gradual increase in inter-
est in labour migration, which is coterminous with the debates on irregular 
migration. I contend that the logic of ‘acting as citizens’ gains a further di-
mension, the emphasis on productivity, as a result of this parallel debate. As 
I have previously shown, there are attempts to establish the understanding 
that irregular migration has arisen as a consequence of protectionist policy. 
Accordingly, irregular migrants are constituted as prospective workers that 
have illegitimately been kept from entering the labour market. 
It should be noted that the discursive strategies drawn upon, and the 
bases of merit they establish, carry somewhat different implications. That 
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is, if the right to stay is legitimized with reference to the potential contribu-
tions from migrants in the capacities of worker and tax-payer, this creates 
demands that these expectations are actually fulfilled. Consequently, for the 
individual migrants, it matters what kind of line of argumentation is used to 
legitimate their stay. Furthermore, even though a strategy that emphasises 
the economic and social benefits of migration can be successful and result 
in inclusion for some migrants, it also runs the risk of reinforcing the overall 
division of migrants into ‘productive’, i.e. ‘desirable’, and ‘unproductive’ cat-
egories53. Consequently, there is a risk that in the long run this argumenta-
tion contributes to the erosion of the right to asylum. 
Implications for the current citizenship regime
The different discursive strategies employed in the debate all aim to establish 
irregular migrants as right-bearers, by either shifting their status (i.e. regu-
larizing them) to a category that has an established access to rights or grant­
ing rights to a category of residents that currently lack them. These two kinds 
of demands, however, relate differently to the current regime of citizenship. 
The demands that challenge the denial of legal status to irregular migrants 
(and, consequently, also the accompanying rights) and seek to legalize their 
stay, aim to secure rights for irregular migrant by accommodating them 
within the present regime. In contrast, the demands for basic rights, such 
as medical care and schooling, for migrants who lack legal status entail, al-
though implicitly, a destabilization of the current order, because they under-
mine the link between citizenship and rights.
A decision to grant people staying in the country irregularly access to 
some basic rights might, from an activist perspective, be a less satisfactory 
outcome. At the same time, such a decision would, from an analytical point 
of view, be considered more far-reaching it would entail a clear break with 
the current approach which reserves rights for people belonging to the dif-
ferent categories of legal residents. In the wake of the political debates ana-
lyzed in this chapter, two public investigations have been initiated to review 
53 Squire, Vicki (2009) The exclusionary politics of asylum. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; McNevin 
2011, 23–25. 
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present regulations. The first investigation, Schooling for all children [SOU 
2010:5 Skolgång för alla barn], was presented in January 2010 and concluded 
that all children have a right to education irrespective of legal status. The 
second investigation, Medical care according to need and on equal terms­ a 
human right [SOU 2011:48 Vård efter behov och på lika villkor­ en mänsklig 
rättighet] was presented in May 2011 and concluded that people staying in 
Sweden irregularly, as well as asylum seekers, should have access to medical 
care on equal terms with other permanent residents. Most importantly, they 
should be entitled to subsidized care. 
There is currently broad parliamentary support for both measures across 
the government-opposition division. This broad support indicates that the 
discursive struggles have resulted in a shift in the understanding of the con-
nection between rights and legal residence and, importantly, that political 
actors have not withdrawn their support for these challenges to the cur-
rent order upon obtaining decision-making power. Despite this support, 
the proposals have not been realized and there have been accusations that 
the current government is delaying the decision-making process54. In June 
2012 it was, however, announced that a change in legislation will be imple-
mented on July 1, 2013, in accordance with an agreement reached between 
the government and the Green party55. The proposed revisions will, when 
implemented, give irregular migrants access to medical care under the same 
terms as asylum seekers56. 
Both the proposals suggested by the public investigations and the less 
far-reaching government proposal for expanded access to medical care con-
stitute a break with the principle that the privileges associated with social 
54 One instance where such critique has been raised is when representatives of the youth organiza-
tions of a number of Swedish political parties made a mutual contribution to the debate in a leading 
newspaper. In this they stressed the urgency of the reform and the importance of initiating the chain 
towards implementation. Svenska Dagbladet. 10 February 2012. ’Inte anständigt att fortsätta diskrim-
inera’. 
55 Regeringskansliet. Fakta­PM om överenskommelsen om vård. 
56 The proposal is less far-reaching than the changes called for by the public investigation, which sug-
gested that both asylum seekers and irregular migrants should be granted the same access to medical 
care as (legal) permanent residents. Currently, adult asylum seekers enjoy only restricted access to 
subsidized care and the new government proposal will incorporate adults staying irregularly in the 
country under the same terms. Correspondingly, children staying irregularly will enjoy full access to 
medical care, as do children applying for asylum. 
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citizenship should be reserved exclusively for those who reside in the coun-
try legally. As such, the proposed changes can be understood as attempts to 
further expand the community whose members carry rights, equivalent to 
the historic expansion where non-citizens with a permanent residence per-
mit, so-called denizens, were attributed rights57. Furthermore, as previously 
stressed, references to notions of human rights are a key component of the 
discursive strategies to challenge the current order. This can be taken as an 
instance of the general trend of notions of human rights contributing to a 
destabilization of traditional notions of citizenship. As Yasemin Soysal has 
pointed out, the ‘national order of citizenship’ is undermined as the rights 
and privileges that were once reserved for citizens are ‘codified and expand-
ed as personal rights’. In a classic analysis, she accredits the expansion of 
rights granted to migrants58 to changes in the understanding of citizenship, 
or more precisely, to a shift to universal personhood, rather than national 
belonging, as the qualifying principle59. Hence, notions of human rights can 
be mobilized to undermine the link between social rights and citizenship 
upon which the national welfare state is premised60. 
Concluding remarks
This chapter has offered an analysis of recent political debates on irregular 
migrants in Sweden starting from the assumption that the ‘discovery’ of this 
group can be interpreted as an instance of dislocation, which has triggered 
a struggle over meaning. The analysis, conducted with a discourse analysis 
framework, has focused on the struggles to establish an understanding of ir-
regular migration, as well as the related attempts to categorize the migrants 
constituting the group. Furthermore, the analysis contains a mapping of 
the discursive strategies mobilized in the debates in order to grant rights to 
those staying in the country irregularly. 
57 Hammar, Tomas (1990) Democracy and the nation state: aliens, denizens and citizens in a world of 
international migration. Aldershot: Avebury. 
58 It should however be noted that Soysal’s argument has been developed to account for the granting of 
rights to migrants arriving during the wave of post-war labour migration. 
59 Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoğlu (1994) Limits of citizenship : migrants and postnational membership in Eu­
rope. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1,3. 
60 Although, it should be noted that the link between social rights and citizenship was already destabi-
lized decades ago as a result of the decision to grant rights to migrants with residence permits.
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Drawing on insights offered by citizenship theory, I have elaborated on 
how the demarcations of the welfare state are contested and negotiated in 
contemporary political debates. The analysis starts from the assumption 
that the demarcation between different categories of residents in relation to 
citizenship regimes and the rights granted to citizens, denizens, and aliens 
respectively are, ultimately, open to negotiation. Historically, there has been 
an expansion of rights for those residing in the country permanently, i.e. 
denizens, and the conclusions from my analysis indicate that we are possibly 
moving towards a new expansion. I argue that the discursive struggles over 
how to interpret the appearance of irregularity have been of key importance 
in bringing about an opening for policy change. The establishment of an 
understanding of irregular migration as policy failure has created a platform 
for making demands. Furthermore, through turning the provision of basic 
social rights into something to be claimed by everyone in society–drawing 
on both conceptions of human rights and the inclusiveness of the welfare 
state– proponents of policy revision have established a widespread agree-
ment on the need for revision. Hence, I argue that the recurring debates on 
irregular migration can be understood as an instance where the demarca-
tions of the welfare state are being contested and negotiated. 
Finally, the analysis in this chapter has also explored how the constitu-
tive tension of the (national) welfare state manifests in the contemporary 
struggles over the rights granted to irregular migrants. The findings suggest 
that the duality of the welfare project can be understood as both the source 
and the solution to the ‘problem’ of irregular migration. It is the source in 
that the limiting of welfare ambitions to a restricted community gives rise 
to migration control and, consequently, produces a situation where staying 
irregularly, despite the subsequent lack of rights and security, becomes the 
only choice for people who do not consider leaving the country an alter-
native. The inherent duality of the welfare state is also the solution to the 
‘problem’ of irregular migration; the universalist framing of the inclusionary 
ambitions of the welfare state creates expectations that can be used to mobi-
lize on behalf of those without rights.
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CHAPTER 3
 
‘This welfare of ours’: 
Justifying public advocacy for 
anti-immigration politics in Finland 
during the late 2000’s
niko pyrhönen 
The anti-immigration oriented political mobilization and the rapidly rising 
public support for anti-immigration politics has been a heated topic in the 
Finnish and Swedish media, particularly after the recent electoral victories 
of Perussuomalaiset1 (PS) in 2008 and 2011 and Sverigedemokraterna (SD) 
in 2010.2 It is hardly surprising that in the public debate, there has been little 
agreement between the voters of the said parties and other commentators 
when it comes to the reasons behind the success of populist anti-immigra-
tion political agenda. Editorials, blogs and letters to the editor have referred 
to the electoral successes with a variety of expressions, among others as ‘red-
neck elections’3, ‘manifestation of resentment towards upper classes and ‘the 
1 In this chapter I refer to the parties with their original names, rather than translating them. The 
main reason for this is to avoid ambiguity related to the English translation of Perussuomalaiset. 
During the period covered in this chapter, Perussuomalaiset used the translation ‘True Finns,’ but as 
of August 2011 started referring to themselves as ‘The Finns’ in international contexts. Since ‘True 
Finns’ is an outdated name, but referring to them as ‘The Finns’ is an analytically problematic trans-
lation, running the risk of the party being conflated to Finns as the people, using the original names 
allows for conducting the analysis with as little ambiguity as possible.
2 Hannula, Milla (2011) Maassa maan tavalla: maahanmuuttokritiikin lyhyt historia. Helsinki: Otava, 
179–185; Keskinen, Suvi, Anna Rastas & Salla Tuori (2009) ’Suomalainen maahanmuuttokeskustelu 
tienhaarassa’. In Keskinen, Suvi, Anna Rastas & Salla Tuori (eds) En ole rasisti, mutta...: maahan­
muutosta, monikulttuurisuudesta ja kritiikistä. Tampere: Vastapaino, 7.
3 Kononen, Seppo (2011) ‘Populismi jyllää myös presidentinvaaleissa’. Savon Sanomat. 23 Apr. 
2012. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.savonsanomat.fi/uutiset/kotimaa/populismi-
jyll%C3%A4%C3%A4-my%C3%B6s-presidentinvaaleissa/665765> (accessed 23 April 2012).
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end of consensus’4, ‘victory of democracy’5, ‘the yeast that brings the spirit 
back to politic’6, ‘brought about by the opaqueness of the public debate’7, and 
‘brought about by the myth of opaqueness of public debate’8. 
What such interpretations in mainstream media have in common, is that 
they attribute the electoral result – the increased support for populist parties 
– to various latent, macro-level phenomena; resentment, erosion of political 
consensus or problems in how the public debate functions. It is far less com-
mon to encounter accounts that focus on the agency side and emphasize on 
what the parties and people affiliated to them actually said or did in order 
to achieve this manifold increase in electoral support. Also regarding the re-
cent academic approaches to anti-immigration advocacy, much of the litera-
ture has been looking into the demand side9 of the phenomenon, in terms 
of fleshing out how factors such as the social psychology of xenophobia and 
the societal macro-level developments – most importantly globalization and 
work-related precariousness – facilitate public anti-immigration advocacy.10
4 Räty, Reetta (2011) ‘Arvot ovat voimakkainta, mitä on’. Helsingin Sanomat. 19 Apr. 2011. Online. 
Available HTTP: <http://www.hs.fi/paakirjoitus/artikkeli/Arvot+ovat+voimakkainta+mit%C3%A4+
on/1135265513471> (accessed 23 April 2012).
5 HS, editorial (2011) ‘Timo Soini teki vaaleissa kaikkien aikojen historiaa’. Helsingin Sanomat.18 Apr. 
2011. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.hs.fi/paakirjoitus/artikkeli/Timo+Soini+teki+vaaleiss
a+kaikkien+aikojen+historiaa/1135265485232> (accessed 23 Apr. 2012) Online. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.ingress.com/~astanart.pritzker/pritzker.html> (accessed 23 April 2012).
6 HS, editorial (2008) ‘Tavallinen kansalainen onkin paras muutosvoima’. Helsingin Sanomat. 12 Jun. 
2008. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.hs.fi/paakirjoitus/artikkeli/Tavallinen+kansalainen+on
kin+paras+muutosvoima/1135241708233> (accessed 23 April 2012).
7 Neuding, Paulina & Johan Lundberg (2010) ‘”Vi efterlyser en debatt om invandringens problem”’. 
Dagens Nyheter. 23 Sept. 2010. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.dn.se/debatt/vi-efterlyser-en-
debatt-om-invandringens-problem> (accessed 23 April 2012).
8 Tydén, Mattias (2010) ‘”Tankefel i debatten om Sverigedemokraterna”’. Dagens Nyheter. 28 Sep. 2011. 
Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.dn.se/debatt/tankefel-i-debatten-om-sverigedemokraterna> 
(accessed 23 April 2012).
9 Here I refer to the typology that divides approaches seeking to explain the support for European 
populist radical right parties into supply and demand approaches. The demand side approaches 
focus more on the macro level societal features that render the potential electorates favourable to the 
populist political agenda. The supply side approaches, on the other hand, focus on how the parties 
themselves construct and make use of various ‘background phenomena’, effectively converting a po-
tential for support to actual support. See, Mudde, Cas (2007) Populist radical right parties in Europe. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 201, 232, 256. 
10 See, for example, Crepaz, Markus (2006) ‘’If you are my brother, I may give you a dime!’ Public 
opinion on multiculturalism, trust, and the welfare state’. In Banting, Keith & Will Kymlicka (eds) 
Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: recognition and redistribution in contemporary democracies. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press; Himanen, Markus & Jukka Könönen (2010) Maahanmuuttopoliit­
tinen sanasto. Helsinki: Like; Keskinen, Suvi, Anna Rastas & Salla Tuori (eds) (2009) En ole rasisti, 
mutta...: maahanmuutosta, monikulttuurisuudesta ja kritiikistä. Tampere: Vastapaino; Koivunen, 
Anu & Mikko Lehtonen (2011) Kuinka meitä kutsutaan? Kulttuuriset merkityskamppailut nyky­Suo­
messa. Tampere: Vastapaino.
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Another branch of relevant academic literature focuses on the mecha-
nisms through which public media exposure facilitates the electoral success 
of right-wing populist parties that commonly advocate anti-immigration 
policies on their agendas.11 In the Finnish context, Mari Maasilta recently 
conducted an interesting study that indicates how immigration-related top-
ics are channelled from traditional types of media to social media and vice 
versa during the Finnish parliamentary elections of 2011.12
Even so, the agency-oriented supply side – that is, what various anti-im-
migration actors do and say in concrete and empirical terms in order to ac-
tualize the potential for popular support – has been studied somewhat less. 
Cas Mudde extensively researched populist radical right parties in Europe 
in the late 1900’s, and Antonis Ellinas has studied how differences in party 
organization help to explain why some populist parties ‘survive their ini-
tial electoral breakthroughs while others collapse’.13 These agency-informed 
studies of anti-immigration parties are invaluable, but unfortunately do not 
include the Nordic countries or assess the implications of a welfare state 
context for party behaviour. In her Master’s thesis, Johanna Ryan-Kraujale 
assesses how Finnish online discussants construct their anti-immigrant 
arguments, but without a particular focus on how the advocacy for anti-
immigration politics is being justified.14 Most recently, Milla Hannula has 
studied how anti-immigration advocates themselves perceive the change in 
the attitudinal climate and the increased presence of anti-immigration argu-
ments in the public debate.15 
11 Ellinas, Antonis (2010) The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist Card. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Horsti, Karina & Kaarina Nikunen (2012, forthcoming) 
‘Hospitality Lost? The Rise of the Anti-Immigrant Movement in Finnish Media Publicity’. European 
Journal of Cultural Studies; Mazzoleni, Gianpietro, Julianne Stewart & Bruce Horsfield (eds) (2003) 
The media and neo­populism: a contemporary comparative analysis. Westport, CT: Praeger.
12 Maasilta, Mari (ed.) (2012) Maahanmuutto, media ja eduskuntavaalit. Tampere: Tampere University 
Press.
13 Ellinas, Antonis (2009) ‘Chaotic but Popular? Extreme-Right Organisation and Performance in the 
Age of Media Communication’. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 17, Issue 2; Mudde, 
Cas (2003) The Ideology of the Extreme Right. Manchester: Manchester University Press; Mudde 
2007; Mudde, Cas (2010) ‘The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy’. West European 
Politics, Vol. 33, Issue 6.
14 Ryan-Kraujale, Johanna (2010) ”Maahanmuuttokriittisiä” puhetapoja meistä ja muista – HS.fi:n 
lukijakeskustelu sosiaalisen konstruktionismin kautta tarkasteltuna. (Master’s thesis). Oulu: University 
of Oulu.
15 Hannula 2011.
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One of the central motivations in this chapter is to bring the supply side 
and discursive agency of anti-immigrant advocates to the fore and critically 
assess how various actors articulate and justify the advocacy of anti-immi-
gration politics in the Finnish context. To that end, this chapter seeks to 
elucidate a particular facet of this question of agency, namely how the advo-
cacy for anti-immigration politics – highly pertinent in both the PS and SD 
political agendas – is presented and justified in the public debate during the 
period from 2008 to 2011. 
Rather than assessing the reasons behind the public demand for the in-
troduction of anti-immigration issues to the political agenda, I focus on the 
discourses that the anti-immigration advocates supply to the public debate, in 
order to both meet and create this demand. This allows an illustration of how 
actors on party and grass-roots levels employ a broad range of discourses with 
the purpose of presenting anti-immigration politics as necessary and justifi-
able. This entails, firstly, a theoretical and empirical assessment of how popu-
list discourses of necessity can be constructed in a welfare-state context, in or-
der to present anti-immigration advocacy as derivable from the concerns for 
social policy and the economic sustainability of redistributive welfare mecha-
nisms. Secondly, such illustration requires an elucidation of how the justifica­
tory discourses, building on the notion of necessity, seek to unlink the anti-
immigration advocacy from any xenophobic or ethnocentric associations and 
interpretations that might undermine its broader social acceptability.
This chapter advances in three sections in order to show how discur-
sive linking of anti-immigration arguments to questions of social policy and 
welfare economy in the public debate can be used for the purposes of fa-
cilitating advocacy for anti-immigration political agenda. The first section 
introduces the theoretical frame which the subsequent analyses employ. 
This theoretical discussion explores the role of justificatory discourses in 
the promotion of populist anti-immigration advocacy. In so doing, it argues 
for the importance on focusing to how context-sensitive use of categorizing 
welfare and social policy discourses can open justificatory avenues, which 
facilitate public endeavours to present anti-immigration advocacy as both 
socially acceptable and necessary. 
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The second section analyzes how anti-immigration political agenda is 
discursively justified in the PS electoral programmes16 for the municipal 
elections of 2008 and the parliamentary elections of 2011. While this analy-
sis should not be understood as a full-fledged comparative study, I use the 
SD electoral programme for the parliamentary elections of 2010 as a point 
of contrast. This helps to highlight the crucial role of discourses pertaining 
to welfare economy in the promotion of advocacy for anti-immigration po-
litical agenda in the PS electoral programmes.
The third section expands this justificatory discourse analysis into the 
grass-roots level of Finnish online discussions. First, as a methodological 
note, I discuss the importance of complementing the analysis of electoral 
programmes with an analysis that focuses on how private actors present 
and justify their anti-immigration advocacy in Finnish online discussion 
boards. Rather than looking at the anti-immigration activists’ blogs and 
fora,17 this set of data consists of public argumentation aimed at mainstream 
audiences that are not necessarily convinced of the anti-immigration politi-
cal agenda to begin with. 
To this end, the object of analysis consists of a sample of three online 
discussion board threads, each consisting of a commentary on a newspaper 
article, in which a Finnish high-profile politician outlines ‘an immigration-
related problem’. The threads selected for analysis are located on the website 
of Finland’s largest nationwide newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (HS), and – as 
I will illustrate in the third section of this chapter – the selection criteria of 
the threads ensures that they represent the country’s most commented on-
line debates on immigration policy during the period from November 2008 
to July 2011. This time frame – starting from the wake of the 2008 municipal 
16 The PS refers to its manifestos as ‘programme’, while the SD calls the document a ‘contract’. 
Considering that the focus of this paper is on the PS, I refer to the manifesto by both parties as 
‘programmes’ as a compromise between maintaining the integrity of the primary sources and having 
the text as fluent as possible. 
17 As a result of this delineation of focus, several anti-immigration blogs and pamphlets that have 
received significant media coverage – such as Jussi Halla-aho’s Scripta and Nuiva vaalimanifesti – are 
not assessed here. This variety of anti-immigration activism, however, has been studied elsewhere in 
varying detail (see, for example, Puuronen, Vesa (ed.) (2001) Valkoisen vallan lähettiläät : rasismin 
arki ja arjen rasismi. Tampere : Vastapaino; Puuronen, Vesa (2011) Rasistinen Suomi. Helsinki: Gau-
deamus; Keskinen, Rastas & Tuori 2009; Förbom, Jussi (2010) Hallan vaara : merkintöjä maahan-
muuton puhetavoista. Helsinki: Like; Hannula 2011; Horsti & Nikunen 2012, forthcoming).
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elections and ending right after the 2011 parliamentary elections – overlaps 
with the period that marked the unprecedented rise in the PS electoral suc-
cess, during which the electoral programmes analyzed in the second section 
were introduced. Using this time frame also makes it possible to observe 
the transference between the justificatory discourses for anti-immigration 
political advocacy present, firstly, in the party programmes and, secondly, in 
grass-roots level of online public debates.18 
Both analyses employ the methodology of rhetorical discourse analy-
sis.19 Extending the focus beyond the nature of discursive practices per se, 
this method allows for the elucidation of how exactly participants in pub-
lic debate proliferate anti-immigration advocacy via the context-sensitive 
application of justificatory rhetoric. For the purposes of this chapter, this 
entails analysis of the use of various discursive mechanisms, through which 
public anti-immigration advocacy is bundled to appeals for ‘saving our wel-
fare state’ from economic ruination. 
By employing rhetorical discourse analysis it is possible to illustrate how 
this discursive bundling of immigration and welfare – their pernicious in-
terplay constructed as an undeniable social fact – is then used to justify 
the necessity for exclusive categorizations and boundary-work, on which 
much of anti-immigration political rhetoric builds.20 This persuasive rheto-
ric employs an interplay between various other, often implicit, justificatory 
strategies, through which the discussants seek to alter and manage public 
perceptions concerning the acceptability, the justifiability and the necessity 
of anti-immigration politics. These strategies include, among others, fact 
construction through invitations for an imagined audience to complete sug-
gestive narratives (along the aforementioned lines), favourable and advan-
18 The order in which the two sets of data are discussed here is not hierarchical. It is not within the 
scope of this chapter to assess the extent to which the justificatory rhetoric within the discussion 
board debates has contributed to the rhetoric used in the electoral programmes or vice versa.
19 Jokinen, Arja, Kirsi Juhila & Eero Suoninen (1999) Diskurssianalyysi liikkeessä. Tampere: Vastapaino; 
Perelman, Chaïm & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1973) The New Rhetoric: Treatise on Argumentation. 
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press; Potter, Jonathan (1996) Representing Reality: 
Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction. London: SAGE.
20 Billig, Michael (1987) Arguing and thinking: a rhetorical approach to social psychology. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 149–150.
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tageous speaker positioning,21 reductive quantification of complex qualita-
tive questions, lists and repetition,22 and connotation management through 
metaphors.23
The theoretical discussion and the analyses lead to a concluding discus-
sion that evaluates the broader implications arising from the widespread 
use of various discourses on welfare in order to justify advocacy of the anti-
immigration political agenda in public debate. Most importantly, the dis-
cussion focuses on how to engage in a meaningful public debate with such 
proponents of anti-immigration politics, who base their advocacy on the 
conviction that their arguments are based on a sound economic assessment 
of the welfare economy and social policy, and attribute any and all racism, 
xenophobia and ethnocentrism only to ‘extremists’.
The construction of public discourses seeking to justify 
anti-immigration advocacy in a welfare state context 
– From categorizing nationalist discourses to exclusionary 
(social) policy
Questions of social policy – including policy mechanisms through which 
welfare is being redistributed – cannot be tackled without assigning peo-
ple to different categories. This is because belonging to a category – such 
as unemployed, immigrant or asylum-seeker – serves to justify why cer-
tain measures need to be applied to a certain group of people but denied 
from another.24 While some categorizations seem relatively straightforward, 
each category is to some extent constructed in order to establish certain 
functions,25 such as the promotion and justification of a particular redis-
tributive regime. 
In public debates touching the issue of social policy in a welfare state, 
the political actors on both party and grass-roots levels commonly seek to 
evoke shared moral principles and construct narratives of how some people 
21 Potter 1996, 21, 114–128, 142–169.
22 Jokinen et al. 1999, 146, 152–154.
23 Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1973, 170.
24 Jokinen et al. 1999, 143.
25 Billig 1987, 135.
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deserve to be included or excluded from a category guaranteeing access to 
a particular set of welfare benefits. The varieties of nationalist mobiliza-
tion rhetoric – applied by PS and SD in their electoral campaigns with an 
unprecedented success – can offer a highly applicable moral resource for 
publicly justifying a set of welfare inclusion criteria.26 However, when anti-
immigration actors seek to expand the public acceptability of exclusionary 
anti-immigration politics in a welfare state context – marked by relatively 
strong norms of social justice – there are some important hurdles these ac-
tors must pass, before their agenda can be seen as primarily motivated by 
mundane concerns for the welfare state.
 
‘Saving our welfare state’ – a core ideology or tactical rhetoric?
There is some academic dispute concerning the role of justificatory dis-
courses in the populist political agenda. For example, Cas Mudde, basing 
his understanding of populist ideology on the assessment of motivations of 
the party representatives and activists, considers the economic justifications 
for populist radical right agenda as merely secondary or ‘tactical’ rhetoric, 
that seek to justify a nativist ‘core ideology’.27 If the justificatory discourses 
are indeed only secondary in the anti-immigration advocacy, is it really im-
portant to study these discourses in length? 
One must note, however, that public discourses advocating any politi-
cal agenda are never simply derived from an ideology, since the causality 
runs in the other direction as well. Narratives seeking to promote political 
advocacy also constantly reconstitute the ideology it pertains to. This gives 
a theoretical reason for reconsidering Mudde’s hypothesis that economy 
is ‘merely’ a tactical feature in right-wing populism. It also underlines the 
importance of a social constructionist focus on the discursive dimension 
of how the advocates of anti-immigration populism publicly deliberate and 
persuade their imagined audiences of their political agenda.
26 Freeman, Gary P. (2009) ‘Immigration, Diversity, and Welfare Chauvinism’. The Forum, Vol. 7, Issue 
3, 9.
27 Mudde 2007, 119–120, 258.
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In order to promote the social acceptability of exclusionary political 
agenda, the sociocultural importance of publicly denying any racist motiva-
tions is greatly dependant on how openly the elites exhibit ethnocentric rea-
soning.28 Therefore, regardless of what prejudices or ideological construc-
tions in the Muddean sense might actually motivate the actors, the public 
justificatory discourses this paper focuses on do not exhibit articulations of 
contested ideological elements. Particularly in the Nordic context – where 
the ‘elites’ and the mainstream media are widely considered29 rather ‘multi-
culturalist’ than nationalist – the proliferation of anti-immigration advocacy 
among the general public is facilitated by the use of discourses that present 
the exclusionary political agenda as not dependant on racist, xenophobic 
or ethnocentric notions. So even though any populist party, by definition, 
seeks to avoid using rhetorical tropes with a strong similarity to the (politi-
cal) elite,30 actors seeking to proliferate anti-immigration advocacy within 
public fora cannot simply disregard the relatively strong norms of tolerance 
and anti-racism without severe repercussions for their ability to persuade 
new audiences. 
In order to illustrate the variety of possible rhetorical avenues to escape 
this social dilemma, van Dijk proposes four categories of denial of racism: 
act denial (‘I did not do/say that at all’), control denial (‘I did not do/say 
that on purpose’, ‘It was an accident’), intention denial (‘I did not mean to’, 
‘You get me wrong’) and goal denial (‘I did not say/do that in order to…’).31 
Public anti-immigration actors, too, make use of these denials. The former 
two denials can be useful for protecting the speaker from the social stigma 
of being racist, but they are limited in their applicability for the purposes 
of promoting the acceptability of anti-immigration advocacy as they effec-
tively entail the cost of abandoning the initial (anti-immigration) argument. 
The latter two, on the other hand, maintain the initial anti-immigration 
argument, but seek to remove its attachment to any racist, xenophobic or 
28 van Dijk, Teun A. (1992) ‘Discourse and the Denial of Racism’. Discourse & Society, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 
94.
29 Hannula 2011, 118–123.
30 Mudde 2007, 23.
31 van Dijk 1992, 92.
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ethnocentric elements. The discourses drawing from intention denial and 
goal denial promote the social acceptability of anti-immigration advocacy, 
because they argue that while the anti-immigration advocacy might appear 
racist, the actual motivation behind their political agenda is only to protect 
the sustainability of the welfare state against any and all challenges it faces, 
regardless of whether the challenges are posed by people who are ethnically 
distinct from us. 
In the welfare state context, the arguments risking the interpretation by 
mainstream audiences of being racist can be consistently complemented 
and justified with narratives drawing explicitly from welfare economy con-
siderations. This has important implications to the ideological core that sup-
posedly underlies the rhetorical ‘tactics’ of persuasion. The rhetorical prac-
tice of constantly invoking arguments against immigration that are framed 
in terms of welfare economy suggests that the considerations for economy 
are actually crucial for the social acceptability of anti-immigration advo-
cacy. Indeed, achieving broader social acceptability for the populist political 
discourse – by drawing from the Nordic peculiarity32 of the consensual sup-
port for the welfare state – has greatly facilitated both political mobilization 
among new constituencies as well as general public advocacy for populist 
policies.33 From this we can infer that the ‘newly converted’ anti-immigra-
tion-minded people are increasingly convinced that their political ideas can 
be largely derived from welfare, the ‘economic realities’, as constructed in the 
public anti-immigration discourses. 
When assuming that Mudde is correct in arguing that populist ‘socio-
economic principles’, such as the need for a more exclusionary social policy, 
‘proceed from the core tenets of [the populist] ideology rather than deter-
mine them’,34 this juxtaposition of ‘core tenets’ and the ‘tactical discourses’ is 
most meaningful when the unit of observation is the partisan masterminds. 
However, studying the use of discursive avenues for articulating ideas is 
also crucial for understanding changes in the political climate and, indeed, 
32 Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, Duncan Gallie, Anton Hemerijck & John Myles (eds) (2002) Why We Need 
a New Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 175.
33 Hannula 2011, 7–8; Keskinen et al. 2009, 7–8.
34 Mudde 2007, 133.
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within the anti-immigration ideology itself. The assessment of these pub-
lic justificatory discourses in the civil society at large also necessitates the 
complementation of electoral programme data with the analysis of discus-
sion board debates. I will discuss in more detail the assets of including the 
two sets of data below.
Finally, from the point of view of political sociology, there is evidently a 
question more interesting than the role of economy as a personal motivation 
of anti-immigration actors. Indeed – regardless of whether the justificatory 
discourses are constructed on public fora as tactical manoeuvres or out of 
ideological conviction by the advocates of anti-immigration politics – a cru-
cial question remains: how are the electorates and the general public actually 
being persuaded by the anti-immigration actors to internalize the interac-
tion between welfare economy and anti-immigration policies that suppos-
edly justifies anti-immigration advocacy?
 So how exactly are the public advocates of anti-immigration politics able 
to link their political agenda to the concerns for the maintainability of the 
welfare state and its redistributive regime? And how do they then employ 
this link and establish a discourse justifying the social acceptability and the 
necessity of anti-immigration politics? In order to pursue these questions 
in the following analysis, it is important to first consider the populist logic 
according to which much of welfare chauvinism on different levels operates. 
Right-wing populism as ‘welfare chauvinism’
Public advocacy of right-wing populism – in party programmes as well as on 
the grass-roots level – commonly builds on the nativist idea that lifestyles, 
values and interests of ‘the people’ are inherent goods.35 In populist, welfare 
chauvinist rhetoric – on the level of public justification as well as personal 
rationalization of anti-immigrant advocacy – the autochthonous popula-
tion’s access to these goods, and their material manifestations, is commonly 
presented as being challenged by various ‘others’ and their interests.36 It can 
35 Mudde 2007, 63.
36 See, for example, Fetzer, Joel S. (2000) ‘Economic self-interest or cultural marginality? Anti-
immigration sentiment and nativist political movements in France, Germany and the USA’. Journal 
of Ethnic & Migration Studies, Vol. 26, Issue 1; Rydgren, Jens (2006) From Tax Populism to Ethnic 
Nationalism. Radical Right­Wing Populism in Sweden. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 52–53.
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appear problematic to label populism in Nordic countries as right-wing 
populism, especially when one considers the extent to which such populism 
presents itself as promoting the interests of ‘the people’ by preserving ‘our’ 
welfare state as the means – and in so doing capitalizes on the nostalgia 
towards a national past marked by solidarity and a relatively generous, if 
exclusive, social policy.37 However, vis-à-vis social policy, belonging to the 
right-wing must be understood in broader terms; not as traditionally as the 
antagonism to public spending and emphasis on private property, but rather 
as the conservative practice of constructing existing inequalities as ‘natural’ 
and thus falling ‘outside the purview of the state’.38 
This conceptualization of right-wing populism helps to understand the 
logic of welfare chauvinism, where the advocacy for a relatively generous 
system of welfare redistributions can be used to justify the exclusionary 
categorization of immigrants as ‘naturally’ having a weaker claim to ‘our’ 
welfare.39 Indeed, the analysis of the electoral programmes in the second 
section of this chapter indicates how both the SD and PS – as well as the 
anti-immigration discussants in the online discussion boards – construct 
the categories of ‘immigrant population’ and ‘autochthonous people’ so that 
inequalities in the treatment of these juxtaposed groups are justified as a 
consequence of this ‘natural order’.
With regard to the role of (welfare) economy in populist ideology and 
rhetoric, there is, however, some significant dispute within contemporary 
research. In the early 2000’s, a great deal of the research considered a sub-
scription to neo-liberal economics as a common core ideology of populist 
radical right parties.40 More recently, Mudde has challenged this notion in 
his study on 12 European populist right-wing parties, indicating that (1) 
many key representatives of this party family do not hold neoliberal views 
37 Andersson, Jenny (2009) ‘Nordic Nostalgia and Nordic Light: the Swedish model as Utopia 
1930–2007’. Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 34, Issue 3, 238–240.
38 Bobbio, Norberto (1994) ‘Rechts und Links. Zum Sinn einer politischen Unterscheidung’. Blätter für 
deutsche und internationale Politik, Vol. 39; Mudde 2007, 26.
39 Bader, Veit (2005) ‘The Ethics of Immigration’. Constellations, Vol. 12, Issue 3, 350–351.
40 See, for example, Höbelt, Lothar (2003) Defiant Populist: Jörg Haider and the Politics of Austria. West 
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press; Thompson, Peter (2000) ‘Jörg Haider, Tony Blair und der 
Wirtschaftsliberalismus’. Berliner Debatte INITIAL, Vol. 11, Issue 4.
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on economics and (2) that the economic programme is of secondary impor-
tance both in the populist party ideology and for advocates of their political 
agenda.41 
Economic justification of anti-immigration advocacy in a  
welfare state context
It must be noted that Mudde’s focus is delineated so that his data includes 
neither the SD nor the PS. Because of this, Mudde admits that when it 
comes to contexts that his empirical material does not cover, his conclu-
sions should be considered hypotheses offered to be tested.42 Accordingly, I 
consider the Nordic countries during the late 2000’s to constitute a context 
that necessitates such reassessment of Mudde’s ‘economy is secondary’ hy-
pothesis, especially in light of recent developments pertaining to the rapidly 
increased electoral support and public advocacy for the populist (anti-im-
migration) political rhetoric of the PS and the SD.
Firstly, the significance of the welfare economy discourse for justifying 
a right-wing populist agenda is accentuated in the context where an over-
arching, consensual support for the welfare state exists across the multiparty 
system.43 This makes it difficult for any political actor to mobilize large con-
stituencies by advocating a substantive restructuring of welfare spending 
in general, and furnishes the discourse of ‘the sustainability of our welfare 
state’ with considerable justificatory potential in the Nordic context.
Indeed, Mudde actually bases his hypothesis44 on previous research, in-
dicating that when electorates consist of ‘groups with opposing economic 
interests (objectively defined)’, it is taken for granted that economy is largely 
a secondary issue.45 But there are some good reasons for challenging the ex-
tent to which this is applicable in the Nordic context that is marked by a rela-
41 Mudde 2007, 119–120.
42 Mudde 2007, 5.
43 Esping-Andersen et al. 2002, 175.
44 Mudde 2007, 135.
45 See, for example, Evans, Jocelyn (2005) ‘The Dynamics of Social Change in Radical Right-wing 
Populist Party Support’. Comparative European Politics, Vol. 3, Issue 1; Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth (2005) 
‘The vulnerable populist right parties: No economic realignment fuelling their electoral success’. 
European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 44, Issue 3.
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tively encompassing welfare system. Under such a comparatively universal-
ist system, the economic interests between classes are considered to coincide 
to a greater degree, since a significant portion of the population belongs si-
multaneously both in financers and net-beneficiaries of the welfare system.46 
Therefore, Nordic political actors in general – and populist parties in 
particular, not least by the virtue of their semi-permanent position outside 
the government – can play two hands at once. On the one hand, they can ap-
peal to the blue-collar population that regards itself as net-losers of global-
ization in general and immigration in particular. This potential constituency 
can be mobilized by employing a discourse pertaining to welfare economy, 
promising to increase or at least maintain the welfare spending channelled 
to them as a result of taking off some other extra burden through policy 
measures. For the purposes of this chapter I will focus on the discourses 
based on categorizations that serve to justify policy mechanisms that restrict 
immigrants’ access to welfare benefits. 
On the other hand, the same political actors can reach middle-class con-
stituencies by justifying the very same anti-immigration policies with refer-
ence to tax-cuts that these policies supposedly allow. The argument here is 
that once the number of people entitled to various welfare redistributions is 
decreased by enacting less immigrant-inclusive social policies, the amount 
of taxpayers’ money needed for funding the welfare system can then sup-
posedly be reduced, thus enabling tax-cuts. Moreover, even the beneficiaries 
of the welfare redistribution are more likely to perceive such tax-cuts as ad-
vantageous within a system where the benefits, too, are subject to taxes (for 
instance, in Finland and Sweden and unlike in the United Kingdom).
These arguments for the heightened role of welfare economy rhetoric 
find further support in the fact that Nordic populist parties – the PS in par-
ticular – are rapidly expanding their support among the middle-classes, 
who traditionally emphasize considerations for economy when aligning 
themselves politically.47
46 Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990) The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton University Press, 
22–23, 68–69.
47 Rahkonen, Juho (2011) ‘Perussuomalaisten ruumiinavaus. Onko työväen protestipuolueen kannatus 
saavuttanut vielä ylärajaansa?’. Yhteiskuntapolitiikka, Vol. 76, Issue 4.
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Justifying anti-immigration policies with welfare economy 
rhetoric in the latest electoral programmes of Perussuomalaiset 
and Sverigedemokraterna
Considering that the period between 2008 and 2011 marked the steepest 
rise in the electoral success of PS and SD – the most rapidly growing Nordic 
political parties during the time – it is important to assess the mobilization 
rhetoric with which this electoral success was reached. 
Naturally, the electoral victories cannot be reduced to the actions of the 
parties and regarded simply as the result of the internalization of the dis-
courses of necessity and justification the parties present as there are numer-
ous explanations for the pre-existing public demand for such an anti-immi-
gration agenda to which I have alluded in the introduction. However, as this 
chapter seeks to explain how the parties seek to convince their electorates 
of the necessity and justifiability of the anti-immigration elements on their 
political agenda, the following analysis focuses on the parties’ agency, illus-
trating the discourses used by the parties with the purpose of creating and 
mobilizing constituencies. 
Within the confines of this chapter it is not possible to conduct a full-
fledged comparative study between the Finnish and Swedish public dis-
courses of anti-immigration policy advocacy. Therefore, the main focus will 
be on the PS electoral programmes, to which the SD programme offers an 
interesting point of contrast, highlighting the relative importance of the wel-
fare economy rhetoric in the Finnish context. 
Another factor necessitating this delineation of the focus is that a rela-
tively superficial content analysis reveals a key difference between the for-
mats of the three documents analyzed here. The SD programme (actually 
called ‘electoral contract’) for the 2010 parliamentary elections presents 
the immigration-pertinent problems and their remedies mostly in a bullet-
point format and consequently, as I will indicate in the following, constructs 
its boundary-drawing narrative on a significantly higher abstraction level.
Moreover, the PS programme for the 2008 municipal election totalled 
21 pages and the programme for the 2011 parliamentary elections incorpo-
rated 69 pages – being far more verbose than any other electoral programme 
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in the Finnish 2011 parliamentary elections – while the SD programme con-
sisted of only seven pages. Even though a direct comparison of these docu-
ments is thus a less fruitful an endeavour, it is important to illustrate how the 
PS elaborates on social policy concerns when justifying anti-immigration 
politics, while the SD relies on abstract, nativist articulations. 
The following analysis is structured by a preliminary, inductive content 
analysis of the electoral programme data. This makes it possible to focus 
the analysis of the programmes on the issues that are most commonly dis-
cussed in conjunction with questions of immigration. On the basis of this 
preliminary assessment, the analysis in this section is divided into three 
parts: ‘Immigrants and the Labour Market,’ ‘Refugees and the Responsibility 
for Victims of Global Injustices’ and ‘National Identity, Immigrants and So-
cial Policy’. This structure reflects the discursive choices the parties employ 
in the programmes in order to construct and emphasize the immigration-
related competences of the welfare state and persuade their imagined audi-
ences of their validity.
 
Immigrants and the labour market
Controlling working life has typically ranked highly in contemporary wel-
fare policy agendas,48 and both the SD and the PS are keen to refer to work-
ing conditions in their critique toward existing immigration policy. In their 
2008 programme, the PS discusses the issue of the foreign workforce within 
the care sector under the subheading ‘For Nordic welfare state’.49 They argue 
that in the long run, importing inexpensive labour ‘endangers the education 
of our own youth as well as their possibilities to be employed with the wage 
required to cover Finnish living expenses’. Here the welfare chauvinist50 an-
ti-immigration message is clearly conveyed to an autochthonous blue-collar 
worker ‘of ours’, incorporating an assumption of the worker having an obvi-
ous claim to ‘our’ welfare. A person in this category is implied to have much 
48 Hemerijck, Anton (2002) ‘Self-Transformation of European Social Model(s)’. In Esping-Andersen et 
al. (2002) Why We Need a New Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 195.
49 Perussuomalaiset (2008) ‘Kunnallisvaaliohjelma 2008. Äänestäjän asialla.’, 12. All translations are by 
the author.
50 See, for example, Freeman 2009; Rydgren 2006.
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to gain economically from the regulation of labour that the PS portrays as a 
core competence of the welfare state. 
This kind of discourse seeks to appeal to the blue-collar constituencies 
with an explicit reference to the economic benefits of labour regulation. 
In order to reach the middle-class audiences, the anti-immigration rheto-
ric relies in its ability to attribute both moral and economic value for the 
maintenance of the ‘willingness to pay taxes’. This willingness is presented 
as threatened by, for example, ‘ethnically based operations’ ‘endorsed by the 
parties in power’ that serve to promote the ‘mass migration’ of the labour 
force – a practice that is considered to ‘increasingly diminish the welfare 
redistributions to our families’.51
In later formulations on the working life and the welfare state, the PS 
has steered away from potentially divisive economic issues. such as the im-
migration of the work force. Instead, the 2011 programme makes several 
references to ‘non-labour oriented immigration’ within the welfare frame, 
constructing it as ‘abuse of the welfare system’. The programme explicates: 
‘Non-labour oriented immigration will cost a lot for Finland’. Distinctions 
between the categories of asylum-seeker and immigrant are downplayed by 
concluding that the burden of non-labour oriented migration can be allevi-
ated by ‘handling applications for asylum rapidly and efficiently, in order to 
save public funds’.52 The amount of public funds that can be saved is carefully 
left unmentioned, an instance of a pseudo-quantifying rhetoric,53 in which 
the actual quantifications are only implied to and the narrative of prudent 
spending is left for the audience to fulfil. 
Actual labour migration is mentioned only once in the 2011 programme 
and no moral formulations are offered in conjunction with it, unlike in the 
2008 programme. Rather, the whole issue is only discussed in terms of the 
potential economic loss to the welfare state because of illegal workers: ‘Pe-
russuomalaiset does not think that we should accept the kind of labour mi-
gration to Finland that involves breaches of Finnish labour regulation or 
51 Perussuomalaiset 2008, 5.
52 Perussuomalaiset (2011) ‘Suomalaiselle sopivin. Perussuomalaiset rp.:n eduskuntavaaliohjelma.’, 42.
53 Jokinen et al. 2009, 146.
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where taxes are not paid to Finland.’54 The assertion that it is immigration 
that creates these illegal working practices is both the point of departure and 
conclusion by the PS, and is thus constructed as a fact that needs no further 
discussion.55 The problem in the allegedly ongoing acceptance of these il-
legal practices is emphasized by referring to the potential benefits in avoid-
ing them in explicitly economic terms: ‘Eradicating the grey economy will 
allow society to recoup a multifold amount of the costs involved.’56 Again, 
this justificatory discourse makes use of a vague quantification of economic 
benefits, this time reinforced with the evocative expression ‘multifold’, with 
the purpose of presenting the regulation of immigration as a socially ac-
ceptable political agenda;57 not xenophobic, but only motivated by a firm 
pro-welfare state stance.
The SD begins its programme by defining itself as a ‘Sweden-friendly’ 
party and continues directly to the issues of labour. They demand ‘stricter 
regulation for labour immigration’ because, as they mention in the lead: ‘In 
our Sweden, each Swedish wage earner can feel safe with their interests be-
ing the top priority.’58 This formulation, taken together as a whole, bears 
some resemblance to the earlier PS programme in the sense that it seems 
to address the blue-collar workers whose interests are suggested to be chal-
lenged by labour migration. The nativist frame of justification, however, al-
lows no additional resource with which to appeal to middle-class taxpayers, 
and the only economic justification for stricter labour market regulation is 
the privileged position given to the Swedish wage-earner, rather than any 
reference to welfare economy. 
Even though various welfare economic justifications for the anti-immi-
gration stance were given in both of the PS programmes, no justification 
transcending the immediate economic benefit to the ‘Swedish wage-earner’ 
is postulated or any reference is made to the welfare state in the SD pro-
54 Perussuomalaiset 2011, 40.
55 Potter 1996, 21.
56 Perussuomalaiset 2011, 40.
57 van Dijk 1992, 94.
58 Sverigedemokraterna (2010) ‘99 förslag för ett bättre Sverige. Sverigedemokraternas kontrakt med 
väljarna 2010–2014.’, 2.
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gramme. With regard to labour, then, the SD’s programme does not appear 
to deviate from Mudde’s view on the economy as an instrumental means to 
a core, ideological end.59
Refugees and the responsibility for victims of global injustices
When discussing immigration and particularly asylum policy, parties invest-
ed in welfare states as producers of territorially bound welfare also address 
the suffering elsewhere. Both the PS and the SD programmes participate in 
this discourse, although with quite different emphases. The SD, in demand-
ing ‘responsible immigration politics’, qualifies this demand with the juxta-
position of Swedish welfare and help to others: ‘Our Sweden helps people 
in distress, but Swedish welfare and prosperity must come first.’60 Contrary 
to the SD labour market approach, which is not justified with references to 
welfare economy, here the resources required by domestic welfare are used 
in order to justify the restricted possibilities to promote global economic 
redistributions. Nevertheless, the position that economic considerations 
are not a central issue justifying the asylum politics is crystallized in the 
SD’s advocacy for Sweden’s ‘heightened support for the world’s millions of 
refugees through a multifold increase in the funds for the UNHCR.’61 Such 
argumentation positions the SD as an unselfish actor that does not consider 
the regulation of public spending as the reason justifying a stricter control 
of immigration. Instead, the notion that controlling immigration promotes 
‘Swedish prosperity’ – even if it means greatly increasing UNHCR spending 
– suggests that economic considerations do not constitute a central justifica-
tory resource for anti-immigration policies. 
There is one significant similarity between the PS and SD positions on 
granting asylum. Like the SD, the PS also promotes a response to refugees’ 
distress that would take place outside the receiving nation-state. However, 
the PS position is immediately qualified through the construction of the 
fact that border closing anti-immigration policy can be justified in terms of 
59 Mudde 2007, 119–120.
60 Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 4.
61 Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 4.
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the practical and efficient allocation of economic resources: ‘Perussuomal-
aiset thinks that it would be wiser if the state promoted the safety [of refu-
gees] closer to their countries of origin, where fewer economic resources 
would likely result in an equally good or even better outcome.’62 However, 
in their 2011 programme, the PS takes a greater step away from the spend-
ing in supra-national bodies that the SD promotes, by using the EU as the 
common enemy, seeking to overburden the Finnish economy with asylum 
seekers: ‘The EU would likely want to increase the number of refugees and 
migrants taken into Finland […] Finland must not participate in the shar-
ing of this burden.’ The welfare economic anti-immigration justification is 
further invoked with regard to the question of refugee quotas: ‘The amount 
of quota refugees must be adjusted with regard to the general economic de-
velopment. If public spending and services are cut, the refugee quotas must 
be cut as well.’63 
Here, the PS role as an actor actively seeking to regulate immigration is 
forcefully downplayed. The opposition to policies benefitting immigrants is 
justified through the discourse of economic necessity. This justification is 
based on a narrative that presents prudent immigration policy as nothing 
but the function of the ‘economic facts’ that then create a framework outside 
of which the welfare state, as a matter of fact, could never operate.64
National identity, immigrants and social policy 
Whilst both the SD and the PS juxtapose distressed refugees with national 
welfare in their electoral programmes, the SD does not justify their ap-
proach with a discourse of welfare economy as the PS repeatedly endeav-
ours to do. Rather, the SD employs nativist arguments for an identity-level 
of welfare, constructing a homogenic ‘Swedish society’ that is being chal-
lenged by refugees and other immigrants alike: ‘Immigrants must adjust to 
Swedish society and not vice versa.’65 Overall, the SD makes no references to 
welfare economy in order to justify its position on national identity. Instead, 
62 Perussuomalaiset 2008, 19.
63 Perussuomalaiset 2011, 42.
64 Bobbio 1994, 26.
65 Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 4.
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the SD’s investment in the Swedish identity, culture or lifestyle is repeatedly 
presented as an inherent value to be protected: ‘In our Sweden, the Swedish 
cultural heritage, the people’s home is built on a common value base and 
the Swedes right to develop their culture as they see fit is protected.’ In a 
similar vein, apart from the single exception of ‘ending the free health and 
dental health care of illegal immigrants’, their rhetoric established no links 
to financing the welfare state or its social policy in formulating their anti-
immigration policies.66
On the PS political agenda, too, national identity is held in very high es-
teem and the programmes argue in various contexts the importance of pro-
tecting ‘a Finnish unity and communality’. However, most commonly these 
values are presented as instrumental to the preservation of the welfare state, 
instead of being justified in exclusively nativist terms or presented as nor-
mative ideals sprouting from a notion of Finnishness as Mudde suggests.67 
Indeed, in the PS programmes, the anti-immigration oriented remedies to 
these – allegedly immigration-induced – threats to such nationalist values, 
are repeatedly justified with discourse drawing from the welfare chauvin-
ist understanding of how the welfare economy can be sustained.68 One of 
the most explicit ways of establishing this connection between the national 
identity and welfare economy employs the construction of a textbook ex-
ample of the so-called ‘recognition-redistribution trade-off ’69 as a social 
fact. According to the PS, because the national solidarity must be protected 
from the corroding effect of value-heterogenization, ‘in the integration of 
immigrants our national identity and patriotism must play a role’.70 This 
66 Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 4.
67 Mudde 2007, 119–120, 258.
68 Freeman 2009.
69 Recognition-redistribution trade-off refers to the variety of arguments that are based on the assump-
tion that there is an inverse relationship between the degree the state is able to recognize and accom-
modate the special needs of minorities and the state’s ability to redistribute welfare. The trade-off 
commonly postulates that the recognition policies either crowd-out the redistributive policies from 
the political agenda, that they corrode the solidarity on which the redistributive policies are based or 
that they misdiagnose issues rising from economic inequality as minority recognition issues. For a 
more detailed account on the recognition-redistribution trade-off, see the introduction in Banting, 
Keith & Will Kymlicka (eds) (2006) Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: recognition and redistri­
bution in contemporary democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
70 Perussuomalaiset 2011, 9.
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assimilative response to heterogenization – constructed as a result of im-
migration – is justified through a narrative according to which a ‘[u]nified 
people guarantees the willingness to pay taxes’.
Moreover, the tax populist argument for stricter regulation of immigra-
tion seeks to justify why the ‘Perussuomalaiset thinks that the requirement 
for economic self-sustainability must be extended to all immigrants coming 
to Finland on the basis of family reunification’ because, ‘[i]n accordance to 
the Danish model, it is possible to expect, for example, that a person apply-
ing for family reunification has not received income support during the past 
two years’. PS further refers to a crowding-out effect that immigration can 
have for the zero-sum game of welfare redistribution,71 calling it ‘irrespon-
sible to attempt to gather seniors in our country when at the same time the 
elder care queues are growing and the age structure of the Finnish popula-
tion is a cause of concern’.72
A nativist variety of national unity is clearly constructed as a value in and 
of itself, by both the PS and the SD. However, concerning the discourse for 
persuasion of the potential constituencies to advocate the anti-immigration 
measures the parties outline in the programmes, the PS presents national 
unity as facilitating support for the redistribution of welfare. Moreover, and 
unlike the SD, the PS also repeatedly justifies the necessity redistribution of 
welfare in terms of a zero-sum game, where anti-immigration politics are 
the sine qua non for the preservation of the welfare state and the welfare 
chauvinist redistributive regime it entails.
 
Justifying anti-immigration advocacy 
in discussion board debates
The mobilization rhetoric of the populist parties with anti-immigration 
political agenda analyzed in the previous section is only one of the facets 
of anti-immigration advocacy in public debate. The electoral programmes 
are, by definition, aimed at more or less potential constituencies with the 
purpose of gaining more votes for the parties. On the other hand, the grass-
71 Rydgren 2006, 52.
72 Perussuomalaiset 2011, 42–43.
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roots level discussants – as private political actors on a mainstream public 
forum – are highly concerned with the social acceptability of their argu-
ments and the political identities they represent. This is why the grass-root 
actors, unlike political parties, do not primarily seek to convert their imag-
ined audiences into voters of populist parties. Rather, they hope to present 
their anti-immigration advocacy as a soundly justifiable political agenda 
and, accordingly, seek to discursively insulate their political activities from 
the social stigmas of racism and xenophobia.73 
As such, the analysis of the Finnish discussion board data in the fol-
lowing sections complements the analysis of anti-immigration political 
mobilization in electoral programmes. Firstly, this analysis illustrates a high 
degree of transference between the economic justificatory rhetoric used by 
the party political actors, on the one hand, and the grass-roots level of the 
anti-immigration advocacy on the other. Secondly – by focusing on grass-
root narratives seeking to promote anti-immigration advocacy and insulate 
this political agenda from stigmatizing criticisms (of being xenophobic) – 
it also allows a broader understanding of the discursive practices through 
which anti-immigration sentiment is advocated and justified as a reasonable 
position in a public debate. 
In order to study the grass-roots level of justification discourses for anti-
immigration advocacy, the three discussion board threads analyzed are se-
lected from the same time period as the electoral programmes. One of the 
threads dates four months after the PS electoral victory of 2008, the second 
dates two months before the 2011 elections, and the discussions in the third 
thread take place one month after these elections. In addition to being situ-
ated in this critical junction, the selection of the threads is subjected to three 
criteria. 
Firstly, each of the threads is based on a newspaper article in the Hel­
singin Sanomat (HS) that exhibits a critical evaluation of an immigration-
related phenomenon, and is articulated by a high-ranking political actor. 
The articles are based, respectively, on statements by the Minister of Econo-
73 van Dijk 1992, 87–88.
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my, Jyrki Katainen (Thread A),74 the PS leader Timo Soini (Thread B)75 and 
President Tarja Halonen (Thread C).76
Secondly, immigration is the main topic of discussion in each of the 
threads, defined as making an explicit reference to ‘immigration’ at least 
once per A4-sheet. With the discussion within each of the threads consist-
ing of about 300 A4 sheets, this translates to at least 300 references to im-
migration per thread.
Thirdly, each of the threads considered here belong among the ten most 
commented topics of the month the thread originates in, each thread con-
sisting of more than 200 posts.77 The threshold of 200 posts is a very high 
threshold. As a point of comparison, the average number of posts in the 
17 most discussed threads of any topic in January 2011 was 173 posts per 
thread according to the HS. Any thread exceeding this threshold therefore 
signifies an exceptionally intense debate.
The discourses justifying anti-immigration advocacy within each of the 
three threads are coded using the Atlas.TI -program up until a saturation 
point is reached. A thread is considered saturated when, firstly, more than 
50 posts are analyzed and, secondly, the number of posts not seeking to 
justify anti-immigration advocacy (labelled as off-topic or anti-racism) ex-
ceeds the count of the most common justification given in the thread for 
anti-immigration advocacy. The subsections illustrate all the discourses 
identified in each thread until the saturation point is reached and continue 
to quote some of the most illuminating posts and discuss the articulations 
within in more detail. 
74 Mölsä, Jouni (2009) ‘Katainen vaatii avointa keskustelua myös maahanmuuton ongelmista’. Helsingin 
Sanomat. 19 Feb. 2009. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.hs.fi/politiikka/artikkeli/Katainen+va
atii+avointa+keskustelua+my%C3%B6s+maahanmuuton+ongelmista/1135243654669> (accessed 23 
April 2012).
75 HS (2011) ‘Perussuomalaiset sijoittaisivat työttömät maahanmuuttajat syrjäseuduille’. Helsingin 
Sanomat. 25 Feb. 2011. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.hs.fi/politiikka/artikkeli/Perussuo
malaiset+sijoittaisivat+ty%C3%B6tt%C3%B6m%3%A4t+maahanmuuttajat+syrj%C3%A4seuduil
le/1135264082407> (accessed 23 April 2012).
76 Silfverberg, Kalle (2011) ‘Presidentti Halonen vaatii hallitukselta rasismin vastustamista’. Helsingin 
Sanomat. 28 May 2011. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.hs.fi/politiikka/artikkeli/Presidentti+
Halonen+vaatii+hallitukselta+rasismin+vastustamista/1135266496495> (accessed 23 April 2012).
77 It is important to note that the discussants participate in the debates anonymously using aliases, and 
sometimes submit posts that are not in accordance with the Finnish legislation against hate speech. 
Considering that the debates are being moderated by the HS staff, the number of posts submitted is 
likely to exceed the actual number of posts published online.
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The tables in the beginning of each subsection illustrate the relative fre-
quency (in percentages) of different discourses with which the discussants 
seek to justify their anti-immigration arguments and deny racism in their 
intentions and goals (as discussed in Section 2). The discourses are divided 
into four main types, depending on whether the justification seeking to in-
sulate anti-immigration advocacy from the critique of being racist points to 
‘Rights of the majority’, ‘Immigrants as the Other’, ‘Economic redistribution’ 
or ‘Norms of public discourse’. Many of the posts employ multiple justifica-
tory discourses, often also belonging in several types of justification. This 
is why the combined count of justificatory discourses (n) is greater than 
the number of posts analyzed in each of the three discussion board threads 
analyzed.
The following analysis is divided in three sections, each covering one discus-
sion board thread. Each section discusses the division of the types of discur-
sive justifications for anti-immigration advocacy and illustrates the func-
tion of the particular discourses by quoting the posts that indicate how the 
discussants in practice formulate the justifications in their posts. Following 
each discussion board excerpt, the justificatory discourses employed within 
are indicated in square brackets. Appendix B defines in more detail what the 
discourses entail and how they are coded for the purposes of the analysis.
Thread A: 
‘[Minister of Finance] Katainen demands an open discussion 
also on problems related to immigration’ 
(February 19th 2009, thread saturated at 168/396 posts) 
A few months after the municipal elections of 2008 that marked the be-
ginning of the steep rise in the electoral success of the PS, the Minister of 
Finance, Jyrki Katainen, acknowledged the validity of some of the concerns 
that were regarded in the public debate as immigration-related by calling 
for an ‘open discussion’. Table 1 indicates how anti-immigration advocacy is 
being justified in this online debate.
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Within the thread A, the proponents of anti-immigration politics in this 
discussion commonly argue that the public debate is marked by taboos that 
need to be broken in order to achieve an open public debate. Almost half 
of all the justifications given for anti-immigration advocacy pertain to what 
the discussants consider to be distorted norms of the public debate. This 
type of justification claims that it has not been possible to critically examine 
immigration-related phenomena in public and voice what the discussants 
consider genuine and legitimate concerns. According to this narrative, this 
is why presenting ‘immigration critique’ as something not marked by rac-
ism, subjects the discussant to the risk of being considered a racist. As such, 
presenting arguments for anti-immigration advocacy vests a discussant 
with a courageous and unselfish speaker position.78 Such position therefore 
78 Potter 1996, 122–124.
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deserves respect, and arguments from such a position deserve a role in pub-
lic debate, even if the critique does not always meet its mark. This type of 
meta-level justificatory discourse commonly frames the subject-matter re-
lated discourses against immigration. 
The following excerpt from a post in thread A illustrates the most promi-
nent discourse, in which economic redistribution and the norms of the pub-
lic debate are being evoked in order to justify anti-immigration advocacy: 
Alias ‘malmilainen’:
‘A simple opening towards the direction of an honest and open dis-
cussion [. . . ] would entail admitting that so-called humanitarian 
immigration is an expense, that is, an item of expenditure for tax-
payers. Once this is a crystal clear fact for everybody, we can discuss 
mainly about how big an expenditure this is and how we can affect its 
magnitude.’ [open debate; taxpayer perspective; welfare state macro-
level]
This argument justifies anti-immigration advocacy by asserting that the 
fact that the officials have not acknowledged humanitarian immigration as 
an expense for taxpayers means that immigration is not ‘honestly and open-
ly’ discussed in public. The post seeks to appeal to its audience’s common 
sense by constructing this as ‘a crystal clear fact’,79 one that would be ‘simple’ 
to remedy by (re-)starting the immigration discussion from the perspective 
of how the state allocates its resources vis-à-vis immigration, thus effectively 
making the economic redistribution as the primary discourse within which 
to assess the feasibility of immigration.
Another common avenue of justification links the economic consider-
ations to assertions of how immigrant groups behave, usually seeking to 
insulate these characterizations of immigrant cultures from the accusations 
of being racist:
79 Potter 1996, 157–158.
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Alias ‘kauku’:
‘I think that this is not about race, culture or religion but rather about 
a topic as dreary as money. […] The immigrants do not integrate 
well enough. So we would need more money. We have only a couple 
of options. a) We regulate the number immigrants so that we may 
focus more resources per individual. b) We gather more resources 
(money) for example by raising taxes. Not many people are willing 
to do that.’ [‘this is not racism’; scarcity of resources; immigrant be-
haviour; taxpayer perspective] 
This argument begins justification of anti-immigration advocacy by ex-
plicit speaker positioning that concerns, such as race, culture and religion 
– as typical starting points of xenophobic arguments – are not in play here.80 
Rather, to the extent that rising taxes are not what the majority wants and 
nobody can deny that resources are limited, the (unsupported) acknowl-
edgement that immigrants do not integrate well enough results in the con-
clusion that anti-immigration politics is needed. The justification for anti-
immigration advocacy is that since all-inclusive policies are not feasible and 
immigrants ‘obviously’ have a weaker claim to common resources than does 
the autochthonous population,81 it must be illogical to publicly reprehend 
advocating exclusionary policies.
The reductive quantification of issues of immigration as merely ques-
tions of economic resources – as is done in posts by ‘malmilainen’ and 
‘kauku’ is dependent on two implicit fact constructions. The first one is that 
the immigrants are not ‘well enough integrated’ (with few attempts to actu-
ally define what counts for well enough integration), and the second one is 
that integrative measures are as efficient as can be, and that only increasing 
the volume of public spending can facilitate ‘better integration’.
Both assumptions construct national identity and integration as un-
problematic and unquestionable ends. However, it is interesting to note that 
the concepts are, although undefined, typically connected to justifications 
80 van Dijk 1992.
81 Bader 2005, 350–351.
niko pyrhönen
118
that present national identity primarily as an instrumental good, allowing 
the pursuit of a sustainable welfare state. The prevalence of this discourse 
goes against the Muddean understanding of national identity as a primary 
populist goal in itself.82 This is because the discourse entails that the con-
struction of anti-immigration policies is a means to fight the solidarity cor-
roding effect that supposedly reduces the willingness to pay taxes and thus 
threatens the sustainability of the welfare state.83 
Table 1 also indicates that the use of welfare economy justifications is 
much more accentuated in this thread than nativist discourses.84 Of course, 
this is not to say that the narratives would not be motivated by ethnocentric 
perceptions. Below is a particularly lucid example of such imaginative use 
of reductive quantification in the construction of welfare state macro-level 
considerations that supposedly justify anti-immigration advocacy:
Alias ‘Jäynääjä’:
‘When we bring 10 incomers to be supported, 1 of them will get em-
ployed who (maybe) supports himself, while the other 9 are covered 
from tax revenues. With about 70% likelihood, this individual must 
be educated all the way from the alphabet, and it is pretty certain that 
he will accumulate expenses from the health service etc. as much as 
a Finn does […] (let’s be optimistic and say that the expenses in-
curred for kindergarten, interpretation, bureaucracy, etc. are 0 euro.) 
So we end up with a calculation that one of these ten becomes a net 
producer in 33 years and the other 9 never.’ [immigrant behaviour; 
welfare abusing immigrants; welfare state macro-level]
As Jäynääjä’s post reveals, these ‘economic realities’ can take on a life 
of their own. It is evident that the ‘calculations’ presented constitute little 
more than prejudiced figments of the contributor’s imagination. What is re-
markable, nevertheless, is that debaters do construct the welfare economy 
82 Mudde 2007, 119–120, 258.
83 Banting et al. 2006, 11–12.
84 See, for example, Fetzer 2000.
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pertinent justifications for anti-immigration advocacy seemingly out of 
thin air. This testifies for a strong conviction present on the grass-roots level 
debates that there is great normative, justificatory potential in presenting 
anti-immigration advocacy as benign and ‘merely’ motivated by welfare 
economic considerations, and that this discourse can mask the pejorative 
and unfounded presentation of immigrant cultures as a worthless burden. 
The less common discourses of justification of thread A – in particu-
lar the ones belonging in the ‘rights of the majority’ type – are hardly ever 
evoked on their own, and usually seek to gain support from the discourses 
of economic redistribution and norms of public debate:
Alias ‘Jugi’:
‘One would not think that wanting to keep Finland Finnish is some-
how an anti-immigrant comment? Or do you think that Finland 
should become, for instance, an Islamic state, so that [immigrants] 
could feel themselves “integrated”? [I]tis hard to understand why 
cherishing the Finnish culture and habits should be somehow a rac-
ist activity against people who have come here from other cultures?’ 
[reaffirming our ways; open debate; ‘this is not racism’]
Here the opposition to immigration is first justified on the basis of the 
concern for the cultural rights of the majority. However, a denial of a rac-
ist intention quickly follows the hyperbolic straw man of the ‘extreme tol-
erant’ position (as in the position that Finland should become an Islamic 
state). Such justificatory narratives typically employ the logic that since 
many of the nativist anti-immigration arguments are not really about im-
migrants themselves (as the proposed justification instead seeks to present a 
legitimate concern for ‘the Finnish culture’), it follows that such arguments 
should not be possible to be defined as racist in the public debate. The gen-
eral implication of such a justificatory narrative is that as long as the discus-
sants supporting anti-immigration policies do not refer to explicitly racist 
goals, anti-immigration advocacy should not be considered racist, either.85 
85 van Dijk 1992, 94.
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What is remarkable, though, is that the discussants never acknowledge 
that the implementation of the actual policies for ‘keeping Finland Finnish’ 
may (very likely) have racist outcomes. As long as reaching racist outcomes 
cannot be shown to be the reason why the discussants advocate anti-immi-
gration measures, labelling anti-immigration advocacy racist would then be 
the kind of an ad hominem accusation that must not be accepted in an open 
debate.
Thread B: 
‘Perussuomalaiset would relocate unemployed immigrants 
in the peripheries’ 
(February 25th 2011: thread saturated at 75/241 posts) 
The discussion in thread B takes place right on the threshold of the parlia-
mentary elections of April 2011, and is grounded quite differently from the 
thread A discussion board, which originated from the Minister of Finance’s 
nod towards the electoral success of the PS. The news article to which the 
posts are related discusses a specific policy proposal – as presented in the 
PS electoral programme – of accommodating the unemployed immigrants 
in regions where housing expenses are lower. Table 2 (next page) illustrates 
that here the justifications for anti-immigration advocacy mostly draw from 
the discourses of economic redistribution, these being almost twice as fre-
quent as either the discourses referring to the Norms of public debate or 
Immigrants as the Other.
As this debate originates from merits of a particular anti-immigration 
policy measure – presented as an economic remedy to an immigration-re-
lated problem by a party soaring in the polls – the discussants are keen to 
appeal to economic ‘logic’ and ‘pragmatism’. This way the anti-immigration 
advocacy is sought to be contained within a ‘mundane’ social political de-
bate that conceptualizes redistribution in terms of a zero-sum game, similar 
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to the PS approach.86 This can be illustrated by quoting posts by aliases ‘Pub-
lic PC’ and ‘Riitu S’:
Alias ‘Public PC’:
‘I guess the immigrants are allowed to reside wherever they please, as 
long as they cover the expenses themselves. As long as society pays for 
the accommodation of the immigrant, he shouldn’t have anything to 
complain about the location where society finds an apartment for him.’ 
[welfare state macro-level; taxpayer perspective; ‘this is not racism’]
In employing the economic redistribution discourses, the narratives 
justify anti-immigration advocacy through the reductive quantification of 
86 Rydgren 2006, 52.
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complex welfare issues.87 Many background assumptions of how welfare re-
distribution works are left implicit, but narrated vaguely as something that 
must evidently be internalized by the other discussants.88 Firstly, the fulfil-
ment of any enabling function for economic redistribution is never articu-
lated as grounds for deciding whether the advocacy for an anti-immigration 
policy measure is justifiable. This is remarkable in a welfare state context, 
where the raison d’être for redistributions has commonly been understood 
in terms of a more or less positive understanding of freedom, whereby redis-
tributing monies allows people to have a greater deal of independence than 
they would have without such redistribution.89
Secondly, there is an underlying supposition – commonly linked to lib-
eral regimes of welfare in the academic discussion90 – that the beneficiaries 
of redistribution should have no say concerning their satisfaction in the out-
come of redistributive policies. This supposition manifests itself lucidly in 
the excerpt from the post by ‘Riitu S’:
Alias ‘Riitu S’:
‘They are being put in the most inexpensive place possible until they 
can support themselves. […][T]hey reside in the cheapest possible place 
and immediately when they support themselves, they can freely choose 
their domicile. Logical, right?’ [welfare state macro-level; taxpayer 
perspective]
It is remarkable that the justification of anti-immigration policy of re-
gional restrictions for housing subsidies for immigrants as merely ‘logical’ 
omits any discussion concerning the welfare chauvinist logic according to 
which Finns are implicitly perceived as entitled to the favourable treatment 
of having regionally unbound access to housing subsidies. 
Even the discourses that justify anti-immigration advocacy by present-
ing immigrants as the ‘other’ most commonly construct this ‘otherness’ in 
87 Jokinen et al. 1999, 146.
88 Potter 1996, 166–169.
89 Esping-Andersen 1990, 3.
90 Esping-Andersen 1990, 26–27.
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economic terms, arguing that immigrants live in a way that threatens to 
excessively strain the resources. Such discourses of ‘othering’ are made more 
lucid when juxtaposed with the common (counterfactual) assertion that the 
autochthonous population’s use of welfare resources is mostly insignificant:
Alias ‘jebbe21’:
‘One can move to Helsinki or any other place once one can pay 
for the costs of one’s own accommodation. I think this is quite logical, 
and although a Finnish social bum can move to a rental apartment 
of any city this is relatively insignificant, in comparison to the fact 
that almost all of the humanitarian immigration is like this.’ [welfare 
state macro-level; welfare abusing immigrants; immigrant behav-
iour]
Moreover, the economy-related anti-immigration discourses often im-
ply – and sometimes even explicitly argue – that welfare resources used 
by immigrants are actually abused. In the excerpt from jebbe21’s post, this 
type of justification for anti-immigration advocacy is sought by presenting 
‘a Finnish social bum’ as the closest point of comparison for humanitarian 
immigrants in the debate on housing subsidies. 
‘Othering’ comparisons between immigrants and the autochthonous 
population can also be employed for the purposes of constructing a narra-
tive in which immigrants are portrayed as challenging the majority’s entitle-
ment to scarce welfare resources. For the purpose of justifying anti-immi-
gration advocacy, these comparisons often seek to reinforce the discursive 
link between the purported nature of immigrants and the ‘realities’ of eco-
nomic redistribution:
Alias ‘Iivari Tahko’:
‘In Finland people emphasize equality in everything, also incl. 
equality between refugees and the Finnish citizens in every pos-
sible respect. […] Actually, the truth to the matter is such that the 
economic situation of a refugee can be easily shown to be better 
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than that of a poor, Finnish person. […] Situating [refugees] to 
peripheries has the added benefit of preventing the concentration 
of [refugee] accommodation, urban decay, in many cases.’ [‘this 
is not racism’; scarcity of resources; majority’s entitlement; immi-
grant behaviour; welfare state macro-level]
This justification of anti-immigration advocacy moves on multiple dis-
cursive levels. First the discussant seeks to pre-empt any accusation of rac-
ism by employing a national self-categorization,91 which presents Finns as 
people, who emphasize equality between refugees and the autochthonous 
population ‘in every possible respect’. By the virtue of being a Finn, who 
greatly values equality, he then points to the inequality in the asserted fact 
that the poor Finns are supposedly worse off in their own country than refu-
gees, who are claiming the (housing) resources the poor Finns used to be 
entitled to.
Anti-immigration policy measures – such as placing refugees to periph-
eries – are being justified by using narratives that combine discourses of 
scarcity and denial of racism. A typical narrative of this kind presents the 
measures as a way for the majority to remedy the unfair loss of their privi-
leged entitlement to scarce welfare goods. Additionally, the anti-immigra-
tion policies are often presented as having the ability to address a macro-
level solidarity corroding challenges that the heterogenizing welfare state is 
supposedly facing.92 The issue of urban decay is an example of the kind of 
a problem that discussants are keen to link to immigration and immigrant 
behaviour, thus arguably justifying the advocacy for anti-immigration mea-
sures for countering the problem. This selective combination of justificatory 
discourses makes it possible to construct fears pertaining to livelihood as 
‘economic facts’. Such construction of facts allows presenting immigration 
as playing a significant role in the accentuation of the pertinent problems 
surrounding the welfare-state, and to advocate anti-immigration measures 
as a simple and effective means to tackle these issues.
91 Billig 1987, 70–73.
92 Banting et al. 2006, 11–12.
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Thread C: 
‘President Halonen urges the government to oppose racism’
(May 28th 2011: thread saturated at 137/265 posts) 
The news article based on President Halonen’s plea against racism, discussed 
in thread C, was published only three months after the discussions in thread 
B took place. In the meantime, however, the parliamentary elections of 2011 
were held, which changed the atmosphere for public debate significantly. 
The elections translated the promising polls into a major victory for the PS 
(as indicated in Appendix A). This meant that their concerns for immigra-
tion could be expected to be on the governmental agenda, especially seeing 
as the formation of the government coalition was still on-going until late 
June. Against this background, it may be surprising to note, as Table 3 (next 
page) indicates, that the posts justifying anti-immigration advocacy with 
economic redistribution discourses were significantly less common than the 
ones using other justificatory discourses. 
One way to address this shift in the use of justificatory narratives be-
tween threads B and C would be to note that by participating in the domestic 
political debate, the president clearly put the advocates of anti-immigration 
politics on a defensive stance. Moreover, the fact that the anti-immigration-
oriented political agenda had already succeeded in prevailing in the elections 
can help explain why the discussants may have experienced less of a need to 
rearticulate the perceived (economic) assets of their political agenda. As the 
electoral result already manifested notable public support for these claims, 
more imminent goals can be identified in the discussion boards. Often these 
goals pertain to the public image of anti-immigration advocacy, challenged 
in numerous ways (as crystallized in the presidential critique in Thread C). 
The challenged public image appears to have prioritized narratives that seek 
to discursively reposition anti-immigration advocacy in a way that allows its 
insulation from the public critique, rather than emphasizing for the impor-
tance of having immigration issues on the political agenda as in the earlier 
threads. Another observation pointing to this conclusion can be found in 
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the fact that the most common discourse in thread C – ‘this is not racism’ – 
has a much greater lead respective to the second most frequent justificatory 
discourse (4,6 pp) than the leading discourses in threads A (0,0 pp) and B 
(0,9 pp). 
In a sense, here the ball is thrown back to anti-immigration advocates. 
They seem to interpret this as entailing the responsibility to show how they 
are not racist, first and foremost, because they are the ones suffering from a 
variety of arguably immigration-related phenomena. This interpretation is 
supported by the dominance of the victimizing discourses pertaining to the 
rights of the majority, which were the least common type of justification in 
the earlier threads. 
Indeed, thread C introduces two new and highly frequent discourses of 
justification, both of which are closely connected together and also com-
monly linked to the ‘this is not racism’ discourse. Firstly, many discussants 
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construct the supposedly extensive debate on the difficulties the immigrants 
face as one pertaining to a relatively insignificant societal issue, but never-
theless crowding out the concerns the Finns would like to put on the politi-
cal agenda.93 This common, zero-sum perception that immigration-related 
issues automatically have the greatest salience in a public debate is generally 
employed for the purposes of asserting, in accordance with welfare chauvin-
ist logic, that the pre-existing, natural and just dominance of ‘our concerns’ 
is now being taken over by a focus on immigrants’ concerns.94 This is exem-
plified in the excerpt below:
Alias ‘eri maailmassako’
‘In the country unemployment is increasing, treatment of the elderly 
and the sick is overlooked [. . .]. And what might our opinion leader 
[President Halonen] be doing? Venting her points on racism [. . .] 
which is not a problem in our country, as opposed to the lack of food 
and employment [. . .] Halonen and other politicians should focus on 
removing these.’ [displacing majority’s concerns; ‘this is not racism’; 
scarcity of goods; majority’s entitlement]
The displacement and scarcity discourses are commonly used in con-
junction with the denial of racism discourse, as it allows the discussants to 
present their indifference or hostility towards the immigrant claims-mak-
ing as not rooted in racism, but rather in the majority’s want. Such linking 
serves to construct a speaker position, in which anti-immigration advocacy 
only reflects the concern that other important societal issues face the danger 
of losing their saliency to questions of racism, which is narrated as brought 
about by the presence of immigrants in the first place.
This displacement discourse is also linked to the discourse of the vili-
fied majority, in order to construct the position of the majority as the vic-
tim, whose anti-immigration advocacy should be seen as nothing but the 
struggle for its own recognition and survival. The narratives employing this 
93 Banting et al. 2006, 10–11.
94 Rydgren, 52.
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discourse suggest that addressing the concerns of minorities in public and 
political debates is excessive in its current form, which only serves to mar-
ginalize the members of the majority group.95 This is visible in the following 
particularly rich – if condensed – excerpt that makes use of each of the four 
types of justificatory discourses:
Alias ‘Sosiaalityömies’:
‘Particularly hetero men with family experience themselves as being 
discriminated against. They are the self-evidence that is left under 
the feet of minority groups. Media visibility is given several times 
a day to [. . .] minorities. Immigrants and language minorities. No 
one says anything about the wellbeing or the societal importance of 
an ordinary, white, hetero taxpayer or that of an unemployed male. 
Why? […] Is it really so [. . .] important to discuss what is not hap-
pening to or done for minorities in their own opinion – rather than 
discuss what should be done according to the majority who main-
tains, finances and builds society? […]’ [reaffirming our ways; vili-
fied majority; displacing majority’s concerns; scarcity of goods; ma-
jority’s entitlement; open debate] 
What comes clear in the excerpt by Sosiaalityömies – whose very alias 
embodies an authoritative speaker positioning as ‘social working man’ – is 
that the majority’s (experience of) marginalization is what justifies anti-
immigration advocacy, and that the diminishing access to material welfare 
resources is only one facet of this marginalization. The combination of dis-
courses in the justificatory narrative constructed by ‘Sosiaalityömies’ pres-
ents ‘the minorities and their sympathizers’ as taking a prominent role in 
the public debate and in the media, thereby pushing the majority away from 
the central position in the public exchange of ideas that the majority should, 
‘obviously’, rightfully occupy. 
95 Fetzer 2000.
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The main thrust of the justifications given for anti-immigration advocacy 
in thread C is that immigration is currently discussed from the wrong angle, 
one that vilifies the majority and displaces their concerns, instead of focusing 
on the majority’s concerns and problems that immigration arguably causes 
to the welfare state and the just economic redistribution within it.
Conclusion
Many of the narratives seeking to justify anti-immigration advocacy in 
the current public debate return to the ancient Aesopian themes of desert 
and entitlement to resources from a common pool. Who, in the end, have 
worked or can be trusted to work for the common good, and to whom are 
these goods common? Even though the questions of desert greatly overlap 
with those of ethnicity and culture in the public discourses justifying anti-
immigration advocacy, the most basic level of justification for differential, 
exclusionary or unequal treatment of groups of people in a welfare state 
context requires little more than identifying a group as newcomers, and 
challenging the group’s claims to resources and equal recognition on this ba-
sis.96 While the innermost motivations against immigration are commonly 
understood to routinely have their roots in fears and anxieties of different 
kinds – also pertaining to immigrants and their cultures97 – the advocates of 
anti-immigration politics rarely articulate such motivations for their activ-
ity, as they understand that presenting such motives would greatly under-
mine the public justifiability of their political advocacy.98 
Rather than seeking to characterize the ‘actual’ motivations of the anti-
immigration actors, I have illustrated in this chapter the public use of dif-
ferent discourses of justifications for anti-immigration advocacy, as they 
are manifested both at a party-level and at a grass-roots level. The analyses 
of both levels of advocacy in this chapter reveal a significant commonality 
between the discourses employed in the electoral programmes and on the 
discussion boards. There is a clear transference between the electoral pro-
96 Kangas, Olli (2000) ‘Muurahaiset ja heinäsirkka australialaisten ja suomalaisten mielipiteet oikeu-
denmukaisista sosiaalieduista’. Yhteiskuntapolitiikka, Vol. 65, Issue 5.
97 See, for example, Puuronen 2011.
98 van Dijk 1992, 94.
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grammes by the PS and the discussion board debates, in the sense that both 
invoke and justify national identity and anti-immigration measures as an 
instrumental means to a (welfare) economic end. In particular, they make 
use of a narrative of necessity, where immigration is constructed as an easily 
quantifiable ‘extra’ strain on ‘our’ welfare system. While this finding chal-
lenges the Muddean notion of economy as secondary in populist rhetoric 
to a degree, it must be noted that ‘their strain on our system’ as the point of 
departure obviously involves strong normative, nationalist sympathies and 
welfare chauvinist assumptions that cannot really be derived from purely 
economic phenomena.99 
Even so, it is important to acknowledge that the advocates of anti-immi-
gration politics do make extensive use of the questions of economic redistri-
bution for the purposes of justifying their political views vis-à-vis immigra-
tion in public debate. This is crucial, because from this acknowledgement 
it also follows that the endeavour to publicly counter the arguments by the 
anti-immigration advocates on the basis that the arguments are motivated 
by racism or xenophobia, is somewhat misguided, even when such motiva-
tions are indeed implicit (as they commonly appear to be). 
The problem with confronting anti-immigration advocacy with pre-
dominantly anti-racist discourses is that the xenophobic position does not, 
obviously, invalidate the proposed policy solutions for tackling welfare eco-
nomic problems any more than a non-racist motivation validates them. In-
deed, the analysis points to the conclusion that in the current public debate, 
many of the anti-immigration discussants consider their political arguments 
valid, because their opponents base their criticism on the questionable mo-
tivations for anti-immigration advocacy, which the anti-immigration dis-
cussants often do not recognize in themselves and in their arguments. And 
even though some discussants certainly do recognize them, they also know 
99 For instance, it is far from obvious, which redistributive measures cause a strain that should be 
considered ‘extra’, as opposed to a welfare system operating as business as usual. And who belongs 
to the ‘we’ that is constructed as obviously entitled to welfare goods, as opposed to the supposedly 
less deserving newcomers? Indeed, the justificatory discourses analyzed in this chapter are typically 
ambiguous on these points, even though the actual (in)validity of the anti-immigration arguments, 
in the end, depends on how soundly and objectively these questions can be tackled.
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that by being careful in not explicating these motivations in the justificatory 
discourses they employ, they can make it very hard for anyone to give wa-
tertight proof for the existence of such motivations – let alone to convince 
those, who are prone to internalizing the economic justifications employed 
by anti-immigration advocates. As a result, many of the discussants feel that 
since they regard themselves as not being racists and use no explicitly racist 
arguments for anti-immigration politics, there can be few objections to their 
predominantly economically framed justifications for anti-immigration ori-
ented political agenda. 
The analyses point to the conclusion that the discussants – even when 
constructing an economic justification of anti-immigration politics – rarely 
feel the need to present any concrete, causal mechanisms through which the 
implementation of anti-immigration measures they propose would remedy 
the problems attributed to immigration. This is at least partly due to the 
relative dearth of arguments in the public space that would challenge the 
outcome of the anti-immigration policies advocated by the parties and the 
discussants. While several studies indicate that it is highly unlikely that im-
plementing anti-immigration policies would either alleviate the issues wel-
fare states are currently experiencing or help the autochthonous population 
in any significant way,100 the discussants’ use of welfare chauvinist discourses 
as a justification for their anti-immigration agenda is not typically chal-
lenged in terms of the factual accuracy of their assertions. Consequently, 
the anti-immigration advocates reinforce the public justifiability of their po-
litical agenda by linking the unchallenged arguments of economic necessity 
to discourses that portray the autochthonous population as the victim. This 
facilitates the internalization of the narrative that constructs immigration 
– and any public focus on immigrants’ concerns – as the prime causes for 
the various globalization and heterogenization-related economic and cul-
tural challenges. These are challenges that the majority population (together 
100 See, for example, Creutz-Kämppi, Karin, Mika Helander & Niko Pyrhönen (2011) ‘Monimuotois-
tuva työväenluokka ja kilpailu matalapalkka-aloilla’. In Helander, Mika (ed.) Totta toinen puoli? 
Työperäisen maahanmuuton todellisen ja kuvitellut kipupisteet. Helsinki: Svenska social- och 
kommunalhögskolan, 30–43; Sarvimäki, Matti (2010) ’Maahanmuuton taloustiede: lyhyt johdatus’. 
Kansantaloudellinen aikakauskirja, Vol. 106, Issue 3, 286.
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with the immigrants) indeed commonly face. Even so, if the actual reasons 
why the immigrant-targeting policies cannot be the remedy are discussed 
in public at all, it is only after the racist outcomes of the anti-immigration 
‘solutions’ have been identified as their advocates’ motivation for voicing 
the concerns. 
An additional difficulty is that the victimizing discourses justifying anti-
immigration advocacy are rendered more effective by the welfare state con-
text. Regardless of how they interpret immigration, public discussants – due 
to their double role as both taxpaying financers and as net-beneficiaries of 
economic redistribution – have much at stake in how welfare is structured 
and organized. The concern for the consensually supported welfare state 
facing immense global challenges is a widely shared concern, making such a 
concern a resilient point of departure for justifying anti-immigration advo-
cacy on both the party and the grass-roots level. 
As concrete and convincing remedies to the complex difficulties the 
welfare state is facing are few and far between, many discussants perceive 
the anti-racist arguments against the advocates of anti-immigration poli-
cies as belittling their authentic and valid concerns, and as unjustly vilify-
ing the majority and inaccurately presenting their concerns as motivated 
by racialized, ideological convictions. The dilemma is that both the PS and 
the grass-roots discussants remain silent on the concrete mechanisms and 
effects of anti-immigration measures, which are consequently difficult and 
time-consuming to expose as unjust and inefficient with substantial argu-
ments in the hectic and heatedly competed space of public media. At the 
same time, the abstract anti-immigration narratives draw from commonly 
shared, real concerns of the future of the welfare state and successfully em-
ploy discourses of economic necessity and solidarity eroding heterogeniza-
tion, thus providing the anti-immigration advocates with seemingly non-
racially motivated and therefore publicly acceptable rhetorical avenues to 
justify their political agenda. As a consequence, the mainstream variant of 
anti-immigration advocacy remains motivated and mobilized by a genu-
ine belief in the projected outcome – imprecisely articulated in the elec-
toral programmes and never publicly elaborated upon within the discussion 
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boards, but also infrequently challenged in public with any level of concrete-
ness. Having anti-immigration politics on the political agenda is considered 
by them to somehow alleviate the precariousness they see Finns as currently 
suffering from as ‘innocent victims.’
On the basis of the analysis of the discussion boards, the mainstream 
advocates are animated online not only by sharing anecdotal evidence of 
‘immigration problems’ and mutually reinforcing, utopian expectations, but 
also by being reduced to ‘just racists’, as the critique they most commonly 
face runs. Many of them either genuinely do not see why unjust and exclu-
sionary treatment would necessarily result from the policies they advocate 
or they consider the extent of such differential treatment to be minute in 
comparison to the widely ameliorated collective and personal prospects 
they hope to be able to enjoy in ‘their country’ as a result of implementing 
anti-immigration policies. 
The way in which the anti-immigration argument is constructed, nar-
rated, advocated and reinforced in the public debate suggests that there is 
much room to challenge the justification of anti-immigration politics, if 
the current focus on xenophobia and racism is complemented in two ways. 
Firstly, there is a need to move away from the debate that concentrates on 
the motivations of the anti-immigration actors and the moral justifiability of 
the public presentation of anti-immigration arguments (within the confines 
of the law), and rather focus on the projected outcomes of the proposed 
(anti-immigration) measures. This shift of focus has two distinct benefits. 
Firstly, it undermines the moral resource the anti-immigration actors find 
in their ability to present themselves as the brave victims, selflessly cham-
pioning the cause of the silent majority and carrying the unjustly issued 
stigma of a racist. Secondly, the focus on outcomes also creates room for 
narratives illustrating how the unjust and exclusionary outcomes following 
from the implementation of the measures on the anti-immigration agenda 
would actually diminish the role the welfare state can take in empowering 
its citizens and denizens at large. 
Secondly, there is a distinct need to acknowledge that the concerns for 
the welfare state are valid and can have a prominent role in the public debate, 
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even in conjunction with questions of immigration. This makes it possible 
to address and illustrate the inefficiency of anti-immigration measures in 
tackling issues of welfare that are presented as justifying anti-immigration 
advocacy. This entails emphasizing that there are very few positive develop-
ments that can be expected from the implementation of anti-immigration 
policies – not least because it possible to show that the difficulties the wel-
fare state faces are a common concern, but one that cannot be attributed to 
immigration.
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Appendix A: 
The development of electoral support (% of the vote) of Perus-
suomalaiset and Sverigedemokraterna in municipal, parliamen-
tary and EU elections from 1998 to 2011
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Appendix B: 
Operationalisation of the justification types and discourses
The four types of justification are indicated as italicized subheadings in bold. 
The quotes that begin with an italicized claim crystallize the content of the 
11 discourses identified in the discussion board analysis. The codes of the 
discourses, also identified in the three tables are in bold inside parentheses. 
Economic redistribution
 ‘Influx of immigrants results in…
…taxpayer money to be misplaced.’(taxpayer money)
…the same amount of goods to be shared among greater number of people.’ 
(scarcity of goods)
…macro-level problems for the economic sustainability welfare state.’  
(welfare state macro-level)
Rights of the majority
‘Recognizing immigrant cultures’ divergent needs facilitates the development 
where…
…non-immigrant concerns lose the moral priority they deserve over im-
migrant ones.’ (majority’s entitlement)
…non-immigrant concerns lose their issue saliency in the media and in the 
political decision making and can no longer be adequately heard.’ 
(displacing majority’s concerns)
…the majority’s concern for its culture and practices are vilified as racist.’ 
(vilified majority)
…the previously self-evident fact that our ways are better for us must be 
constantly reinstated in the public debate.’ (reaffirming our ways)
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Immigrants as the Other
‘We must oppose immigration and immigrant practices, because…
…immigrants and their habits cause all kinds of public disturbance.’  
(immigrant behaviour)
…immigrants are being pampered by our welfare system and abuse it with-
out remorse.’ (welfare-abusing immigrants)
Norms of the public debate
‘It’s perfectly ok to publicly advocate anti­immigration politics, because…
…our arguments against immigration cannot be linked to any kind of rac-
ism.’ (‘this is not racism’)
…only that way immigration-related societal problems get debated more 
openly and the debate becomes marked by a healthy, critical distance 
from the pro-tolerance dogmas.’(open debate)
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CHAPTER 4
 
Managing diverse policy contexts: 
The welfare state as repertoire 
of policy logics in German and French 
labour migration governance 
regine paul
Migration scholars widely acknowledge that welfare states ‘constitute key 
arenas within which issues of inclusion and exclusion are mediated’1. Ged-
des argues that welfare states have become ‘an “internal” method for the 
regulation of migration2. By providing access to, or exclusion from, welfare 
support, European states have sought to welcome some forms of migration 
while deterring others’. In line with this claim this chapter conceptualises 
the relationship between welfare states and migration from a critical politi-
cal economy perspective3, arguing that welfare states serve as repertoire of 
policy logics which are employed selectively in migrant admissions to serve 
specific selectivity goals. Labour migration management across the world is 
certainly always concerned with the economic utility4 of migrants as workers. 
1 Geddes, Andrew (2000) Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe? Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 152.
2 Geddes, Andrew (2003a) ‘Migration and the Welfare State in Europe.’ In Spencer, Sarah (ed.) The 
Politics of Migration. Managing Opportunities, Conflict and Change. Oxford: Blackwell, 150–162, 153.
3 Mainly: Jessop, Bob (2009) ‘Cultural Political Economy and Critical Policy Studies.’ Critical Policy 
Studies 3(3–4), 336–356; also see: Paul, Regine (2011) Labour Migration Management as Multidimen­
sional Border­Drawing: A Comparative Interpretive Policy Analysis in the EU, PhD dissertation, Uni-
versity of Bath.
4 Carmel, Emma (2011) ‘European Union Migration Governance: Utility, Security and Integration.’ In 
Carmel, Emma, Alfio Cerami & Theodoros Papadopoulos (eds) Migration and Welfare in the New 
Europe. Social Protection and the Challenges of Migration. Bristol: Policy Press, 49–66; Menz, Georg 
(2009) The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate Actors, Europeanization, and the Politics 
of Designing Migration Policies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Yet, some suggest that economic selectivity as it features in migration poli-
cies coincides more smoothly with Bismarckian social insurance model and 
entitlement logics than with the universal Scandinavian welfare state logics, 
as the latter can less easily sustain a disjuncture between the normative un-
derpinnings of universal citizenship and migrants’ social exclusion5. More 
precisely, Sainsbury’s comparative work has shown that the Bismarckian in-
surance model ‘appears to dovetail nicely with labour migration, enhancing 
the social rights of foreign workers [...] [while at the same time] employ-
ment has been a central condition for a residence permit and the right to 
abode’6. More than that: if we take Geddes’ notion of ‘internal method of 
regulation’ seriously, Bismarckian entitlement logics – social rights derived 
from labour market success and relative status maintenance for welfare re-
cipients – can be expected to serve as a crucial policy repertoire to distin-
guish wanted from unwanted migrant workers in the governance of first 
admissions in Continental Europe. 
Based on the conceptual notion of repertoire of policy logics, and aim-
ing to test the empirical claim of functional concurrence of migrant admis-
sion policies with Bismarckian entitlement logics, this chapter scrutinises 
labour migration policies (LMP) in France and Germany in a comparative 
perspective. Whilst not offering a cross-welfare model comparison I aim to 
specify whether two comparable welfare state models in Continental Europe 
‘dovetail’ with utilitarian selectivity in LMP in the straightforward manner 
suggested above. I seek explanation for potential variation in the wider pol-
icy context of each case. 
The chapter concentrates on labour admissions from third countries, 
covering a policy area that has recently experienced a revival across Europe. 
Labour migration offers a suitable empirical field for exploration as respec-
tive policies embrace highly selective and tightly regulated entry schemes 
with a strong focus on the anticipated economic utility of migrants as work-
5 Schierup, Carl-Ulrik, Peo Hansen & Stephen Castles (2006) Migration, Citizenship, and the European 
Welfare State: A European Dilemma. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6 Sainsbury, Diane (2006) ‘Immigrants’ Social Rights in Comparative Perspective: Welfare Regimes, 
Forms in Immigration and Immigration Policy Regimes.’ Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 16, 
Issue 3, 229–244, 234f.
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ers7. If anywhere, the claim of functional concurrence between Bismarckian 
entitlement logics and migrant admission selectivity should be expected to 
be pronounced in the – allegedly – economically driven field of LMP. Ger-
many and France offer suitable case studies as they share key institutional 
and formal policy characteristics: within limits, both count as Bismarckian 
welfare regimes of Continental Europe; both revived active foreign labour 
recruitment at roughly the same time in the new Millennium; both admit a 
comparable number of foreign workers through admission systems which 
looks quite similar from the outlook. 
In a case-oriented comparison, the chapter explores the ways in which 
Bismarckian entitlement logics functionally coincide in German and French 
labour admission governance and policy discourse, and explains compara-
tive variation in relation to policy context. Methodologically, I analyse and 
explain the relationship between LMP and the Bismarckian welfare state by 
means of interpretive policy analysis (see next section), meaning that high-
ranking policymakers’ accounts of policy drivers and rationalities form the 
core of the analysis. Analysing data from 22 legal documents and 17 in-
depth interviews with high-ranking policymakers in both countries, this 
chapter comes to the conclusion that the reach of the functional concur-
rence argument – between Bismarckian entitlement logics and economi-
cally selective LMP – is a matter of specific policy contexts and their man-
agement in labour admission regulation.
To develop this argument, the subsequent sections firstly conceptualise 
the relationship between welfare and migration as politically constituted in 
governance processes, drawing attention to the importance of repertoires of 
policy logics and their selective usage in policy-making. I then establish pre-
sumptions about typically ‘Bismarckian’ entitlement logics based on ideal 
types in welfare regime theory. Following this theoretical benchmarking, 
I will contextualise, describe, and analyse German and French LMP to ap-
praise roles and meanings attributed to Bismarckian entitlement logics in 
7 Menz 2009; Menz, Georg & Alexander Caviedes (2010) ‘Introduction: Patterns, Trends, and (Ir)Regu-
larities in the Politics and Economics of Labour Migration in Europe.’ In Menz, Georg & Alexander 
Caviedes (eds) Labour Migration in Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1–22.
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labour migration governance, and explain variation in relation to diverging 
policy contexts. The last section will conclude the findings and discuss im-
plications for future research.
Setting the analytical terrain: 
governance, welfare states and migration policy 
In order to assess the extent to which Bismarckian entitlement logics dove-
tail with utilitarian LMP approaches in Germany and France, we require a 
conceptual understanding of governance as well as an analytical framework 
which captures welfare state logics and makes them accessible to empirical 
scrutiny. This section defines key concepts, briefly discusses methodological 
implications, and develops an analytical benchmark based on ideal types 
derived from welfare regime theory.
Key concepts: governance, policy logics, repertoire
I understand governance as the political ordering of social relations which 
is achieved (and continuously re-shaped) through public policy8. This criti-
cal perspective is less interested in the technical procedures, institutions or 
administrative levels of governance in their own right, and more concerned 
with exploring the means, ends and effects of structuring different people’s 
access to different rights9 through policy. In this context, I take Fischer’s10 
critique of ‘conventional’ policy analysis seriously, who castigates the em-
phasis on effectiveness and efficiency of policy-making at the expense of 
capturing the underlying values, ideas and the contested character of poli-
cies as political ordering attempts. From this perspective, policymakers em-
ploy semiosis – or meaning-making – strategically to order the social world 
8 Paul 2011. In my reflections on critical governance studies, I am indebted to intellectual exchange in 
the Governance Research Group at the Department of Social and Policy Sciences of the University of 
Bath.
9 A fragmentation of rights across the economic, social, political etc. dimension for different groups 
of migrants leads to empirical bricolages of rights regimes. For this argument see: Carmel, Emma & 
Regine Paul (2009) ‘From Stratification to Bricolage: Politics, Markets and Migrant Rights in the EU.’ 
Paper presented at the 5th ECPR General Conference. Potsdam, Germany.
10 Fischer, Frank (2003) ‘Beyond Empiricism: Policy Analysis as Deliberative Practice.’ In Hajer, Maarten 
A. & Hendrik Wagenaar (eds) Deliberative Policy Analysis : Understanding Governance in the Network 
Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 209–227.
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and relations within it in a specific and selective way11. This chapter thus 
dedicates its analytical heart to the substance of public policy governance 
and its normative inscriptions, bearing disciplinary overlaps with critical 
political economy and critical policy studies. This dictates a strong meth-
odological commitment to the interpretive turn in policy analysis12 and the 
application of interpretive methods of data access and data analysis13. Policy 
is understood – and reconstructed through document and interview analy-
sis – as policymakers’ attempt to create and impose specific meanings and 
relationships in the social world and thereby govern it14. This view equally 
frames the need for an ideographic small-n comparative approach that aims 
to understand cases in-depth and in their complexity15. This chapter takes 
the link between philosophical underpinning and methodology seriously 
by using qualitative methods of document and interview analysis, scrutinis-
ing the meanings vested in policies in Germany and France in-depth, and 
explaining configurative variation between the cases in an ideographic and 
contextualised manner. 
Policy logics constitute my analytical entry point to the interpretive study 
of governance processes. This concept encapsulates the meaning of complex 
institutional arrangements such as the welfare state in the form of rules of 
access, provision, funding etc. It is by means of reconstructing these mean-
ings, examining their reach across policies, and evaluating the relevance of 
alternative logics, that the interpretive analyst can unpick the meaning of 
governance processes. For instance, logics of ‘universal access’ to social ser-
vices would imply specific normative assumptions about social equality and 
citizenship. Usage or non-application of universal access logics in migration 
policies would thus entail specific meaning-making and order migrants’ 
subject positions in the host country in accordance with these norms.
11 See Jessop 2009; Paul, Regine (2012) ‘Limits of the Competition State: The Cultural Political Economy 
of European Labour Migration Policies.’ Critical Policy Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 4 379–401; Paul 2011.
12 E.g. Yanow, Dvora (2006) ‘Thinking Interpretively: Philosophical Presuppositions and the Human 
Sciences.’ In Yanow, Dvora & Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (eds) Interpretation and Method. Empirical 
Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 5–26.
13 E.g. Yanow, Dvora (2000) Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
14 More details in Paul 2011.
15 Della Porta, Donatella (2008) ‘Comparative Analysis: Case-Oriented Versus Variable-Oriented Re-
search.’ In Della Porta, Donatella & Michael Keating (eds) Approaches and Methodologies in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 198–222.
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The concept of repertoire, finally, links logics to the institutional frame-
works in which policies are embedded. The notion of repertoire underpins 
a critical analysis of governance (in contrast to more conventional institu-
tionalist or rational choice approaches), as it captures selective uses of in-
stitutional logics in policy-making as a distinctly political act16. The pool of 
potential logics is not independent from structural factors; policymakers do 
not make logics up in unbound ways. Rather, complex and heterogeneous 
institutional arrangements such as ‘the welfare state’ prescribe a range of 
specific policy logics. They do not do this in a functionalist way though; 
logics are selectively drawn on in legislation depending on political objec-
tives. Some logics might get emphasised, others silenced. Logics might even 
be tweaked to mean something slightly different in a specific context. They 
might also be mixed and arranged in novel ways. The concept of repertoire 
aims to capture the ability of policymakers and legislators to use policy log-
ics in this highly selective way. It bridges the divide between structural de-
terminism and radical contingency by analytically capturing both the struc-
tural embeddedness of meaning-making in governance processes (overall 
repertoire) and its constitutive character (specific choice and combination 
of logics). It is by means of interpretive policy analysis, in this case a com-
bined analysis of legal documents and high-ranking policymakers’ inter-
pretations of documents’ meanings and intentions, that these sense-making 
processes are reconstructed in the remainder of this chapter.
Analytical benchmark: Bismarckian entitlement logics  
in labour migration policy
In this chapter, governance is understood as the intentional political act of 
selective usage and arrangement of policy logics from a bounded repertoire 
offered by the institutional infrastructure surrounding any one policy. This 
conceptualisation lends itself to an understanding of welfare states not in 
terms of migrants’ social stratification and inclusion patterns within a given 
host country ex-post first entry as many conventional analyses would have 
16 This, again, draws on notions of selective accentuation and prioritisation of parts of the social world 
in policymaking, as developed in the Cultural Political Economy framework by Jessop 2009. 
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it17, but as ex-ante strategic allocation and governance mechanism with re-
gard to migrants’ initial admission as workers. But what policy logics come 
with the Bismarckian welfare state and how can we expect them to coincide 
with LMP?
From the perspective of the welfare state, the basic repertoire of policy 
logics in German and French labour admission governance should have 
a fairly similar shape. Despite slight national variations, the two cases are 
much more similar to one another in their ways of doing welfare than any-
one of them would be to an Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian country. An 
examination of the usage of this very repertoire will hence enable me to 
highlight variations in labour migration governance in relation to differ-
ent policy contexts. A brief review of welfare state theory below informs a 
theoretical reflection as to the Bismarckian entitlement logics LMP could 
principally employ.
The seminal work of Gøsta Esping-Andersen18 triggered now long-
standing debates about the variable organisation and underpinning political 
objectives of social policy and welfare provision. Conservative-corporatist 
welfare states – such as Germany, France, or Austria – provide social rights 
with reference to occupational statuses. Entitlements are usually propor-
tional and originate from an individual’s labour market participation and 
the associated social insurance contributions paid into the Sozialkassen and 
Caisses Sociales. This model uses wage replacement rates to achieve propor-
tionality between contributions and welfare entitlements. The Bismarckian 
welfare state19 eventually works as ‘compensator of first resort’ in cases when 
17 Morris, Lydia (2002) Managing Migration: Civic Stratification and Migrants’ Rights, London: Rout-
ledge; Sainsbury 2006; Schierup et al. 2006; Carmel et al. 2011.
18 Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
19 In the remainder of the chapter I will use the term ‘Bismarckian’ welfare state, rather than ‘Conser-
vative’ or ‘Corporatist’, as a shorthand for the German and French welfare systems. The chapter’s 
analytical focus is not on the role of political parties or ideologies (‘Conservative’), or the function 
of societal groups in self-organising social policy (‘Corporatist’). It rather emphasises the specific 
analytical value of the Bismarckian social insurance logics in understanding labour migration 
governance. I equally neglect the attribute ‘Continental’ as it bears no analytical value beyond a 
description of geographical distribution.
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income from labour market participation fails20. The relative preservation of 
previous income and status in case of unemployment, sickness, old age, and 
parental leave etc. by means of relatively generous replacement rates bears 
modest decommodification effects depending on the former income. How-
ever, indirect dependence on the market is held up as benefit levels depend 
on prior employment21. 
Germany and France figure as paramount examples of Bismarckian 
welfare states in regime theory22. Germany has the longest-standing social 
insurance model in the world; indeed the social and health policy reforms 
of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in the 1880’s have baptised an entire so-
cial policy model. In comparison to other Western countries, Germany 
and France grant moderately generous benefits, focussed predominantly 
on status maintenance in social policy, and display lower levels of redis-
tribution than the Scandinavian welfare states. A recent comparative vol-
ume on reform trajectories demonstrates that there has not been any ‘in-
stances of brutal departure from Bismarckian ways of thinking and doing’ 
even though incremental reforms progressively changed the layout of social 
policy in Continental Europe over the last decades23. The relevance of status 
maintenance and rights acquisition via labour market participation prevails 
to date even where elements of universalism and means-testing have been 
introduced. Most importantly, entitlement to social rights is still largely de-
pendent on labour market performance.
The subsequent analysis of German and French labour migration gov-
ernance focuses on the ways in which policy logics of Bismarckian welfare 
states coincide with LMP, aiming to explain variations in the use of this rep-
20 Leibfried, Stephan (1993) ‘Towards a European Welfare State? On Integrating Poverty Regimes into 
the European Community.’ In Catherine Jones (ed.) New Perspectives on the Welfare State in Europe. 
London: Routledge, 120–143.
21 Palier, Bruno (2010) ‘Ordering Change: Understanding the ‘Bismarckian’ Welfare Reform Trajectory.’ 
In Bruno Palier (ed.) A Long Goodbye to Bismarck? The Politics of Welfare Reform in Continental Eu­
rope. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 19–44.
22 Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera, Maurizio (1996) ‘The ‘Southern Model ‘of Welfare in Social Europe.’ 
Journal of European Social Policy , Vol. 6, Issue 1,17–37; Bonoli, Giuliano (1997) ‘Classifying Welfare 
States: A Two-Dimension Approach.’ Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 26, Issue 3, 351–372; Arts, Wil & 
John Gelissen (2002) ‘Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A State-of-the-Art Report.’ Jour­
nal of European Social Policy, Vol. 12, Issue 2, 137–158.
23 Palier 2010.
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ertoire in governance. From the discussion above we can assume that the 
equivalence between social insurance contributions and someone’s welfare 
entitlements create 1) a logic of entitlement via labour market participation 
and 2) a logic of differential statuses depending on the level of contribution.
Based on this theoretical sketch and existing empirical research we can 
derive preliminary ideas about the functional concurrence of these Bis-
marckian entitlement logics with LMP. Analyses of migrants’ social inte-
gration have confirmed functional concurrence arguments. In the case of 
German guest workers, for instance, stable employment quasi automatically 
– albeit unintended by policymakers at the time who firmly embraced the 
idea of return migration – generated social rights such as old-age pensions 
and healthcare for migrant workers and their families24. I have argued else-
where that the labour market has therefore offered a dominant domain of 
inclusion for guest-workers in Germany25. Koopmans has recently shown 
that Bismarckian welfare systems enact comparatively higher employment-
incentivising functions for migrants than the Scandinavian universal social 
system26. Equivalence between contributions and social rights seems to dis-
cipline migrants to partake in formal employment for the sake of their own 
future entitlement record and status maintenance. These findings seem to 
support Sainsbury’s entry statement that the strong labour market participa-
tion orientation of the social insurance model ‘appears to dovetail nicely with 
labour migration, enhancing the social rights of foreign workers [...]’.27 Their 
economic contribution can earn migrant workers social rights through the 
equivalence logic, and help them achieve and maintain a certain life stan-
dard and socio-economic position via status maintenance. At the same time, 
24 Bommes, Michael (2000) ‘National Welfare State, Biography and Migration. Labour Migrants, Ethnic 
Germans, and the Re-Ascription of Welfare State Membership.’ In Bommes, Michael & Andrew Ged-
des (eds) Immigration and Welfare. Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State. London: Routledge, 
90–108.
25 Kaiser, Lutz C. & Regine Paul (2011) ‘Differential Inclusion in Germany’s Conservative Welfare State: 
Policy Legacies and Structural Constraints.’ In Carmel, Emma, Alfio Cerami & Theodoros Papado-
poulos (eds) Migration and Welfare in the ‘New’ Europe. Social Protection and the Challenges of Integra­
tion. Bristol: Policy Press, 121–142.
26 Koopmans, Ruud (2010) ‘Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Mul-
ticulturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, Vol. 36, Issue 1, 1–26.
27 Sainsbury 2006.
managing diverse policy contexts: the welfare state as repertoire of policy …
147
to make employment a central and highly selective condition for residence 
rights – as in fact all LMP schemes tend to do – seems to logically coincide 
with Bismarckian entitlement logics whilst putting the universal logics of 
the Scandinavian models in much fiercer legitimacy conflicts28. 
Whilst the above cited literature finds functional concurrences of LMP 
and Bismarckian entitlement logics (labour market derived rights and status 
maintenance), my conceptual framework suggests that repertoires of policy 
logics are used selectively in migration governance depending on policy ob-
jectives and policy context. The following sections illuminate the empirical 
terrain case by case and pave the way for a joint discussion.
Germany: functional concurrence of Anwerbepolitik and 
Bismarckian welfare state
German labour migration policies – officially revitalised with a 2005 law 
– are set in a policy context of demographic shrinking and urgent labour 
shortages. This section shows in which ways Anwerbepolitik (recruitment 
policy) engages with the Bismarckian socio-economic integration logics in 
order to positively discriminate groups of workers that are deemed to serve 
the economic interest of filling shortages. I delineate policy context first, 
then map the current de jure provisions for labour admissions of third coun-
try nationals based on the document analysis of 11 legal texts, reconstruct 
the meanings policymakers attach to admission policies from the analysis 
of interviews with 10 policymakers, and analyse if and how these meanings 
draw on Bismarckian logics. The findings indicate that German LMP full-
heartedly employs the policy repertoire entailed in the welfare state. I argue 
that the policy context of demographic shrinking, related labour demand, 
as well as a lack of colonial bonds and a history of utilitarian guest-worker 
recruitment, jointly explain why German labour migration governance can 
dovetail so neatly with the Bismarckian way of doing welfare.
28 Schierup et al. 2006.
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Policy context: labour demand in a demographic decline scenario
In 2009, almost 3.3 million foreign individuals accounted for 9.4 per cent 
of the German workforce29. The profound Europeanness of the German la-
bour geography seems striking in comparison to France, or also the UK, as 
I have discussed elsewhere30. Turkish residents account for almost a quar-
ter of all foreigners living in Germany in 2009, Italians and Greeks jointly 
make up another 11 per cent, and Serbs and Montenegrins are the second 
largest non-EU population in Germany31. This composition of the foreign 
resident population in Germany is the result of several past political de-
cisions and contexts: a deliberate exclusion of most non-Europeans from 
guest-worker recruitment agreements in the post-war era32; a simultaneous 
lack of colonial labour ties to other parts of the world; a strongly promoted 
integration of ethnic Germans from Russian territories up to the early 1990’s 
underpinned by an ethnic model of citizenship33; and the principal origin 
of asylum-seekers from the Balkans during the big ‘waves’ of this type of 
migration in the 1990’s. It is important to consider this specific empirical 
context of current German LMP, especially in comparison to the distinctly 
post-colonial character of foreign residents in France.
The German Zuwanderungsgesetz34 (Migration Act) from 2005 has been 
interpreted as a paradigmatic shift towards active migrant worker recruit-
29 OECD (2011) ‘Key Statistics on Migration in OECD Countries’ (Stocks and Flows of Immigrants, 
2000–2009), Paris.
30 Paul, Regine (2013, forthcoming) ‘Strategic contextualisation: EU free movement, national labour 
migration policies and the governance of foreign workers in Europe’. Policy Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 2. 
31 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2009b) Grunddaten der Zuwandererbevölkerung in 
Deutschland. Paderborn.
32 Schönwälder, Karen (2004). ‘Why Germany’s Guestworkers Were Largely Europeans: The Selec-
tive Principles of Post-War Labour Recruitment Policy.’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 
248–265.
33 Brubaker, Rogers (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press; Howard, Marc M. (2009) The Politics of Citizenship in Europe. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
34 This law codifies all main aspects of migration. Amendments and decrees regulate details. Bundesre-
publik Deutschland (2004) Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung 
des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwanderungsgesetz). Berlin: 
Bundesgesetzblatt.
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ment mainly based on a strong perception of demographic ‘pressure’35. Ca-
talysed by the debate around a German ‘Green Card’ for IT-specialists36, 
the foreign labour recruitment stop of 1973 had been gradually reviewed 
since 2000. Policy debate at the time suggested that the German national 
economy ‘had to attract highly skilled immigrants to remain economi-
cally competitive’37, thus overhauling the long cherished belief of being ‘no 
country of immigration’. Underpinned by a change of government from 16 
years Conservative-led rule towards a Social Democrat-Green majority, the 
scenario of urgent labour demand significantly changed the parameters of 
the policy debate and inspired policy reform. Eventually, the Migration Law 
came into force in 2005 and provided several new routes and liberalisations 
for foreign labour recruitment under the heading of Anwerbepolitik. Seman-
tically, this term stresses the need to recruit and attract (certain types of) 
workers through policies.
Before scrutinising these provisions in more detail, it is important to 
take the demographic labour shortage argument for what it is: a genuine 
driver of policy change. Unlike France, Germany experiences considerable 
workforce shrinking, fuelled by the third lowest fertility rates worldwide (af-
ter Japan and Italy) and an ageing population. While population projections 
estimate a population growth by 4 million people in France 2010–2050, the 
German population is expected to shrink by around 8 million during the 
same period. The trend is not just prospective and shapes the contempo-
rary policy context: in 2010 the proportion of the population aged 65 and 
over was much higher in Germany (20.4 per cent) than in France (16.8 per 
cent)38. 
35 Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos & Karen Schönwälder (2006) ‘How the Federal Republic Became an Im-
migration Country. Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germany’s Guest Worker System.’ German 
Politics and Society, Vol. 24, Issue 3, 1–19; Green, Simon (2007)‘Zwischen Kontinuität und Wandel: 
Migrations- und Staatsangehörigkeitspolitik.’ In Schmidt, Manfred G. & Reimut Zohlnhöfer (eds) Re­
gieren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Innen­ und Aussenpolitik Seit 1949. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag 
für Sozialwissenschaften, 113–134.
36 Vacancies between 75,000 and 150,000 had been reported in 2000: Werner, Heinz (2001) ‘From Tem-
porary Guests to Permanent Settlers? From the German ‚Guestworker‘ Programmes of the Sixties to 
the Current ‚Green Card‘ Initiative for IT Specialists.’ ILO International Migration Papers 42,1–25.
37 Green 2007, 112.
38 All data based on: Eurostat (2008) ‘In the Spotlight. Demographic Change: Challenge or Opportu-
nity?’ Brussels: Eurostat.
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While not precluding the potential layering of economic drivers (i.e. re-
sponding to labour shortages) with other agendas in German labour migra-
tion policy-making, the demographic context means that a pledge for for-
eign labour recruitment in the German case might indeed functionally link 
to the labour market situation to a considerable extent. The utilitarianist gist 
of the current recruitment rhetoric also mirrors Germany’s strong guest-
worker heritage. Even though debates about the ‘unintended consequenc-
es’ of economically-driven recruitment in the post-War era has triggered 
a policy focus on societal integration, the analysis below will show that a 
basic distinction between economically wanted and unwanted workers still 
seems to be widely accepted in policymakers’ discourse39. This distinction is 
further underpinned by the lack of post-colonial obligations – as the com-
parison with France will demonstrate. Germany features a predominantly 
European labour geography with descendants of former Turkish, Italian and 
Greek guest workers, former asylum seekers from the Balkans, and new-
comers from the Eastern European EU member states being the most nu-
merous groups.40
Labour migration policies in Germany
The most relevant policy tools in labour admissions are work-residence 
permits, which migrant workers can obtain when they fulfil certain admis-
sion criteria, related to their skills profile for instance (see Figure 1 for a 
de jure snapshot of selection mechanisms in German admission policies). 
These permits by default require migrants to present a binding job offer to 
admission authorities and to pass the resident labour market test (RLMT). 
This labour market protective tool establishes whether a domestic worker, 
including foreign legal residents and EU free movers, could fulfil the labour 
shortage instead of a third country national (TCN) worker. 
While most labour migrants can only be admitted under the RLMT and 
job offer condition, the admission regime entails further selection criteria 
39 Cf. Castles, Stephen (2006) ‘Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection?’ International Migration Re­
view, Vol. 40, Issue 4, 741–766.
40 The labour geographies of Germany, France and Britain are analysed as a variable policy context in 
much more depth in Paul 2011.
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– some more beneficial, others more restrictive – which lead to highly dif-
ferential work and residence statuses for migrants, predominantly organised 
around different skill levels (Figure 1). Most importantly, one of the novel-
ties introduced with the 2005 Migration Act has been the settlement permit 
for high-skilled individuals (Niederlassungserlaubnis). This allows highly 
qualified foreigners – high-ranking specialists in their field with a university 
degree or those who earn at least 66,000 Euros41 per year – to settle without 
limitations, with immediate family reunion rights, and with access to the en-
tirety of the German labour market. By contrast, standard temporary work-
residence permits (Aufenthaltserlaubnis) are for designated jobs only, fixed 
term for the duration of the job contract, restrict family reunion options, 
and only offer free labour market access to migrant workers after three years 
of social insurance contributions in regular employment. Table 2 indicates 
that the latter represent the overwhelming majority of work inflows while 
the benevolent rights entailed in a settlement permit apply to a very small 
number of professional elites.
Significant exceptions to the domestic labour preference principle fur-
ther apply to graduates of German universities and those who were either 
trained in the vocational education system or acquired relevant skilled work 
experience in the country. These workers can accept a job offer on an equal 
footing with Germans and EU nationals without passing the RLMT. In der-
ogation from the usual job offer requirement for a work-residence permit, 
a recent amendment of the Migration Law (Arbeitsmarktsteuerungsgesetz) 
further allows graduates of German universities to search for a job in their 
academic speciality for up to a year with a post-study work permit42. These 
provisions also benefit tolerated residents, so-called Geduldete43: if they have 
worked in a job that requires a vocational education for three years without 
41 Data for 2010.
42 Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2008) ‘Zweite Verordnung zur Änderung der Beschäfti-
gungsverordnung.’ Berlin.
43 Duldung in German law refers to the temporary omission of expulsion orders for asylum seekers 
on German territory who have been rejected as refugees but cannot be expelled due to the unstable 
situation in their home country, for example. While Duldung is not a secure residence status and 
expulsion can be executed at any time, many Geduldete have resided in Germany for several years, 
go to schools, do training etc. and are de facto long-term residents. This is why I use the term ‘semi-
legal’ in this context. 
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Figure 1. German labour admission regime for non-EU workers
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interruptions and without relying on social benefits in at least the last year 
of employment, they can legalise their status and switch to the employee 
category. By contrast, workers who are not considered as highly skilled and 
lack a German qualification or work experience face more stringent entry 
conditions. Figure 1 highlights that additional criteria, such as a shortage 
list matching or a bilateral agreement with a sending country, are rquired of 
migrant workers in skilled and unskilled jobs. 
Table 1. Labour inflows per type of permit in Germany44
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Settlement permit 80 151 157 169 219
Temporary work-residence permit 29466 28761 29141 25053 28298
Post-study work switch to employment 2742 4421 5935 4820 5676
Provisions overall indicate a beneficial treatment of TCN workers in 
high-skilled jobs and/or with domestic qualifications or work experience. 
Lower skilled shortages are catered for mainly from within the EU in the 
German case45, and the phasing in of free movement for Eastern Europe-
ans has de facto legalised previous informal flows. From this brief review 
of main selection principles, the German labour migration regime displays 
a strong consideration of educational and economic pathways to social in-
clusion, therewith apparently dovetailing Bismarckian welfare state logics. 
When analysed jointly, interview data and legislation expose several explicit 
links between utilitarian governance of labour admissions and the German 
‘way of doing welfare’46.
44 Parusel, Bernd & Jan Schneider (2010) ‘Deckung des Arbeitskräftebedarfs Durch Zuwanderung.’ 
Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge; Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
(2011) Migrationsbericht 2009. Nürnberg; Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2012) Migrati­
onsbericht 2010. Nürnberg.
45 Paul 2012.
46 Sainsbury 2006.
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Anticipation of socio­economic integration pathways
Interviewees widely recognize the German welfare system as a relevant ref-
erence point for assessing and anticipating the economic and social inclu-
sion capacities of a migrant worker before admission. The imperative of a 
binding job offer, for instance, is not just described as an economic rationale 
of demand-led shortage recruitment. German policymakers frequently link 
it to social integration policies more generally: ‘I mean, work is the utmost 
and first priority and essential also with regard to integration capacities’47. 
In this understanding, successful labour market integration – and a job of-
fer seemingly works as guarantor here – serves as a proxy for anticipated 
successful societal integration: ‘[…] work is indeed one of the most crucial 
paths to integration. This is why it is always underpinning labour migration 
management’48. 
Interviewees construe a functional link between labour market par-
ticipation and social inclusion outcomes, and are strongly internalising the 
equivalence and status maintenance logics of the Bismarckian welfare state 
in their accounts of labour migration policy-making. Most experts directly 
refer to the guest-worker heritage when contextualising current labour mi-
gration policies. They speak of ‘lessons learned’ with policies now – much 
more than back in the guest-worker era – anticipating pathways of inclusion 
and settlement. Policies seemingly aim to select candidates who seem (or 
have proven) likely to succeed as longer-term employees, welfare contribu-
tors, and social citizens in the Bismarckian fashion. 
Following this pattern, the highest integration potential is ascribed to 
high-skilled migrant workers, who are seen to ‘deserve’ the beneficial rights 
regime offered by the settlement permit. Interviewees perceive high profes-
sional skill levels among respective workers as guarantor for quasi automatic 
and successful labour market inclusion. Eventually, the status maintenance 
principle of contribution-based welfare provision in the Bismarckian wel-
fare state will prompt high levels of social inclusion for high-paid and high-
contributing professionals as well. Although a similar ‘automatic integration’ 
47 GER5.
48 GER7. 
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argument is brought forward with respect to high-skilled migrants’ exemp-
tion from language proficiency requirements and immediate family reunion 
rights, some policymakers castigate this vision as unrealistic and unfair 
towards other migrant groups in Germany49. Irrespective of that critique, 
wider societal integration through labour market participation is writ-large 
as an omnipresent subtext in German labour migration governance. 
The latest MIPEX50 illustrates significant trade-offs between the Bis-
marckian social integration ‘automatism’ via the employment route and 
general openness to migration, confirming the findings above. However, 
initial access to employment and eligibility conditions for long-term resi-
dence are only halfway favourable in Germany, and lofty economic require-
ments apply to secure residence. Nevertheless, Germany also ranks among 
the most favourable rights regimes when it comes to equal access to welfare 
benefits and the labour market, equal working conditions and a highly se-
cure resident status for a carefully selected group of high-skilled workers. 
These rights provide a carefully selected group of migrant workers who (are 
expected to) contribute successfully in economic and labour market terms 
with a comparatively advantageous status. In Germany, the logics of the Bis-
marckian welfare state work as a hub for this discrimination of wanted and 
unwanted migrant workers.
‘Earned’ integration via education and labour market
The functional link between labour market inclusion and equivalent social 
and residence rights also works as ‘earned integration’, thus accounting for 
the comparative weight of domestic skills in German regulation. As Figure 
1 highlights, so-called Bildungsinländer51 can access the labour market with-
out RLMT or shortage assessment. This is justified as recognition of their 
already demonstrated professional and educational integration: ‘achieving 
a German educational degree means a demonstration of your integration 
49 GER2, GER4.
50 Huddleston, Thomas & Jan Niessen (2011) Migrant Integration Policy Index III. Brussels.
51 TCN with domestic qualifications, i.e. university or VET certificate or equivalent domestic work 
experience; the term implies a strong notion of domestification of a group of foreign workers which 
obtained qualifications in Germany.
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capacities’52. Whilst this chapter does not offer enough room to discuss the 
relation between migrant integration and education systems in depth, I have 
argued elsewhere that educational attainment has become increasingly rele-
vant for migrants in a predominantly employment-related domain of social 
inclusion in Germany53. 
The work-welfare link also plays a significant part in the ex-post regularisa-
tion of foreign residents in semi-legal positions. Most importantly, the retro-
spective acknowledgement of education and employment achievements as 
integration success structures the residence rights regime for Geduldete (see 
Footnote 4). Policymakers overwhelmingly request a settlement perspective 
for those semi-legal residents who have acquired a German qualification 
(as above) or worked and contributed to social insurance consecutively for 
two years54:
The philosophy of [the former Minister of Labour] was that those 
who have been here many years should be able to stay and not be 
restricted in their labour market access. […] Because if they stay, it 
makes sense in terms of humanitarian and labour market policy con-
cerns to say: if they are willing to integrate in the labour market, they 
should have an option to do so, and who succeeds to maintain their 
own living should have a residence rights perspective. Especially as 
we will need more workers.55
This statement summarises a wide-spread perception that those who are 
already integrated in the labour market and are successfully gaining a living 
should benefit in terms of residence rights. The last sentence of the quota-
tion indicates, however, that this policy is not purely driven by humanitar-
ian concerns: surging labour shortages in the widely accepted demographic 
52 GER10.
53 Kaiser & Paul 2011.
54 At the time of interviewing in December 2009, a revision of labour market access provisions for this 
group was ongoing, so it does not come as a surprise that all interviewees referred to it without the 
interviewer particularly inquiring the issue. 
55 GER3.
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decline scenario also shape alleviations for an otherwise highly excluded 
group of migrant residents in Germany. 
Attracting high­skilled workers via welfare and residence rights
Lastly, there is a strong element of status differentiation by migrants’ skill 
level which interacts with the belief that the German welfare state can be 
used to attract high-skilled workers. Policymakers largely adhere to the idea 
that in order to attract high-skilled and highly specialised employees the 
German companies allegedly need, regulation must literally welcome these 
workers ‘with a red carpet’56. It is through the tool of generous residence 
rights for high-skilled workers that German administrators think they can 
best provide this red carpet. I have argued elsewhere that the relative open-
ness to these migrants is deeply enshrined in an economic imaginary of 
‘high-skilled global labour competitiveness’ and collapses for migrants of 
lower-skill levels57. Moreover, one official also refers to the social protec-
tion system as a particular strength in the perceived ‘global competition’ for 
talents: ‘Our social protection system and our labour law is indeed a trump 
card that we can make the most of. It protects foreign employees […] and is 
interesting for the highly qualified.’58
In this context, some have argued that labour admissions in Germany 
form another institutional complement in support of the specific mode of 
production and competitiveness in a typical Coordinated Market Econo-
my59. Varieties of capitalism (VoC) scholars contend that those possessing 
the specific skills required in this kind of economy are usually courted with 
high levels of security and protection60. The analysis above indicates that 
LMP translate the usual job and unemployment protection applying to do-
mestic workers into increased residence security and generous labour mar-
56 GER3, GER1.
57 Paul 2012. 
58 GER 3.
59 Menz 2009, 2010
60 Estevez-Abe, Margarita, Torben Iversen & David Soskice. (2001) ‘Social Protection and the Formation 
of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State.’ In Hall, Peter A. & David Soskice (eds) Varieties of 
Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
145–183.
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ket access for high-skilled migrant workers, i.e. the advantageous settlement 
permit. It can thus be argued that the typical role attributed to Bismarckian 
social protection in Coordinated Market Economies in attracting special-
ised workers – as suggested by VoC accounts – is mimicked in labour ad-
missions for high-skilled migrants. It is again important to note, however, 
that this argument does not assume a natural functional concurrence be-
tween LMP and the German economy, but that – from a critical political 
economy viewpoint – any functionalist link has to be understood as a result 
of strategic governance and creation of meaning through policy. Moreover, 
the policy claim that lower-skilled migrant workers are not needed in the 
German economy is of course juxtaposed in practice, as high demand for 
workers in areas such as domestic care indicate.
The analysis of the German case shows that the Bismarckian welfare state 
can serve as a veritable linchpin in labour admission policies. The equiva-
lence between social insurance contributions and welfare entitlements is 
strongly utilised to create a publicly supported pathway of socio-economic 
integration for migrants both ex-ante and ex-post their initial entry. Cer-
tainly, not only in Germany is work seen as a prime pathway for migrants to 
obtaining – and ‘deserving’ – other sets of rights. Yet, we have seen that in 
the German case Bismarckian entitlement and status differentiation logics 
coincide smoothly with economically selective labour admission policies – 
just as Sainsbury61 has claimed. The repertoire of policy logics offered by 
the ‘way of doing welfare’ is fully employed to discern and amplify desirable 
socio-economic integration patterns in labour admission governance. More 
than that: German policymakers seem to be at more liberty to utilise this 
specific policy repertoire than their French counterparts, precisely because 
the lack of post-colonial obligations, no widely cherished notion of civic 
citizenship, and the perceived urgency of finding solutions to demographic 
decline and labour shortages in the German case create a policy environ-
ment in which the almost untainted economic selectivity of migrant work-
ers is largely acceptable.
61 Sainsbury 2006.
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France: tensions between immigration choisie and post-colonial 
citizenship
French labour migration policies – officially revitalised with a 2006 law – are 
primarily set in a policy context of negotiating family reunion, settlement and 
citizenship rights of post-colonial migrants. Based on a mapping of 11 legal 
documents and interpretations of 7 high-ranking policymakers in France, 
this section shows that immigration choisie (selected immigration) also 
dovetails with Bismarckian logics but to a much more limited degree. Due to 
the overwhelming concern with ‘post-colonial downsizing’62 – rather than a 
strong perception of urgent labour demand like in Germany – Bismarckian 
socio-economic integration pathways for labour migrants are highly contest-
ed as a means of selecting workers in French LMP. While trying to impose 
an economically selective admission regime in which expected high-end 
labour market success is rewarded with beneficial residence and mobility 
rights, French labour admission governance openly clashes with the tradi-
tional post-colonial Republican citizenship regime. The findings presented 
below further indicate the relevance of policy contexts in the governance of 
labour recruitment – especially when compared with the German case – and 
expose the variable interaction of economically selective LMP with specific 
integration and citizenship models as a future venue for research. 
Policy context: reducing post­colonial family flows
Around 1.5 million individuals with a foreign passport worked in France 
in 2009, accounting for 5.8 per cent of the workforce63. The smaller share in 
comparison with Germany is arguably due to easier historical naturalisation 
practices and civic citizenship in France, which allowed more foreign resi-
dents and their children to become French by ius solis64. The civic citizenship 
model usually associated with France has been entangled with post-colonial 
62 This concept has been used to describe Britain’s strategic detachment from its former Empire through-
out the 1970’s. In this chapter, I apply the same notion to current French policy-making, which repre-
sents a case of late ‘post-colonial downsizing’ compared to Britain. See: Geddes, Andrew (2003b) The 
Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. London: Sage.
63 OECD 2011.
64 Brubaker 1992; Howard 2009.
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belonging when entries from former French colonies started to pick up. In-
deed, the ethnic composition of registered foreign residents in France dis-
plays striking differences compared to Germany as it reveals a less European 
and strong post-colonial pattern. Residents of North African descent are the 
largest minority group living in France; Algerians and Moroccans have been 
most numerous in 200565. France has also seen a growing South-East-Asian 
and Sub-Saharan African resident population66. While the French govern-
ment had tried to impose ethnic hierarchies and re­europeanise inflows 
since decolonisation67, the general picture is one of increasing relevance of 
workers from former colonial territories in the French labour geography 
and a decline of the traditionally European workforce from Spain, Italy and 
Portugal which was targeted with the French guest-worker scheme after 
the Second World War. The urban riots of French nationals of Maghrebin 
descent in Paris in autumn 2005 have recently added to the heated debate 
about national identity, post-colonial relations and citizenship rights. Again, 
this specific French context matters: with most migrants originating from 
her former colonies, migration and integration policies tend to have a strong 
post-colonial underpinning in France.
Labour migration was one of the pet subjects of Nicolas Sarkozy’s (won) 
presidential campaign in 2007 while fierce rhetoric on severely curbing fam-
ily migration accompanied his (lost) campaign in spring 2012. As Home 
Secretary in 2006 Sarkozy set out to ‘profoundly transform immigration 
policy in France’68. The new law’s regulative aim was to tailor flows after 
the country’s economic needs and to choose entries (immigration choisie), 
rather than having flows ‘imposed’ (immigration subie) by mainly family 
reunion. This has co-occurred with the following: the introduction of an 
65 Huddelston & Niessen 2011.
66 Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (2005) Les Immigrés En France – Édi­
tion 2005. Paris.
67 The idea of ‘ethnic hierarchies; alludes to the deliberate selection of Catholic European guest workers 
in the 1950’s (mainly Italians) to fill labour shortages, whilst Maghrebin workers were only recruited 
when intra-European supply did not suffice. It is argued that France tried to impose these ethnic hi-
erarchies again after decolonisation and the respective immigrations from former colonies. See Spire, 
Alexis (2005) Étrangers À la Carte. Paris: Édition Grasset & Fasquelle; Paul 2011.
68 Marthaler, Sally (2008) ‘Nicolas Sarkozy and the Politics of French Immigration Policy.’ Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 15, Issue 3, 382–397.
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integration contract for newcomers targeted mainly at family members, a 
further tightening of entry conditions and assimilation requirements for 
non-work migrant categories, and the abolishment of automatic access to 
permanent residence rights after 10 years of residence, which also applied 
to irregular workers. 
The direct coupling of the professional migration agenda to the aim of 
reducing family reunion flows indicates a conflation of labour migration 
with citizenship and residence rights restrictions in the specific post-colo-
nial context of France. More precisely, the policy aim was to boost levels of 
professional work inflows to 50 per cent of all entries by 2012 with the help 
of incentivising new labour migration routes, permits and right regimes, 
as well as by de-incentivising non-work routes and settlement69. Compared 
to Germany, there seems to be a much stronger preoccupation with sig-
nalling desirability of professional entries and at the same time transmit-
ting a message of being unwanted (‘subie’) to already residing and settled 
migrant groups, including family members of French citizens70. As a pre-
liminary step in a similar direction, the Hortefeux Law in 2007 introduced 
a procedure of exceptional regularisation on a case by case basis in profes-
sions and regions with labour shortages (TCN shortage list, see Figure 3). 
This conflates the management of irregular workers and residents with the 
professional migration approach and signals to residents and newcomers 
that economically useful workers are welcome, even when previously in-
formal, while tough measures will apply to all others. Overall, compared to 
Germany, we can expect that the post-colonial setting and Republican citi-
zenship71 – with its long cherished civic pathway of inclusion for long-term 
residents on French soil – create a very different context for LMP, its links to 
Bismarckian entitlement logics, and its interaction with conflicting norms 
of inclusion in France.
69 Le Président de la République and Le Premier Ministre (2009) ‘Lettre de Mission du Président de la 
République et du Premier Ministre À Eric Besson, Ministre de L’immigration, de L’intégration, de 
L’identité Nationale et du Développement Solidaire.’ Paris.
70 Comité interministériel de contrôle de l’immigration (2011) ‘Les Orientations de la Politique de 
L’immigration et de L’intégration. Rapport au Parlement.’ Paris.
71 For a discussion of the highly diverging migrant integration and citizenship models in France and 
Germany, see: Brubaker 1992; Howard 2009.
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Labour migration policies in France 
The French legal infrastructure makes a clear distinction between so-called 
‘professional’ schemes and shortage routes for migrant worker admissions72. 
As in Germany, migrants of different skill levels face quite different selec-
tion criteria and rights regimes, with the higher-skilled and ‘professional’ 
entries being treated most benevolently (see Figure 3 for a de jure snapshot 
of selection mechanisms in French admission policies). Generally speaking, 
foreigners need a work authorisation to enter the French labour market. 
Since the recruitment stop in the 1970’s, migrant workers have been ad-
mitted with specific job offers and through an RLMT procedure, just as in 
Germany. More specifically, companies have to offer vacant positions on the 
domestic labour market through the National Employment Agency (Pôle 
Emploi) before being able to employ any TCN worker.
A scrutiny of permits and selection procedures highlights the judicial 
concentration on high graduate level skills. A range of different residence 
and work permits is available for the relatively smooth recruitment of the 
highly-skilled and the protection of the domestic workforce has partly been 
removed since 1997 (Chèvenement Law). Since 2006, a renewable three-year 
permit for ‘skills and talents’ (carte compétences et talents) opens options for 
prolonged professional stays and even eventual settlement. The permit is 
explicitly targeted at attracting highly-qualified workers73. As in the German 
case, the number of workers coming in via this route is rather low compared 
to the standard RLTM entries (Table 4). 
In addition to ‘skills and talents’, foreign graduates with a French post-
graduate degree also encounter facilitated entry conditions: they can look 
for a job irrespective of the domestic labour market situation for six months 
with a job search visa and can obtain a ‘paid employee’ permit (carte salarié) 
for a job offer that suits their academic speciality. Special permits also exist 
for scientists and young professionals. The required skills for these favour-
able migration routes include specialist expertise in research and science, 
72 All current legislation is codified in: République Française (2010) Code de L’entrée et du Séjour des 
Étrangers et du Droit D’asile (Ceseda). Paris. Additional decrees and amendments regulate details.
73 Ministère de l’Immigration (2010) ‘L’immigration Professionnelle – Professional Immigration’ 
(Powerpoint Presentation from the Public Relations Department). Paris.
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Figure 2. The French labour admission regime for non-EU workers
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specific skills in some sectors like IT, academic and professional experience, 
and in some cases high potential earnings.
Statistically speaking, the vast majority of skilled workers have to enter 
via the RLMT route and acquire a paid employment permit. Exceptions are 
predefined shortage lists via which migrants with a suitable skills profile 
can access specifically listed ‘shortage’ professions without RMLT. Since a 
legal amendment of the foreign admissions and residence code in 2007, the 
shortage list for TCN workers can also be used as a tool of exceptional regu-
larisation of sans­papiers who are employed in the listed shortage profes-
sions74. Table 4 indicates that about 1,500–2,600 workers per year benefit 
from this provision, but these admissions lie in the discretionary decision-
making realm of prefectural administration.
Table 2. Labour inflows per type of permit in France75
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Skills and talents - - 5 183 364
Paid employees 8377 8356 13448 18371 15155
Exceptional regularisations 2697 2695 1541 1862 2583
Algerian residence certificates 31344 31060 26635 26133 25245
In the French admission regime we moreover observe a multi-layered 
differential treatment per country of origin, which mainly distinguishes for-
mer colonies, developing countries (often former colonies), and other third 
countries. Country of origin selectivity cuts across permits in several ways 
and feeds into a fine-grained system of classifying migrant workers (Figure 
3). Circular migration schemes determine admission and residence rights 
for nationals from so-called priority solidarity zone76 countries (PSZ). For 
74 GISTI 2009b, L’admission Exceptionnelle au Séjour par le Travail dite «Régularisation par le Travail». 
Paris.
75 Office de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration (2010) ‘Rapport D’activités 2009.’ Paris; Sénat de la Répu-
blique Française (2010) ‘Questionnaire Parlamentaire de la Commission des Finances’ (Parlamentary 
Questions Concerning the Budget 2010). Paris; Comité interministériel de contrôle de l’immigration 
2011; unfortunately no data available for graduate job search visas.
76 The ‘zones de solidarité prioritaires’ comprise 54 developing countries including for instance Congo, 
Senegal and Mali. French development policy aims to prevent a brain drain from these countries.
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instance, a ‘skills and talents’ permit for individuals from PSZ countries can 
only be issued if a bilateral agreement exists, flows can be capped, and TCNs 
have to agree upfront to go back to their country of origin after a maximum 
stay of 6 years, thus relinquishing long-term resident inclusion pathways77. 
Most emblematic for French selection by origin are bilateral ‘migration 
management agreements’ with former colonies78. In exchange for access to 
the French labour market granted to some of their nationals, sending coun-
tries consent to fighting irregular flows by enforced emigration controls 
and facilitated repatriation procedures. French development aid to former 
colonies is contingent on their contractual commitment to facilitate the re-
patriation of their nationals, and to strictly control their borders to avoid in-
formal entries to France. Moreover, Algerian nationals cannot enter via any 
of the labour-related routes. According to the Evian Agreements of 1962, 
the Certificat de résidence pour Algériens has to entail free labour movement 
rights. De facto, however, this de jure beneficial treatment means that Alge-
rians are often outright rejected as migrant workers. Table 5 indicates that 
Algerian inflows – at around 25,000 in 2009 – are still larger than the TCN 
work routes added together, but they have been decreasing considerably 
over the last years.
In sum, we find a similar concentration on high-skilled workers, with 
some privileges for in-country graduates and ex-post regularisation options 
for informal workers in shortage jobs, as in the German case. We now turn 
to the meanings policymakers vest into this legal infrastructure.
Attraction of high­skilled workers and socio­economic integration pathways 
French policymakers contextualise the new high-skilled work permits as 
part of a global competitiveness strategy79. They consider permits to be 
77 GISTI (2009a) Guide de L’entrée et du Séjour des Étrangers En France. Paris: Éditions La Découverte
78 So-called accords de gestion des flux migratoires As of October 2011, France has signed nine agree-
ments: with Senegal (2006), Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville and Benin (2007), Tunisia, Mauritius and 
Cape-Verde (2008) and Burkina-Faso and Cameroon (2009) and more accords were planned for 
2011/12, among others with Mali, Haiti, Philippines, Nigeria, and Egypt: Carrère, Violaine & Monique 
Duval (2009) ‘Des Accords Léonins.’ Plein Droit 83.
79 I offer a comparative empirical specification of the different economic imaginaries that underpin la-
bour migration policies elsewhere: Paul 2012, forthcoming.
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‘tools for growth’80, utilised to attract bright minds: ‘the skills and talents 
permit reflects the interest of the French state. It is about France’s attractive-
ness for highly-qualified people’81. As in Germany, but much less empha-
sised in policy discourse overall, labour migration seems to figure as yet 
another labour reproduction strategy in capitalist coordination, focusing on 
high skills and negating the need of lower-skilled labour recruitment. The 
welfare system plays a crucial – and functional – part in attracting desired 
migrants, with policymakers differentiating between its incentivising role 
in terms of attracting high-skilled workers, and a restricting and shielding 
function towards others:
Social rights […] concurrently form veritable barriers as to avoid 
migration that would both ruin the social systems and damage the 
rights of already resident workers, but they are also a factor of attrac-
tiveness. If you wish, the worker coming to France knows that they 
will benefit from equal rights; once having crossed the border he is 
a man like everyone else. […] That means that we can well decline 
someone wanting to come to France, that’s quite easy, but when they 
are resident in France, they have all rights.82
Policy experts highlight that the French system offers equal treatment 
to foreign workers in terms of access to social security, health care, housing 
etc., but also equal working conditions (this is confirmed in recent MIPEX 
scores) and regard these rights as a tool for attracting especially high-skilled 
workers. As in Germany, the contribution-equivalence logics of the Bis-
marckian social insurance model seemingly dovetail with the highly dif-
ferential treatment of workers of different skill levels in admission decisions. 
Most importantly, French legislation expects both the socio-economic con-
tribution and integration potential of high-skilled professionals to be high 
and therefore waives the usual integration requirements. While all newcom-
80 FRA6.
81 FRA7.
82 FRA6.
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ers otherwise need to sign the contrat d’acceuil et d’intégration (admission 
and integration contract) and indicate their French language proficiency, 
these conditions are lifted for ‘skills and talents’ permit holders: ‘We assume 
that since they are highly qualified they will integrate in our country without 
difficulties, even if they do not speak French when first arriving.’83 These 
high – and quasi automatic – integration expectations are used in immigra­
tion choisie to symbolically invalidate similar integration pathways for other 
migrant groups, especially residents of post-colonial descent.
‘Earned’ integration for sans­papier workers and its contestation
As in Germany, a notion of ‘earned’ integration surfaces in the French gov-
ernance of informal workers. Policymakers feel that someone who integrat-
ed into the labour market deserves – under certain conditions – a secure 
residence status, thus justifying the policy tool of exceptional regularisation 
via shortage lists: ‘Well, we recognise that there should be a regularisation of 
a certain number of irregular workers who have been in France for a certain 
time, […] under the condition that they have a preceding work contract, 
that they will have a new contract for the future.’84 
However, ex-post admissions to the labour market bear significant lim-
its, indicating the conflict over utilitarian socio-economic integration path-
ways in France. The employment to be regularised has to be in line with 
French droit social, the social norms around working hours, wages and oth-
er labour rights. Indeed the Bismarckian welfare state had inclusive effects 
for those paying social insurance in work, even where their residence was 
irregular as in the case of sans­papiers. Yet, the droit social clause triggers 
uneven effects for workers of different skill levels: as in Germany, it is likely 
to render those at the lower skill and lower pay end of the labour market 
ineligible for regularisations. 
We have to bear in mind though that in contrast to Germany, informal 
workers in France are mostly TCNs of post-colonial descent rather than 
Eastern European EU nationals. Together with the much higher salience 
83 FRA1.
84 FRA6.
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of informality in France, especially in low-skilled and low-paid segments 
of the economy85, the conflation of informality and post-colonial belonging 
has triggered a highly politicised debate on the recognition of precarious 
employment conditions of sans papiers86. Critiques argue that ex-post short-
age regularisation is no genuine escape from informality, but has the poten-
tial to confine the often post-colonial informal working population to low-
skilled jobs in precarious spaces of both the labour market and society87. In 
sum, while being clearly activated in policymakers’ rhetoric of immigration 
choisie, utilitarian LMP that operates with logics of ‘earned integration’ and 
negates lower skilled TCN labour needs sits much more uncomfortably with 
the French post-colonial citizenship model and informal labour market re-
ality. It is not surprising then that it causes much more open contestation 
than in Germany.
Labour migration as post­colonial population management
The analysis above indicates considerable differences in the context of LMP 
and the use of Bismarckian entitlement logics in French policy-making and 
policy discourse when compared to the German case. Policymakers in in-
terviews contextualise immigration choisie in a governance agenda that sym-
bolically invalidates the settlement and naturalisation pathway for other, not 
‘chosen’ migrant groups. Several interviewees claim an intention of revoking 
family reunion rights and traditionally inclusive settlement and citizenship 
paths via the promotion of economic selectivity in immigration choisie. The 
targets of increasing ‘selected’ labour inflows and simultaneously reduc-
ing family entries are not coincidentally coupled in policy: ‘When stating 
‘but we need these people and all’, what is also implied is that those who 
85 Papadopoulos, Theodoros (2011) ‘Immigration and the Variety of Migrant Integration Regimes in 
the European Union’. In Carmel, Emma, Alfio Cerami & Theodoros Papadopoulos (eds) Migration 
and Welfare in the New Europe: Social Protection and the Challenges of Integration. Bristol: Policy 
Press, 23–47.
86 See Barron, Pierre, Anne Bory, Sébastien Chauvin , Nicolas Jounin & Lucie Tourette (2011) On Bosse 
Ici, on Reste Ici! La Grève des Sans­papiers: Une Aventure Inédite. Paris: Éditions La Découverte.
87 FRA2, FRA3 and FRA4; also see: Morice, Alain & Swanie Potot (2010) ‘Travailleurs Étrangers entre 
Émancipation et Servitude.’ In Morice, Alain & Swanie Potot (eds) De L’ouvrier Immigré au Travailleur 
Sans Papiers. Les Étrangers dans la Modernisation du Salariat. Paris: Édition Karthala, 5–21.
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we do not need, they can go back home’88. Several interviewees argue that 
discourses of economic selectivity carry signalling functions vis-à-vis post-
colonial residents, especially family members: they have not been ‘chosen’ 
according to economic needs and are hence not desired. Concomitant rights 
cut-backs for other migrant groups (asylum seekers and family members 
mainly) stress this point.89
This struggle over residence pathways and over what should consti-
tute a legitimate entitlement to live and work in France is mostly expressed 
through the lens of post-colonial population management. The differential 
treatment of descendants from former colonies, those from developing 
countries, Algerians, and other third country nationals is highly evident in 
legislation. Policymakers construe policy tools like the accords de gestion 
as vehicles of post-colonial resident population control and ‘post-colonial 
downsizing’. Immigration choisie is employed to restructure post-colonial 
migration and resident patterns along economic utilitarian logics, hence 
evidencing a wider trend of conflating ethno-cultural discriminations with 
neo-liberal economic policy drivers in European migration policies90. In 
contrast to Germany – which domestic legislators perceive as ‘relatively un-
encumbered’ with respect to historical migration links91 – the French con-
text of post-colonial migration and residence considerably layers LMP. The 
conflation of economic utility considerations with an intended weakening 
of post-colonial ties causes levels of contestation in France plainly unparal-
leled in the German case.
In summary, French labour migration governance displays a more am-
biguous relationship with Bismarckian welfare state logics in comparison 
to the German case. This can be explained by diverging policy contexts 
shaped by different migration histories and citizenship regimes and open-
88 FRA3.
89 Emmenegger Patrick & Romana Careja (2011) ‘The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion: Social Policy, 
Migration Politics, and Welfare State Nationalism.’ In Suszycki, Andrzej Marcin (ed.) Welfare Citizen­
ship and Welfare Nationalism. Helsinki: The Nordic Centre of Excellence NordWel, 155–190.
90 Hansen, Peo (2000) ‘European Citizenship, or Where Neo-Liberalism Meets Ethno-Culturalism.’ Eu­
ropean Societies, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 139–165; Hansen, Peo & Sandy Brian Hager (2010) The Politics of Eu­
ropean Citizenship: Deepening Contradictions in Social Rights and Migration Policy. Oxford: Berghahn.
91 GER5.
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ing more or less possibilities for LMP to utilise the policy repertoire offered 
in Bismarckian welfare state contexts. As in Germany, French LMP targets 
high-skilled workers in anticipation of their good socio-economic integra-
tion potential, and rewards informal residents who are integrated on the 
skilled-labour market with a secure residence perspective. Yet, the attempt 
to prioritise an economically driven labour admission regime that utilizes 
Bismarckian entitlement logics to select wanted migrant workers and stig-
matise all others as unwanted is subject to highly politicised struggles over 
French citizenship and post-colonial Republican belonging. In this spe-
cifically French context of conflicting entitlement logics, a utilitarian LMP 
agenda coincides much less smoothly with the welfare state as a denomi-
nator of differential statuses. While immigration choisie is explicitly aimed 
at seizing the Bismarckian socio-economic entitlement logics to select and 
stratify ‘wanted’ migrant workers, the conflation of this selectivity with 
post-colonial population management is highly contested in French politi-
cal debate. Compared to Germany, the distinct French policy context offers 
less scope and ease for using a shared Bismarckian policy repertoire to con-
duct an economically selective LMP.
Conclusion: policy context and variable uses of Bismarckian 
policy repertoire
This chapter has explored the relationship between Bismarckian welfare 
states and migration from the angle of initial admissions. I have argued that 
the institutional arrangements of welfare states do not merely matter with 
regard to social inclusion pathways of migrant residents, but equally serve as 
repertoires of policy logics which policymakers draw on to structure initial 
admission routes for non-EU migrant workers. From the perspective of the 
Bismarckian welfare state the utilitarian selection of migrant labour can be 
expected to functionally concur with the Bismarckian logics, mainly equiva-
lence of contributions and entitlements, and status maintenance. By means 
of an interpretive policy analysis this chapter has compared German and 
French LMP to explore how labour admission policies draw on Bismarck-
ian entitlement logics and how different interaction dynamics between LMP 
and the Bismarckian welfare state can be accounted for. 
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Labour admission governance in Germany and France frames LMP 
with reference to a pathway of socio-economic inclusion that champions 
high-end labour market success as the admission and residence criterion. 
Especially the selection of migrant workers by skill level is presented as be-
ing functionally concurrent with the logics of Bismarckian welfare entitle-
ments. This seems to suggest that – while LMP regimes elsewhere similarly 
target migrants’ economic utility and tend to differentiate migrants by skill 
level92 – the Bismarckian welfare state offers a repertoire of policy logics fit 
to promote and support the differentiation of ‘wanted’ from ‘unwanted’ mi-
grants. Studies in the Scandinavian context have shown that the logics of the 
universal welfare state are much more at odds with an economic selectivity 
regime93. 
Yet, the interpretive policy analysis has exposed that different policy 
contexts in Germany and France trigger a highly variable usage, meaning 
and political contestation of Bismarckian entitlement logics. The strongly 
perceived demographic decline and labour shortage scenario in Germa-
ny, paired with a lack of post-colonial obligations, allows for a seemingly 
smooth interaction of the welfare state as chief status allocation mechanism 
and economic selectivity in LMP. The German example showcases that Bis-
marckian pathways of socio-economic inclusion can be amplified in labour 
admission governance in an environment where economic selectivity of mi-
grant workers does not seem to clash with the norms of citizenship. In the 
French case, however, post-colonialism, Republican citizenship and related 
notions of belonging directly conflict with the attempt to use Bismarckian 
entitlement logics in labour admissions governance and fuel fierce political 
struggles over immigration choisie. 
While more case studies across Continental Europe would be required 
to sustain more general claims, these findings nourish the claim that the 
reach of the functional concurrence argument between Bismarckian en-
titlement logics and LMP is a matter of governing policy contexts. Labour 
92 See Paul 2011; 2013, forthcoming. For a larger n study see: Ruhs, Martin (2011) ‘Openness, Skills 
and Rights: An Empirical Analysis of Labour Immigration Programmes in 46 High- and Middle-
Income Countries’. Oxford: COMPAS Working Paper (No. 88).
93 Schierup et al. 2006.
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migration governance uses the repertoire of welfare state logics selectively 
in accordance with highly contextualised policy objectives. The theoretical 
functional concurrence of LMP and Bismarckian entitlement logics, there-
fore, depends on their interaction with the wider policy context of the poli-
cy-making process, especially the extent to which conflicting logics of inte-
gration and entitlement prevail in the political struggle over policies. Future 
research on the relationship between welfare and migration should take se-
riously the relevance of policy contexts when analysing and comparing the 
governance of labour recruitment in different countries. Otherwise we risk 
overlooking subtle nuances between LMP and their variable implications 
for the variable labour markets and societal environment they act upon. The 
interaction of economically selective LMP with specific integration and citi-
zenship models, but also with the varying composition of resident migrant 
populations, represents a particularly promising future venue for research94.
The conceptualisation of welfare states as repertoires of policy logics of-
fers considerable analytical mileage, as this chapter has shown. Adding to 
critical governance scholarship in migration studies and beyond95, this per-
spective enabled us to expose the powerful role of legislators to selectively 
draw on institutional architectures and logics in order to achieve specific 
policy goals. In the case of Germany and France at least, the relationship 
between the welfare state and migration is not functionally determined. It 
is part of the on-going political ordering of social and economic relations 
in governance processes, which includes the negotiation and re-working of 
distinct policy contexts by means of selectively drawing on a shared reper-
toire of welfare state logics. As the French case has indicated, the possibili-
ties for what I label ‘governance of context’, however, are highly bounded. 
They are delimited by the political acceptability of re-constituting the very 
foundations of the citizenship model through LMP. Eventually, context does 
not just matter as a passive container within which policies operate; it is an 
active and constantly re-shaped component of political struggles over the 
norms that should guide migration policy.
94 I offer an analysis of the interactions of LMP for non-EU workers with EU free movement and variable 
labour geographies in specific empirical contexts elsewhere: Paul 2013, forthcoming.
95 Carmel 2011; Hansen & Hager 2010; Jessop 2009.
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CHAPTER 5
 
Teaching integration in France and Finland: 
A comparison of national discourses  
within civic integration programmes
elizabeth onasch and marjukka weide
Civic integration programmes are an increasingly prevalent measure within 
national immigrant integration policies across Europe.1 These programmes 
principally target newcomers originating from outside the European Union, 
particularly lower socio-economic status and family migrants. As part of a 
reaction to a potential ‘integration crisis’ proclaimed by prominent Euro-
pean politicians, the latest modifications of civic integration programmes 
help set the tone for the place of these immigrants within European national 
communities and welfare states. The programmes also present a productive 
vantage point from which to understand current attempts to define national 
identities within a context of transnational migrations and European Union 
governance. 
This chapter addresses the recently renewed emphasis on national be-
longing across the European Union, and attempts to identify how the dis-
course2 surrounding civic integration and language programmes constitutes 
and employs ‘national models’. Our point of departure is the academic dis-
cussion about the decline or persistence of distinct national models guiding 
immigrant incorporation in the social systems of European nation-states. 
1 Jacobs, Dirk & Andrea Rea (2007) ‘OPEN FORUM: The End of National Models? Integration 
Courses and Citizenship Trajectories in Europe’. International Journal of Multicultural Societies, Vol. 
9, Issue 2, 264–283.
2 The concept of discourse is defined and employed in a number of ways within social scientific 
research. In this chapter, we define discourse as a specific way of speaking about an issue or a pattern 
of speech.
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According to the widely cited thesis by Christian Joppke3, the approaches 
to immigrant incorporation of a number of European nation-states have 
started to converge, indicating that these countries are abandoning their 
nationally-specific ways of dealing with resident foreigners and new ethnic 
minorities. This view has been challenged by Dirk Jacobs and Andrea Rea4, 
who claim that despite the similarities at the overall level of policy tools now 
used to address immigrant incorporation, the civic integration programmes 
in fact differ from each other to such an extent that it is still meaningful to 
speak about national models. 
The contributions in the academic discussion around models and Eu-
ropeanization typically utilise an empirically-intermediate level of analysis 
in which a number integration policies at large, or civic integration pro-
grammes in particular, are scrutinized according to a fixed set of criteria.5 
Furthermore, while comparative work on integration and immigration 
policy often uses the term ‘national models’ to describe different policy con-
stellations, there is also a tendency to employ national models as indepen-
dent variables that shape policy preferences. This use of national models 
as static national self-understandings that have historically determined and 
continue to shape policy not only tends to neglect the agency of social actors 
and rely on popular ‘political stereotypes’, it also masks contradictions and 
tensions within national self-understandings and institutions. 6 
Our contribution to the discussion of the persistence of national mod-
els is two-fold; we interrogate the assumed coherence and distinctiveness 
of different national models as cultural references, and we employ tools of 
qualitative analysis, which allow us to access more subtle, yet revealing, dif-
ferences or similarities in the meaning-making that takes place in policy 
3 Joppke, Christian (2007) ‘Transformation of Immigrant Integration: Civic Integration and Antidis-
crimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany’. World Politics, Vol. 59, Issue 2, 243–273.
4 Jacobs & Rea 2007.
5 See, e.g., Goodman, Sara Wallace (2011) ‘Controlling Immigration through Language and Country 
Knowledge Requirements’. West European Politics, Vol. 34, Issue 2, 235–255; Jacobs & Rea 2007; See, 
also, Migrant Integration Policy Index. Online. Availabile HTTP: <www.mipex.eu> (accessed 18 
June 2012). 
6 Bertossi, Christophe (2011) ‘National Models of Integration in Europe: A Comparative and Critical 
Analysis’. American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 55, Issue 12, 1563; Bowen, John R. (2007) ‘A View from 
France on the Internal Complexity of National Models’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 
33, Issue 6, 1005–1006.
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material. We define national models, borrowing from a critique by Bertossi, 
as ‘structures of reference’ that ‘frame the questions of identity, common 
belonging, and inclusion and exclusion.’7 Based on this concept, we explore 
the use of national models by comparing how belonging and identity are 
framed within the discourse of the political debates and legislation related 
to civic integration programmes, as well as the discourse of the programmes 
themselves. In shedding light on the discursive side of the civic integration 
programmes, we argue for the need for analysis at various levels to facilitate 
the broader discussion around the development of integration policies and 
their complex relationships with national models.
In this chapter, we examine the cases of France and Finland. France reg-
ularly appears in work on integration and immigration policy not only be-
cause it was amongst the first countries to adopt an integration programme, 
but also because the French ‘Republican’ national model has come to serve 
as a prime example of civic assimilationism within scholarship and poli-
tics.8 France has a state-funded programme of language acquisition and in-
tegration courses, which are contracted out to training agencies, and links 
participation in its integration programme to the renewal of residence per-
mits. Although it has received less attention, Finland also belongs to the 
early adopters of a civic integration programme. Initially developed for 
unemployed migrants around the same time as France’s initial policy, the 
programme has recently expanded to include all foreigners. In contrast to 
France, however, the approach to diversity in Finland has been character-
ized by a particular brand of multiculturalism that is specific to an extensive 
welfare-state framework. The Finnish civic integration programme has a 
varied and relatively individualized system of language courses, vocational 
training, and some civic education contracted out to different educational 
institutions and is linked to eligibility to receive a social benefit, rather than 
residence permits. A large part of the migrants participating in the French 
integration programmes come from former French colonies in the Global 
7 Bertossi 2011, 1573.
8 For an influential example of this scholarly classification, see Brubaker, Rogers (1992) Citizenship 
and nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
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South, while the majority of the Finnish programme participants come 
from neighbouring Russia, or are refugees from various countries. 
The rough similarities of the integration programmes within these two 
cases with very different histories of immigration, institutional frameworks, 
and cultural resources exemplify the convergence debate; while there are 
considerable differences between the French and Finnish integration poli-
cies, they do share certain policy tools with each other and the European 
level integration framework. It is within this context of possible convergence 
that we evaluate the role and contents of the supposedly distinct French and 
Finnish national models. This chapter will proceed by reviewing the general 
developments and characteristics of integration programmes, then delving 
into how and why policies that emphasize nationally-bounded communities 
appear to be becoming increasingly common among several European na-
tion-states. After discussing our methods and data, we present our analysis 
of national models within the French and Finnish cases. Finally, we discuss 
the similarities and differences of the two cases and provide conclusions 
about the persistence and nature of national models.
Civic integration programmes in Europe
Civic integration programmes are one example of a broader category of ‘in-
tegration policies’, which concern the reception of immigrants and address 
an array of issues, including access to the labour market, nationality, long-
term residence, family reunification, education, political participation and 
discrimination. In addition to targeting migrants and their children, many 
of the policies, such as anti-discrimination laws, aim to make sure the re-
ceiving community enables the incorporation of immigrants. 
Public measures for the incorporation of resident foreigners were gener-
ally initiated in response to perceived needs to guide refugees and family 
and labour migrants in different national and/or local contexts.9 The earliest 
9 For historical overviews on the policy development in Denmark, see Jønsson, Heidi Vad (2011) 
‘In the Borderland of the Welfare State: Danish Integration Policy – the Early Years 1967–1983’. In 
Suszycki, Andrzej Marcin (ed.) Welfare citizenship and welfare nationalism. Helsinki: The Nordic 
Centre of Excellence NordWel, 227–260; and in the Netherlands, see Vermeulen, Hans & Rinus Pen-
ninx (2000) Immigrant Integration: The Dutch Case. Het Spinhuis.
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versions of the current civic integration programmes were instituted in the 
Netherlands and France in 1998.10 In Finland, an equivalent programme was 
adopted a year later. Over the last ten years, the basic philosophy within the 
EU soft policy on integration has shifted from the idea that rights and access 
would facilitate integration and performance of civic duties, to a paradigm 
in which the fulfilment of duties and proof of integration are necessary con-
ditions for the bestowal of rights and access.11 Ten EU member states have 
introduced an ‘integration condition’, which restricts access to certain rights 
to those immigrants who fulfil specific criteria, e.g., signing an integration 
declaration or passing a test.12 A number of countries have also developed 
‘integration-from-abroad’ programmes, which require that potential family 
reunification migrants submit to linguistic and civic evaluations and train-
ing while in their country of origin, in order to receive a visa.13 Thus, while 
the initial versions of the civic integration programmes often served as sup-
port and employment mechanisms14, the recent versions entail more explicit 
aspects of conditionality and control. 
The most common component of the programmes is host-country lan-
guage assessment and instruction. The programmes also increasingly entail 
civic education in the host country’s institutions and laws, and sometimes 
the country’s history, values, symbols, and traditions. Some programmes are 
funded and administered directly by the state, while others are run by private 
actors contracted by the state, and sometimes partly funded by participa-
tion and material fees. The programmes also vary in the number of hours of 
coursework, type of evaluation, whether participation is mandatory, and how 
residence permits and access to social benefits are linked to participation. 
10 Joppke 2007, 249–251.
11 Borevi, Karin (2010) ‘Dimensions of Citizenship. European Integration Policies from a Scandinavian 
Perspective’. In Bengtsson, Bo, Per Strömblad & Ann-Helén Bay (eds) Diversity, Inclusion and Citi­
zenship in Scandinavia. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 19–46; See also van 
Houdt, Friso, Semin Suvarierol & Willem Schinkel (2011) ‘Neoliberal communitarian citizenship: 
Current trends towards ‘earned citizenship’ in the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands’. 
International Sociology, Vol. 26, Issue 3, 408–432.
12 Acosta, Diego (2010) ‘A Belief in the Purity of the Nation: The Possible Dangers of Its Influence on 
Migration Legislation in Europe’. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, Vol. 10, Issue 2, 235.
13 Goodman 2011.
14 See e.g. Virtanen, Mervi (2002) ‘Miksi kotouttamislaki? Lain synty ja seuraukset’. In Lepola, Outi 
(ed.) Koto­maana Suomi: kertomuksia maahanmuutosta 1999–2001. Helsinki: Työministeriö, 18–24.
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International convergence on the national
The development of civic integration programmes reveals growing similari-
ties in policy across national contexts15, including a renewed emphasis on 
national identity.16 According to the convergence thesis, similar civic inte-
gration policies are developing across European nations, despite historically 
different ‘philosophies of integration’ and constellations of immigration and 
integration policy.17 While Jacobs and Rea argue against over-estimating the 
similarities between different national programmes and point to a number 
of key differences, they do allow that civic integration programmes as a 
policy tool have become more common.18 Whether it is a result of conver-
gence or parallel development, the proliferation of integration programmes 
indicates a point of similarity in integration policies across different nations. 
The similarities among different integration policies could, in part, be 
the result of countries reacting to increasing economic globalization and 
population changes, and the demands of economic elites for policies that 
selectively encourage migrants according to their economic utility.19 Policy 
similarities may also be connected to ‘Europeanization’ through EU legal 
mandates and coordinated soft policy.20 Two legally-binding European level 
directives concerning immigration adopted in 2003, the Council Directive 
on the Right to Family Reunification21, and the Council Directive on the 
Status of Third-Country Nationals who are Long-Term Residents22, legiti-
mated the implementation of civic integration programmes by including the 
possibility that member states make the granting of residence permits and 
other rights and protections contingent upon migrants meeting integration 
requirements.23 The non-binding EU policy on immigrant integration was 
15 Joppke 2007.
16 Acosta 2010. 
17 For discussion of ‘philosophies of integration’ see Favell, Adrian (2001) Philosophies of integration: 
immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and Britain. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
18 Jacobs & Rea 2007, 265.
19 Kofman, Elenore (2005) ‘Citizenship, Migration and the Reassertion of National Identity’. Citizenship 
Studies, Vol. 9, Issue 5, 453–467, 455; Joppke 2007, 245.
20 Joppke 2007, 245–247.
21 Council of the European Union (2003) ‘Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the 
right to family reunification’.
22 Council of the European Union (2003) ‘Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 con-
cerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents’.
23 Acosta 2010; Goodman 2011, 241–243.
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published in 2004 in the form of the 11 ‘Common Basic Principles for Im-
migrant Integration Policy in the European Union’, which emphasize that 
the integration of migrants should facilitate their employment, education, 
equal ‘access to institutions and resources’, and democratic participation.24 
The principles were further elaborated in 200525 and their implementation 
has been supported by European Commission handbooks on integration 
for ‘policymakers and practitioners’.26 Due to the soft policy nature and the 
open method of the development of these policies, they reflect different na-
tional interests and traditions and do not act as a simple top-down influence 
on member states.27 Nevertheless, the establishment of EU integration poli-
cies does suggest increasing coordination and consensus around the basic 
purposes and methods of immigrant integration within Europe.28
In addition to policy similarities, the increasing emphasis on gender 
equality and interest in defining acceptable public religious practices within 
EU and national integration policies may also be a product of cultural Eu-
ropeanization. This emphasis reflects a construction of a ‘European’ iden-
tity in contrast to a ‘non-European,’ and specifically, Muslim, other. This 
contrast historically facilitated the formation of a European identity29, and 
has recently manifested in the insistence that gender equality and religious 
moderation are central ‘European’ values that Muslim immigrants, who are 
presumed to hold opposing beliefs, must accept in order to integrate within 
Europe and European nation-states30. 
24 Council of the European Union (2004) ‘Common Basic Principles for immigrant integration policy 
in the European Union’. 14615/04 (Presse 321).
25 Commission of the European Communities (2005) ‘A Common Agenda for Integration Framework 
for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union ‘. COM(2005) 389 final.
26 See e.g., European Commission (2010) ‘Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitio-
ners’.
27 See, e.g., Jacobs & Rea 2007. 
28 See Velluti, Samantha (2007) ‘What European Union Strategy for Integrating Migrants? The Role 
of OMC Soft Mechanisms in the Development of an EU Immigration Policy’. European Journal of 
Migration & Law, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 53–82.
29 Hesse, Barnor (2007) ‘Racialized Modernity: An Analytics of White Mythologies’. Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, Vol. 30, Issue 4, 643–663; Kumar, Krishan (2002) ‘The Nation-State, the European Union, 
and Transnational Identities’. In AlSayyad, Nezar & Manuel Castells (eds) Muslim Europe or Euro­
Islam: politics, culture, and citizenship in the age of globalization. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
53–68.
30 Fassin, Eric (2006) ‘La démocratie sexuelle et le conflit des civilisations ‘. Multitudes, Vol. 26, Issue 
3, 123–131; Scott, Joan Wallach (2007) The politics of the veil. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press.
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Civic integration programmes focussing on national identity may seem 
paradoxical within the context of cultural and legal Europeanization. In-
deed, Soysal argued that international regimes, such as the EU, and claims 
to universal human rights would decrease the significance of the nation-
state in matters of immigration and rights.31 This argument, however, does 
not appear to hold true for integration policies: integration conditions that 
require national cultural and linguistic conformity in order to reside in a 
national territory extend the reach of the national beyond the institution of 
national citizenship.32 
Much has changed since post-national theories, such as Soysal’s, became 
popular in the context of 1990’s.33 The current ‘return to the national’34, or 
the renewed emphasis on national belonging, comes partly in response to 
9/11 and other violence35 and the perceived threat to the welfare state by 
immigrants36. Governments appear to be retreating from policies entailing 
societal accommodation and attempting to protect social solidarity, which 
they frame as ‘national’.37 This framing is influenced by populist right-wing 
parties, as mainstream politicians in European countries take up some pop-
ulist rhetoric and concerns with the definition, maintenance, and protection 
of national identity.38 Furthermore, while previous emphases on national 
identity formulated that identity in contrast to those of other nation-states, 
the current emphasis focuses instead on a contrast with the identities of mi-
grants.39 This formulation of national identity necessarily relies on an image 
of immigrants as culturally different and may be used to support integration 
31 Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu (1994) Limits of citizenship: migrants and postnational membership in Eu­
rope. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. See, also, Kofman’s discussion of Soysal’s thesis: Kofman 
2005, 453–454.
32 Goodman 2011, 235.
33 Kofman 2005, 454.
34 Bertossi, Christophe (2007) ‘French and British models of integration: Public philosophies, policies 
and state institutions’. Working Paper No. 46. Oxford: ESRC Centre on Migration Policy and Society, 
University of Oxford, 6.
35 Kofman 2005, 454.
36 See, e.g. Goodhart, David (2004) ‘Too Diverse?’. Prospect Magazine, Issue 95.
37 Bertossi 2007.
38 Acosta 2010; Mudde, Cas (2007) Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
39 Suvarierol, Semin (2012) ‘Nation-freezing: images of the nation and the migrant in citizenship pack-
ages’. Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 18, Issue 2, 213.
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requirements of cultural conformity as a method of protecting and main-
taining national solidarity. 
Overall, the current prevalence of civic integration programmes repre-
sents a trend across European countries to emphasise nationally-defined 
communities and identities in immigrant integration policies. This pattern 
begs the question of whether national models as cultural frames and struc-
tures of reference still appear within integration policies. If so, are these 
national models now similar, like the integration policies themselves, thus 
perhaps reflecting a European identity, or do they remain distinct? 
Methods and data 
To address whether French and Finnish national models are constituted and 
deployed differently and the extent to which these ‘models’ incorporate ref-
erences to a European identity, we examine the discourse of the French and 
Finnish civic integration programmes and identify 1) the justifications of 
the policies and programmes, 2) how and what values40 are articulated as 
core elements of ‘national identity’, and 3) the constructions of those target-
ed by the policies.41 Programme justifications give insight into whether and 
how national discourses use national models to frame and support the inte-
gration programmes. National values and the representations of the policy 
targets may be constructed in juxtaposition to one another and provide us 
with examples of how national identity and belonging is framed. 
In order to access these discursive constructions, we rely upon qualita-
tive, text-oriented content analysis with attention to the political context, 
and focus on discursive practices such as naming, category definitions, 
and binary oppositions. Giving a phenomenon a name makes it visible and 
forms a boundary between it and its surroundings. Similarly, categorization 
joins together various individuals or elements, ascribing them distinguish-
40 For this analysis, we define values as ideals or ways of being in the social world that we interpret as 
being ascribed worth by the authors of the texts.
41 We borrow our focus on programme justifications and the representations of the national commu-
nity and the migrants targeted by these programmes from Bacchi’s ‘What is the problem represented 
to be’ (WPR) approach. Research utilizing the full WPR approach would ideally also include ele-
ments of process-tracing, effects evaluation and alternative policy propositions. Bacchi, Carol Lee 
(2009) Analysing policy. What’s the problem represented to be? Frenchs Forest, N.S.W.: Pearson.
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able attributes different from other categories. Naming and categorizing are 
thus not natural or apolitical acts but creative, contingent and political. It is 
therefore meaningful to examine which issues need explicit description or 
motivation and which, again, are represented as given.42
The empirical text analysis was carried out through close-reading and 
qualitative coding. Two types of codes were created: thematic and interpre-
tive. The former type of coding mapped the thematic substance of the docu-
ments analysed, marking contents related to our research interests.43 This 
gave us the possibility to assess the documents in terms of content: which 
issues were taken up and which were not. The interpretive coding marked 
sections of the corpus with our evaluations of what the piece of text ‘does’ 
in terms of naming, categorization or assigning hierarchical positions. As a 
result, we were able to point to unique and interesting textual constructions 
as well as discursive patterns, or recurrent ways of speaking about integra-
tion and its subjects in the contexts of the two nation-states.
The data for this chapter is listed in Table 1. The selected documents 
present discourses from different political actors or bodies and address a 
variety of audiences. Most of the texts connect directly to civic integration 
courses. It was, however, not always possible, or fruitful, to limit the analysis 
to only the contents of integration policies that specifically concerned civic 
integration programmes.
The following sections present the findings from France and Finland; 
each case starts with an introduction to the historical, legislative, and po-
litical contexts, followed by our analysis of the programme justifications, 
national values, and representations of the target groups. 
42 Bacchi 2009, 4–9; Ginger, Clare (2006) ‘Interpretive Content Analysis: Stodies and Arguments in 
Analytic Documents’. In Interpretation and Method. Empirical Research Method and the Interpretive 
Turn. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 331–348; Potter, Jonathan (1996) Representing Reality. Discourse, 
rhetoric and social construction. London: Sage, 177.
43 Not all passages of the text included in the corpus were coded – the analysis was not ‘grounded’ (cf. 
Charmaz, Kathy (2003) ‘Grounded Theory: Objectivist and Constructivist Methods’. In Strategies of 
qualitative inquiry. SAGE.).
elizabeth onasch, marjukka weide
184
Table 1. Texts selected for analysis*
France Finland
Material for 
Newcomers
• The ‘Reception and Integration Contract’. 
The Ministry of the Interior, Overseas 
France, Local Authorities and Immigra-
tion and the French Office of Immigra-
tion and Integration (1/2010)
• The ‘Welcome Booklet’. Ministry of Im-
migration, Integration, National Identity 
and Solidarity Development (5/2009)**
• ‘Vilma’ Online civics education 
material at http://virtuoosi.
pkky.fi/vilma (2002–2010)
• ‘Welcome to Finland’. Ministry 
of the Interior, 2011
• ‘Foundation for the Syllabus 
of the Integration Education 
for Immigrants’. The Finnish 
National Board of Education 
(Opetushallitus) Instructions 
and Directives, 1/2012 
Legislative 
Documents
• National Assembly Bill N° 823 on Im-
migration Control and Residence of 
Foreigners, 30/4/2003
• National Assembly Bill N° 2986 on Immi-
gration and Integration, 29/3/2006
• National Assembly Bill N° 57 on Immigra-
tion Control, Integration and Asylum, 
4/7/2007 
• Act on the Integration of 
Immigrants and Reception of 
Asylum Seekers L 493/1999 
(Integration Act 1999) 
• Act on the Promotion of Inte-
gration L 1386/2010 (Integra-
tion Act 2010) 
Governmental 
and adminis-
trative reports
• ‘Introducing the Values of the Republic: 
Introducing, Understanding and Re-
specting the Values and Symbols of the 
Republic and Organizing the Evaluation 
of This Knowledge’, report by the High 
Council of Integration, 4/2009
• ‘The Essentials of Integration: Promoting 
the Integration of Legal Immigrants’, 
document by Ministry of Immigration, 
Integration, National Identity and Soli-
darity Development, 2009 
• ‘The French Office of Immigration and 
Integration (OFII): A Multi-faceted Public 
Establishment in Service of Integration 
Policy’, Administrative Review, 2010
• Government Report on the 
Implementation of the Integra-
tion Act VNS, 5/2002
• Government Report on the 
Implementation of the Integra-
tion VNS, 4/2008
• Pronouncement of the Admin-
istrative Committee on the 
Government bill on the Act on 
the Promotion of Integration 
HaVM 26/2010 vp
• Parliamentary reply E. V. 
239/2010 vp 
*  Quotes from French and Finnish language sources are translated by us unless stated otherwise.
** Although the ‘Welcome Booklet’ is no longer supplied to participants in the ‘Living in France’ classes, we still 
analyse this text because it was designed to be used with the Reception and Integration Contract.
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France – Republican reception and assimilation
Both the patterns of immigration and the integration policies in France re-
flect French colonial history. Large-scale migration to France from former 
colonies and other European countries formed as a result of labour demand 
during the first post-war ‘boom’ decades.44 Many guest workers from the 
Global South settled in France and established durable migration flows 
despite the 1974 immigration control policy that only allowed labour mi-
gration from nations within the European Community and family reunifi-
cation. As of 2008, there were 5.3 million migrants living in France, consti-
tuting about 8.4 per cent of the total population. While about 34 per cent of 
these immigrants originated in other European Union member states, 42.5 
per cent were born in Africa, more than half of whom came from former 
colonies in the Maghreb and 12.5 per cent of whom came from other parts 
of Africa. About one million migrants originated in other parts of the world, 
principally Turkey and Asia.45
Scholars and political actors have traditionally identified France as a 
universalist, ‘civic’ nation, where belonging is supposed to be based on po-
litical citizenship, rather than ethnicity or primordial ties.46 Access to French 
citizenship through naturalization requires ‘assimilation to the French com-
munity’, through sufficient mastery of the French language, along with other 
more ambiguously defined criteria of assimilation.47 Thus, entry into the 
universal French community involves renouncing, or relegating to the pri-
vate sphere, aspects of culture and faith that are judged to be incompatible 
with French national identity.48 Importantly, these incompatible aspects of 
culture tend to be attributed to non-Europeans and, particularly, Muslims.49 
44 Winant, Howard (2001) The world is a ghetto: race and democracy since World War II. New York: 
Basic Books.
45 Statistics from: Institute National de la Statistiques et des Études Économiques (2012) ‘3.7 Étran-
gers- Immigrés’. Online. Availabile HTTP: <www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?reg_id=0&ref_
id=T12F037#presentation> (accessed 22 February 2012).
46 Brubaker 1992.
47 Koopmans, Ruud, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni & Florence Passy (2005) Contested citizenship: im­
migration and cultural diversity in Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 52.
48 Jennings, Jeremy (2000) ‘Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France’. 
British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, Issue 4, 575–598, 582.
49 Juge, Tony S. & Michael P. Perez (2006) ‘The Modern Colonial Politics of Citizenship and Whiteness 
in France’. Social Identities, Vol. 12, Issue 2, 187–212.
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The relegation of religion to the private sphere is a feature of the French 
form of secularism, laïcité, which dictates the separation of church and state. 
While laïcité historically allowed the French state to overcome the political 
power of the Catholic Church, more recently political actors have used this 
concept to criticize the ‘public’ religious practices of non-Christians.50 The 
French emphasis on cultural assimilation is also congruent with both the 
history of French nation-building, which involved the creation of a ‘French’ 
population through the imposition of a standardized ‘French’ national cul-
ture and language51, and the French colonial legacy of explicit cultural tute-
lage exemplified by the mission civilisatrice.52 
Despite the emphasis on assimilation, which appears to place the re-
sponsibility for successful integration on immigrants themselves, there 
has also been an acknowledgement of the barriers to integration faced by 
immigrants.53 In the late 1990’s, integration policies began to address dis-
crimination directed toward migrants, thereby highlighting the role and re-
sponsibility of the French state to provide immigrants with equal access to 
resources.54 While anti-discrimination policies still exist, this concern has 
partly faded in the public debates over integration, as it was replaced in the 
early 2000’s with a focus on group tensions and laïcité as a ‘moral framework 
that defined [French] identity’.55 
The development of the Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration (The Recep-
tion and Integration Contract, CAI) reflects the idea that assimilation is cru-
cial to immigrant integration. In 1998, the French government put in place 
plates­formes d’accueil (introduction platforms) aimed initially at those mi-
grants arriving through family reunification.56 These voluntary programmes 
consisted of a half day of instruction on French culture and everyday life. In 
50 Scott 2007.
51 Greenfeld, Liah (1992) Nationalism: five roads to modernity. Cambridge, MA Harvard University 
Press.
52 Fredrickson, George M. (2005) ‘Diverse republics: French & American responses to racial pluralism’. 
Daedalus, Vol. 134, Issue 1, 97–98.
53 See, i.e., Long, Marceau (1988) Etre Français aujourd’hui et demain. Paris: La Documentation Fran-
çaise 
54 Hachimi, Alaoui Myriam (2012) ‘L’intégration sous condition: valeurs non négociables et égalité des 
sexes’. Canadian Journal of Women and The Law / Revue femmes et droit, Vol. 24, Issue 1, 119.
55 Bertossi 2011, 1570.
56 Joppke 2007, 251.
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April 2003, the inter-ministerial committee for integration established the 
more extensive CAI for non-European immigrants on a trial basis.57 
The CAI is administrated by the Office Français de l’Immigration et de 
l’Intégration (the French Office of Immigration and Integration, OFII). As 
part of the CAI, migrants attend a welcome session, which includes a short 
presentation about the contract and a film, Vivre ensemble, en France (Living 
Together in France), about entering the French national community. On the 
same day, the migrants are required to attend a medical visit and a personal 
interview, during which they sign the contract after an auditor has evalu-
ated their level of French fluency, as well as any other specific needs, and 
has explained the requirements of the contract with the help of a translator, 
if necessary. If the auditor judges the migrant’s level of French fluency to be 
insufficient, the migrant must complete a more thorough language evalua-
tion and attend the recommended state-sponsored French classes in order 
to reach the lowest Diplôme Initial de Langue Française (Initial Diploma in 
French Language) fluency standard. 
All CAI participants must also attend a day-long civics class that presents 
the fundamental rights, laws, values, and institutions of the French Republic. 
Depending on the needs of the migrants, their contracts may also require 
them to attend a workshop on Vivre En France (Living in France), which 
aims to facilitate their comprehension of French society and their access to 
public services, and an individual interview for labour market integration, 
which includes an assessment of their professional competencies and infor-
mation on how to find appropriate work. The contracts last one year, and 
may be extended for an additional year under certain circumstances. If the 
administration finds that the contract has not been fulfilled satisfactorily, 
the migrant may be denied a renewal of their residence permit. 
The initial years of the programme saw inconsistent participation with 
many applicants failing to follow-up on their recommended French lan-
guage courses58 and in 2006, the second ‘Sarkozy Law’ established the CAI 
as obligatory.59 The integration programme was extended in 2007 with a 
57 Direction de l’Accueil et d’Intégration (2010) ‘Le dispositif d’accueil et d’intégration en 2009’, 2.
58 Joppke 2007, 252.
59 Loi n°2006–911 du 24 juillet 2006 Relative à l’Immigration et à l’Intégration.
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law which requires family unification migrants to complete certain integra-
tion requirements in their country of emigration in order to receive a visa.60 
Additionally, the Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration pour la Famille (Recep-
tion and Integration Contract for the Family, CAIF), which was legislated 
in 2008, requires immigrants who are bringing their children to France 
through family reunification to attend a special course on the ‘rights and du-
ties of parents in France’.61 More than 510,736 CAI were signed between July 
2003, when the contracts were introduced, and the end of 2009.62 In 2010 
alone, 101,355 people signed the contract, 23.7 per cent of whom were re-
quired to take additional language training. Participants from the Maghreb 
states represented the largest regional group, making up about 38 per cent 
of the 2010 participants.63 
Programme justifications 
The Reception and Integration Contract and its associated civic integration 
courses developed within the context of concerns about migration control 
and claims that the project of integrating immigrants into the French Re-
public had failed. Migration control is a central issue within the bills and 
laws that established the integration programme. For instance, the integra-
tion requirement was introduced in the 2003 bill on Immigration Control, 
Residence of Aliens, and Nationality, which began by stating the need to 
manage migration flows and fight against the illegal migration that was 
‘crystallizing the fears of our citizens and feeding xenophobia’. In addition 
to stating that a demonstration of integration into French society should be 
a requirement for receiving a ten-year residence permit, this bill advocated 
for the need to streamline expulsion processes and better sort out and pro-
tect ‘victims of persecution’.64
60 Loi n°2007–1631 du 20 novembre 2007 Relative à la Maitrise de l’Immigration, à l’Intégration et à 
l’Asile.
61 Direction d’Accueil de l’Intégration (2011) ‘La mise en oeuvre par l’OFII du Contrat d’Accueil de 
d’Intégration pour la Famille’.
62 Direction de l’Accueil et d’Intégration 2010.
63 L’Office Francais de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration (2011) ‘Rapport d’activité 2010 de l’Office 
Français de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration’. Paris, 8–9.
64 L’Assemblée Nationale (2003) ‘Projet de Loi relatif à la maîtrise de l’immigration et au séjour des 
étrangers en France’, N° 823, déposé le 30 avril 2003.
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The bill for the 2006 law on Immigration and Integration that made the 
Reception and Integration Contract mandatory also expressed the impor-
tance of fighting illegal migration and highlighted the need to continue the 
current stabilization and control of migration.65 The bill identified the in-
sufficient integration of immigrants who lack ‘a job, housing, and sufficient 
knowledge of the French language’ as a problem, and proposed that the con-
tract be mandatory and include a civic programme, linguistic formation, 
and an assessment of professional expertise.66 The bill also argued for a more 
thorough evaluation of immigrants’ integration in order for them to receive 
a ten-year residence permit, stating the need to examine ‘the foreigner’s per-
sonal commitment to respect the principles that govern the French Repub-
lic, the actual respect of these principles, and sufficient knowledge of the 
French language’.67 As part of an effort to reduce ‘endured’ migration and in-
crease ‘selected’ migration, this same bill also proposed the Compétences et 
Talents (Skills and Talents) residence permit.68 Highly-skilled migrants with 
this permit are allowed to bypass the integration programme requirements.
Finally, the 2007 Immigration Control, Integration and Asylum bill and 
law extended the reach of the Reception and Integration Contract to family 
migrants still in their countries of origin so that potential migrants could 
‘better succeed in the process [of integration] by beginning before they come 
to France’.69 The law also instituted the Reception and Integration Contract 
for the Family, arguing that migrants with children needed to be familiar 
with the ‘essential principles that, in accordance with the laws of the republic, 
govern family life in France’.70 The introduction of integration from abroad 
in 2007 mirrors the policy suggestions in the EU framework in 2005.71 
While the titles and contents of the bills and laws that instituted the 
French integration programmes suggest that the integration requirement is 
65 L’Assemblée Nationale (2006) ‘Projet de Loi relatif à l’immigration et à l’intégration’, N° 2986, déposé 
le 29 mars 2006.
66 L’Assemblée Nationale 2006.
67 L’Assemblée Nationale 2006.
68 Paul, Regine (2012) ‘Managing diverse policy contexts: The welfare state as repertoire of policy logics 
in German and French labour migration governance’ in this volume.
69 L’Assemblée Nationale (2007) ‘Projet de Loi relatif à la maîtrise de l’immigration, à l’intégration et à 
l’asile’, N° 57, déposé le 4 juillet 2007.
70 L’Assemblée Nationale 2007.
71 Commission of the European Communities 2005.
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part of a broader project of immigration control, political actors also jus-
tified the development of the programmes as a reaction to the continued 
failure of integration, indicated by both identity conflicts and the socio-
economic disadvantage and segregation of immigrants and their children. 
These integration problems were also connected to the threat of civil unrest 
and violence, which Sarkozy obliquely referenced in 2009: 
The integration policies of the last 30 years in France have not 
achieved their objectives. More than 60 per cent of foreigners live in 
three regions (Ile de-France, Rhône-Alpes, Provence- Alpes-Côte-
d’Azur). In these regions, the immigrant population is concentrated 
in areas marked by urban tensions and the effects of ‘communau-
tarism’. Several recent events that have taken place in these areas 
show how much the feeling of relegation can damage that of belong-
ing to our national community.72
The need to address a supposed lack of national identity, particularly 
among second and third generations73, played a role in the implementa-
tion and strengthening of integration policies; however, references to more 
concrete phenomena, such as segregation, the high unemployment rates of 
migrants, and the poor scholastic performance of their children, were more 
common in justifications for the programme. With a somewhat circular 
logic, educational achievement and employment represented not only indi-
cators of the level of integration achieved, but the paths to achieving integra-
tion. Civic integration programme documents emphasize that in order to in-
tegrate into French society, immigrants must have knowledge of the French 
language and French values. This knowledge can be obtained through the 
72 L’Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’intégration (2010) ‘L’Office Français de l’Immigration et 
de l’intégration (OFII): Un Etablissement Public aux Multiples Facettes au Service de la Politique 
Migratoire›. Revue Administration, Paris: Cahier d›Administration, 36. For a discussion of per-
ceptions of failure in French integration policy, see Schain, Martin A (2012) ‘Managing Difference: 
Immigrant Integration Policy in France, Britain, and the United States’. Social Research, Vol. 77, Issue 
1, 205-236, 227.
73 See, e.g., Le Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (2009) ‘Faire Connaitre Les Valeurs De La République: Faire 
connaître, comprendre et respecter les valeurs et symboles de la République et organiser les modali-
tés d’évaluation de leur connaissance’, 8.
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French education system, which is ‘where the primordial construction of 
political citizenship takes place for the majority’74, or, alternatively, through 
the state-sponsored civic integration programme and language courses.
The value of education as a route to integration not only justifies requir-
ing general civic training for migrants, but also justifies intervening in the 
parenting of school-age children. While the CAIF has a day-long course fo-
cusing on the rights and duties of parents in France, even the CAI’s materials 
for migrants contain extensive advice on parenting children in school. For 
example, migrants are instructed to follow their children’s school work, and 
more specifically, to ‘ask every night what they must do for school. If there 
is too much noise around them at that moment, they will not succeed. Turn 
off the television!’75 Furthermore, policy documents use the importance of 
education and parenting as part of the justification for targeting immigrant 
women in the integration programme, due to their ‘role in the heart of the 
family and in the education of children’.76 
The language requirements of the integration programme are justified 
with the argument that mastery of the French language is the ‘greatest as-
set’77 in the process of integration. Speaking French is presented as essential 
for finding a job, understanding French culture and values, and even es-
tablishing gender equality.78 The integration programme as a whole is also 
justified by its efforts to facilitate immigrants getting jobs, because, ‘the best 
path to integration, other than knowledge of the French language and ad-
herence to our principles of community life, is legal, declared and protected 
work’.79 To this end, the contract process involves not only an assessment of 
professional skills, but also connections to employment agencies and job 
opportunities created through OFII partnerships with organizations, such 
74 Le Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 2009, 61.
75 Le Ministère de l’immigration de l’intégration de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire 
(2009a) ‘Livret d’Accueil: Vivre en France’, 34.
76 Le ministère de l’Immigration, de l’Intégration, de l’Identité nationale et du développement solidaire 
(2009b) ‘L’Essential sur L’intégration – Promouvoir l’intégration des immigrés légaux’. Online. 
Available HTTP: <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/la-france/venir-en-france/immigration-et-droit-
d-asile/l-essentiel-sur/article/l-integration-promouvoir-l >. 13.
77  Le Ministère de l’immigration de l’intégration de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire 
2009a, 14.
78 L’Assemblée Nationale 2007.
79 L’Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’intégration 2010, 20.
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as those representing the care and transportation industries. Programme 
documents further highlight efforts by the French government to encourage 
businesses to hire immigrants by awarding participating businesses with a 
‘diversity label’.80 The emphasis on employment and education as key factors 
in integration fit with the Common Basic Principles. 
Values and the civic integration programme
Knowing and respecting French ‘Republican values’ constitutes a central re-
quirement in the French process of integration; yet, with the exception of 
gender equality and laïcité, these values remain general and abstract in the 
integration programme’s legislative texts. Two documents directed towards 
immigrants signing the contract — the Livret d’Accueil (Welcome booklet) 
and the Reception and Integration Contract itself— provide slightly more 
detail on the values to which participants are acquired to adhere. Both docu-
ments highlight and elaborate on several values, including gender equality 
and laïcité, and leave the rest to appear in lists. 
The Reception and Integration Contract is an actual contract with ar-
ticles listing first the commitments of the state, and then those of the signer, 
as well the duration of the contract and the specific requirements that the 
individual immigrant must fulfil. These articles are followed by signature 
lines for the immigrant and the official. Before the articles of the contract, 
the document begins by stating that, ‘France and the French are attached 
to a history, a culture and certain fundamental values. To live together, it is 
necessary to know and respect these values.’81 It goes on to describe these 
values in a series of bullet points divided according to five headings. These 
headings state that France is a country of democracy, rights and duties, 
secularism, and equality. The contract text describes France as ‘an indivis-
ible, secular, democratic and social republic’ in which ‘the power rests in 
the sovereignty of the people, expressed by the universal suffrage available 
80 L’Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’intégration 2010, 24–25.
81 Ministère de l’Intérieur, de l’Outre-mer, des Collectivités Territoriales et de l’Immigration and Office 
Français de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration (2010) ‘Contrat D’Accueil et d’Intégration’.
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to all French citizens over the age of 18’.82 The section on rights and duties 
highlights the equality of rights, lists the right to freedom (of opinion, ex-
pression, meeting, movement), the right to personal safety and protection 
by the state, and the right to personal property, and points out that regular 
(legal) foreigners have the same rights and duties as French, except for the 
right to vote. Under a heading describing France as a laïque county, ‘laïcité’ 
is explained with the statement that while the French state respects all faiths 
and the freedom of religion, religion is relegated to the private domain and 
the state is independent from all religions. Finally, under the heading of 
‘France, a country of equality,’ the contract text elaborates specifically on 
gender equality and the equal rights and duties of men and women. 
The Welcome Booklet, which presents information on everyday life in 
France to supplement the courses of the integration programme, lists de-
mocracy, freedom, equality, fraternity, safety, and secularism as the funda-
mental Republican values to which one must commit when signing the in-
tegration contract.83 Like the contract, the book also has a section dedicated 
to explaining gender equality as ‘a fundamental principle of French society,’ 
which goes into the different rights that men and women share, the laws 
that support the freedom of choice in marriage, and the illegality of ‘forced 
marriages’ and polygamy.84 The booklet does not have a section dedicated 
to laïcité, although the concept appears many times throughout the text. 
Two other sections in the booklet address the equality of rights, expounding 
upon the illegality of discrimination, particularly according to race, and the 
right to personal safety, which forbids ‘the treatment of the human body like 
an object or merchandise’.85 
In its 2009 report on introducing the values of the French republic, Le 
Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (The High Council of Integration, HCI) criti-
82 Ministère de l’Intérieur, de l’Outre-mer, des Collectivités Territoriales et de l’Immigration and Office 
Français de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration 2010.
83 Le Ministère de l’immigration de l’intégration de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire 
2009a, 13.
84 Le Ministère de l’immigration de l’intégration de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire 
2009a, 10.
85 Le Ministère de l’immigration de l’intégration de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire 
2009a, 11.
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cized the superficial treatment of values and symbols within the booklet 
and the civic courses, arguing that respect for French republican values 
(rather than memorization) would be facilitated by more thorough discus-
sions of the specific histories of the values and symbols.86 Considering the 
importance that the integration programme legislation has given to under-
standing and respecting French national values, it does appear to contra-
dict the goals of the civic integration programme that these values are not 
more thoroughly explained in the written material for migrants analysed 
here. Even if the French values are manifested in the laws and obligations 
discussed in the program materials87 this connection is not made evident. 
While this apparent negligence could support arguments that French in-
tegration programmes are designed for purposes of immigration control, 
rather than acculturation88, the integration programme may have improved 
the oral instruction at the day-long civics and ‘Living in France’ classes to 
better elaborate on the national values since the HCI evaluation.
The HCI report also emphasizes the importance of discussing the im-
perfect realization of the French values; for example, the report states that it 
is necessary to acknowledge that there is a great deal of inequality in France, 
and that ‘more than ever, the ideal of equality is a work in progress’.89 The 
programme materials convey this flawed reality in the case of discrimina-
tion; the booklet states that ‘despite campaigns to fight against xenophobia 
(hostility toward foreigners) and racism, [the reader] may encounter intol-
erance or rejection’90, and encourages the reader to contact local authori-
ties or The French Equal Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Commis-
sion91. This statement provides a rare glimpse of the possible gap between 
the stated French values and the values to which people in France actually 
subscribe and adhere. In her analysis of the representations of the French 
86 Le Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 2009, 33–34.
87 Suvarierol 2012, 221.
88 See, e.g., Goodman 2011.
89 Le Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 2009, 25.
90 Le Ministère de l’immigration de l’intégration de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire 
2009a, 9.
91 As of March 2011, HALDE was replaced by the organization, Le Défenseur des Droits (Defender of 
Rights).
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nation-state and the migrant in the official materials provided to migrants, 
Suvarierol highlights the booklet’s statement that domestic violence ‘con-
cerns all social classes and cultures’92, which can represent another acknowl-
edgment of this gap. Overall, however, the integration materials often add 
that French laws ‘apply to all’ but tend to not address the question of how 
much French citizens espouse and adhere to French values.93 
The French integration programme differs from the EU level sugges-
tions in that it does not focus much on the relationship between French 
citizens and immigrants and does not articulate the value of cultural ex-
change. However, perhaps because they are at a similar level of abstraction, 
the broader lists of French values line up well with the general list of Eu-
ropean values presented under the second Common Basic Principle: ‘re-
spect for the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law’ and ‘dignity, freedom, equality 
and non-discrimination, solidarity, citizen’s rights, and justice’.94 While the 
specific values of gender equality and laïcité (or a comparable concept) do 
not appear explicitly within this list as they often do in the French lists, a 
concern for the equal rights of women appears several times in the elabora-
tion of the Common Basic Principles and the eighth principle highlights the 
freedom to practice one’s religion, as long as these practices ‘do not prevent 
individual migrants from exercising other fundamental rights or participat-
ing in the host society’.95 
Representations of the policy target groups
The populations targeted by the integration programme are often referred to 
as ‘immigrants’ or ‘migrants’, or, according to their role in the programme, 
e.g., ‘participant’, ‘signatory’, ‘trainee’; however, the most common term used 
in the legislation is ‘étranger’, or ‘foreigner’. This designation is interesting in 
92 Le Ministère de l’immigration de l’intégration de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire 
2009a, 26, cited in Suvarierol 2012, 220.
93 As the exception in this analysis, the 2009 HCI report considered to what extent French citizens 
adhere to the values that are being presented to immigrants. 
94 Council of the European Union 2004.
95 Council of the European Union 2004.
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that, unlike ‘immigrant’, or ‘participant’, which signal some sort of role or 
action (e.g., immigrating to the country), ‘foreigner’ signals a more basic, 
static status of outsider. The purported need to educate target populations 
on French culture and values indicates a perception of cultural difference 
between the French and the targeted immigrant groups. The texts also oc-
casionally explicitly reference conflicts or incompatibilities between French 
and immigrant cultures, and characterize immigrant cultures as traditional 
or communitarian. 
In line with the concept of binary oppositions, it is also possible to dis-
cern an image of the target population as a contrast to the image of the 
French that the programme discourses present. The repetition of gender 
equality and laïcité as important French values, while others often remain 
unnamed or unelaborated, strongly suggests that immigrants might not 
subscribe to these values. In the same way, the frequent interdiction of po-
lygamy and the repeated use of genital mutilation and ‘forced marriage’ as 
examples of practices in contradiction to the French right of personal safety 
suggest that these are practices relevant to immigrants.96 
It is also possible to discern an image of the target population by consid-
ering what kinds of information about everyday life appear in the Welcome 
Booklet. For example, the inclusion of sections on how to use the postal sys-
tem and a bank card suggests that immigrants may be unfamiliar with these 
systems. The booklet also warns that in France, ‘it is often necessary to dress 
warmly and buy winter clothes’, thereby implying that immigrants may be 
used to warmer climates.97 In line with the image of migrant cultures as less 
gender equal, the booklet informs migrants about practices of equality in 
spousal relationships in France: 
In the family, the husband and wife are equal and stand together in 
making important decisions (choosing a home, making important 
purchases). Even if she does not work, the woman must, for example, 
96 See, also, Suvarierol 2012 for a similar conclusion about the portrayal of immigrants as gender 
unequal within the Welcome Booklet.
97 Le Ministère de l’immigration de l’intégration de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire 
2009a, 12.
teaching integration in france and finland: a comparison of national … 
197
sign the couple’s taxes. The woman does not need her husband’s per-
mission to work or to open a bank account. Concerning the children, 
both parents jointly exercise parental authority and participate in the 
child’s education.98
Finally, the Welcome Booklet text suggests migrants may have differ-
ent or even inadequate parenting practices. The booklet contains a list of 
instructions related to child care, including directions to maintain a baby’s 
room at a maximum of 19 degrees Celsius, to lay a baby on its back to sleep, 
and not to let children under the age of eight cross the road alone.99 This per-
ceived need to educate immigrants on parenting practices is also reflected in 
the development of the CAIF and the associated training on the rights and 
duties of parents in France.
Finland – the Nordic welfare framework applied
Finland is a latecomer to the group of post-World-War-II immigration 
countries. It remained an emigration country until the turn of the 1990’s, 
providing labour mainly to Sweden.100 In the early 1990’s, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the war in Somalia brought new citizens to Finland – some 
of them asylum seekers and refugees, some family migrants, others Ingrian 
Finns migrating as ‘returnees’, a status granted to them due to ethnically 
Finnish origin and historical circumstances. Until 2007, Finnish citizens 
moving (back) from Sweden formed the largest group of inbound migrants, 
reported by citizenship and country of emigration. At that point, foreign cit-
izens moving from Estonia to Finland outnumbered Finns migrating from 
Sweden. The percentage of foreign citizens in the population of Finland was 
as low as 0.53 per cent in 1990 and rose to 3.39 per cent by 2011.101
98 Le Ministère de l’immigration de l’intégration de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire 
2009a, 10.
99 Le Ministère de l’immigration de l’intégration de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire 
2009a, 43.
100 See Korkiasaari, Jouni & Kari Tarkiainen (2000) Suomalaiset Ruotsissa. Turku: Siirtolaisuusinstituutti.
101 Tilastokeskus (2011) ‘Maahan- ja maastamuuttaneet lähtö- ja määrämaan, iän, sukupuolen ja kansa-
laisuuden mukaan 1987–2010’; Tilastokeskus (2012) ‘Kansalaisuus iän ja sukupuolen mukaan maa-
kunnittain 1990–2011’. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.statfin.fi> (accessed 11 April 2012).
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While arrangements for the reception of refugees and asylum seekers 
have existed since the 1970’s102, Finnish immigrant integration policy was 
first formulated in 1999 in the form of an Integration Act.103 Contrary to 
the French approach to ethnic diversity, the 1990’s were generally a time 
in the Finnish politics of several legislative projects related to rights and 
recognition, such as a basic rights reform and the constitutional reform. 
The latter stipulated the ‘right to maintain and develop one’s own language 
and culture’, explicitly mentioning the Roma and indigenous Sámi people.104 
Linguistic recognition was not, however, a novelty of the 1990’s. The first 
Finnish constitution (1919) defined the public system as bilingual, and the 
constitution continues to recognize the historically important Swedish lan-
guage as equal to Finnish.105 
A positive discourse around diversity by Finnish authorities was contin-
ued in the 2000’s. Thus, at the level of the official framework, the immigrant 
policy in Finland can be classified as belonging to the ‘multiculturalist’ way 
of dealing with minorities and incorporating newcomers.106 Laura Huttunen 
et al. have pointed out that ‘Finnish multiculturalism’ has been driven by 
public authorities who other actors, in turn, have expected to solve all its 
problems.107 Finnish policies have, furthermore, been depicted as more 
occupied with the concepts of tolerance and multiculturalism than antira-
cism.108 Discourses of services and rights are typical of administrative, tech-
102 Rinne, Irene (1989) Suomen pakolaispolitiikka. Valtion kannanotot pakolaiskysymyksessä vuosina 
1973–87. Helsinki: Sosiaalihallitus.
103 L 493/1999 ‘Laki maahanmuuttajien kotouttamisesta ja turvapaikanhakijoiden vastaanotosta 
9.4.1999’.
104 L 731/1999 ‘Suomen perustuslaki. 11.6.1999’; Lepola, Outi (2000) Ulkomaalaisesta suomenmaa­
laiseksi. Monikulttuurisuus, kansalaisuus ja suomalaisuus 1990­luvun maahanmuuttopoliittisessa 
keskustelussa. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura.
105 Today, Swedish is the registered mother tongue of a mere 5.4 per cent of Finnish citizens. Tilastokes-
kus (2012) ‘Taulukko: Kieli iän ja sukupuolen mukaan maakunnittain 1990–2011’. Online. Availabile 
HTTP: <http://www.statfin.fi> (accessed 7 May 2012). 
106 Saukkonen, Pasi (2012) ‘Suomi: Euroopan multikulturalistisin maa? ’. Oikeus, Vol. 41, Issue 2, 
226–243. It is too early to assess how the recent sharpening of tones in politics and media debates 
will be reflected in the language of authorities. Saukkonen (ibid.) points out that the resourcing of 
incorporation policies is at a very modest level compared to the positive approach and high goals set 
in the policy texts.
107 Huttunen, Laura, Olli Löytty & Anna Rastas (2005) ‘Suomalainen monikulttuurisuus. Paikallisia ja 
ylirajaisia suhteita’. In Rastas, Anna, Laura Huttunen & Olli Löytty (eds) Suomalainen vieraskirja. 
Kuinka käsitellä monikulttuurisuutta. Tampere: Vastapaino, 23.
108 Suurpää, Leena (2005) ‘Suvaitsevaisuus. Sietämistä vai solidaarisuutta?’. In Rastas, Anna, Laura Hut-
tunen & Olli Löytty (eds) Suomalainen vieraskirja. Kuinka käsitellä monikulttuurisuutta. Tampere: 
Vastapaino, 61–62.
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nical, or otherwise ‘apolitical’ Finnish texts on immigrant integration. In the 
parliamentary and other public fora, issues related to immigration are much 
more contested. While politicians with an anti-immigration agenda have 
gained more parliamentary mandates since 2008109, there have also been 
members of parliament voicing welfare chauvinist and xenophobic senti-
ments during the past decades.110
The Integration Act was reformulated in late 2010. Under the new rules, 
not only the unemployed immigrants but all foreigners living in Finland are 
entitled to an ‘initial assessment’ of their needs in relation to the integration 
services and can be referred to courses. The core ‘clientele’ of the integration 
services remain, however, those newcomers who have an agreement with 
the Employment and Economic Development Office or their municipality 
about an individual integration plan. This agreement is made for a year to 
begin with but it can last up to three years.111 An integration plan can consist 
of a variety of elements that aim to enhance the individual’s employabil-
ity, such as civic integration courses, basic education, vocational training 
and internships at workplaces. Involving several public actors at the state, 
regional and local levels, the system of integration service provision in Fin-
land is rather complicated.112 In the following, we concentrate on the civic 
integration courses more specifically. 
Contracted by a regional authority, various kinds of educational insti-
tutions organize civic integration courses. From 2012, the content of the 
courses has been regulated by an instruction by the Finnish National Board 
of Education.113 Previous recommendations by the same body left consid-
erable room for local adaptation. The new instruction did not, however, 
109 See Keskinen, Suvi, Anna Rastas & Salla Tuori (eds) (2009) En ole rasisti, mutta... Maahanmuutosta, 
monikulttuurisuudesta ja kritiikistä. Tampere: Vastapaino; Maasilta, Mari (2012) ’Perinteinen ja 
sosiaalinen media ruokkivat toinen toisiaan’. In Maasilta, Mari (ed.) Maahanmuutto, media ja edus­
kuntavaalit. Tampere: Tampere University Press. Online. Availabile HTTP: <http://tampub.uta.fi/M/
maahanmuutto_media_ja_eduskuntavaalit_2012.pdf>.
110 See Lepola 2000.
111 L 1386/2010 ‘Laki kotoutumisen edistämisestä 30.12.2010/1386’.
112 Heikkilä-Paukkonen, Irma (2005) ‘Työvoimapoliittinen koulutus ja siihen rinnastettava kotoutumis-
koulutus’. In Kotomaa – Uusimaa Maahanmuuttajien osaaminen voimavaraksi M.O.V.I. Uudenmaan 
työvoima- ja elinkeinokeskus, Uudenmaan Liitto, 54–60.
113 Opetushallitus (2012) ‘Aikuisten maahanmuuttajien kotoutumiskoulutuksen opetussuunnitelman 
perusteet 2012’. Määräykset ja ohjeet 2012:1. Helsinki: Opetushallitus.
elizabeth onasch, marjukka weide
200
change the basic idea of the course: to introduce the course participant to 
information deemed relevant for everyday life and labour market participa-
tion, with a focus on language learning. Learning Finnish or Swedish114 con-
stitutes a major part of the civic integration programme for most of those 
enrolled. Apart from being represented in policy texts as the most important 
factor for finding employment, language skills also form part of the legal 
criteria for naturalization.115
In 2010, the number of participants at civic integration courses was 
13,800, and the number of recipients of the cash benefit called Integration 
Assistance was 15,500.116 These figures indicate that most recipients of In-
tegration Assistance are enrolled in a civic integration course at some point 
during their integration plan period. The biggest single nationality group 
amongst the recipients was Russian citizens, accounting for 21 per cent of all 
recipients, followed by Iraqis and Somalis (both at 11 per cent).117 
Policy justifications
After the adoption of the Integration Act in 1999, Finnish immigrant policy 
has roughly undergone two periods, the first being informed by humanitar-
ian and family migration, and the second, starting in the mid-2000’s, ac-
knowledging the growing need for labour migration.118 In the presentation 
below, we divide the discussion of the selected texts into these two periods. 
114 While the government documents consistently formulate the language goal as ‘learning Finnish or 
Swedish’, Swedish is not always mentioned or practically available as an option at the implementa-
tion level. Actors guarding the Swedish language in Finland have recently given more attention to 
the right to ‘choose to integrate in Swedish’ (see e.g. Creutz, Karin & Mika Helander (2012) Via 
svenska. Den svenskspråkiga integrationsvägen. Helsingfors: Magma.)
115 The language skill requirement has been in place since 2003. Since 2011, it has been possible to 
naturalize a year earlier than before if the applicant passes the language requirement already at 
that point. Kuosma, Tapio (2003) Uusi kansalaisuuslaki. Helsinki: Lainvoima, 116–123; L 359/2003 
’Kansalaisuuslaki. 16.5.2003’.
116 Kela (2011) Kelan tilastollinen vuosikirja 2010. Helsinki: Kela; Nupponen, Jouni (2011) ’VS: Kotou-
tumis-/suomen tai ruotsin kielen kurssien osallistujamäärät Suomessa’. E-mail (9 August 2011).
117 Kela 2011, 248. 
118 See Saukkonen 2010, 36–37. A new period may now be incipient, considering the claims for more 
restrictions made and spread by the True Finns populist party and smaller political movements. 
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Early 2000’s: The 1999 Integration Act and the 2002 Implementation Report
The purpose of this Act is to promote the integration, equality and 
freedom of choice of immigrants through measures which help them 
to acquire the essential knowledge and skills they need to function 
in society […]. […] In this Act: 1) integration means the personal 
development of immigrants, aimed at participation in working life 
and society while preserving their own language and culture […].119 
Justifications for immigrant integration measures in Finland, in our 
reading of the documents, are chiefly connected to two features of the Finn-
ish state: its tax-funded, domicile-based welfare system and the special im-
portance of language issues in the Finnish nationhood. Firstly, it is from the 
perspective of the extensive welfare state that the approach to integration as 
a broad set of measures, found in the policy texts, makes sense. The primacy 
of employment for ‘good integration’, as also indicated in the quote above, 
further connects to two intertwined elements in society: on the one hand, 
to the principle of the state as a common project to which everyone should 
contribute, and to the cultural importance of wage labour, on the other.120
Secondly, the dual focus on learning Finnish or Swedish, and the right 
to one’s own language and culture can be seen in the light of the Finnish 
language as the key element of the late 1800’s nation building and the official 
bilingualism of the state. The constitutional reform granting the Sámi, the 
Roma and ‘other groups’ the right to develop their language and culture121 
was concluded the same year with the first Integration Act; the recurrent 
mentioning of the right to culture in the implementation report on the Inte-
gration Act (2002) echoes this spirit of recognition. 
Outi Lepola’s research on the 1999 Integration Act and connected docu-
ments also points out the primacy of employment in the concept of inte-
119 L 493/1999. Translation from www.finlex.fi, our emphasis.
120 On conditioning citizenship through paid labour, see Nordberg, Camilla (2010) ‘Tutut vieraat – 
Suomen romanit, työelämän marginaalissa?’. In Wrede, Sirpa & Camilla Nordberg (eds) Vieraita 
työssä: työelämän etnistyvä eriarvoisuus. Helsinki: Palmenia Helsinki University Press, 254–273. 
121 L 731/1999.
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gration. According to her, a newcomer’s unemployment was defined as the 
primary policy problem which was to be solved through various kinds of 
educational measures and recruitment initiatives. Integration policy of the 
1990’s was, in the Finnish context, understood as an anti-marginalization 
policy; given the task of the welfare state to support vulnerable people in 
general, immigrants had to be cared for as well. Integration was further 
framed as a process of becoming equal with Finns in terms of access to work 
and services, and awareness of rights and responsibilities. Policy documents 
additionally listed instruments such as the promotion of tolerance, directed 
at the society in general rather than the newcomer alone – something that 
was later named the ‘two-wayness’ of integration.122 The introduction of 
conditionality, parallel to other job-seekers obligations to take part in acti-
vation measures, again, connected the reception of Integration Assistance to 
fulfilling measures listed in one’s individual integration plan.123 In this sense, 
there was a contractual and disciplining element to the Finnish civic inte-
gration programme already from the beginning. In contrast to the French 
case, the Finnish integration plan is, however, not a proper contract; it does 
not legally obligate the authorities.124
Late 2000’s: the 2008 Implementation report and the 2010 Integration Act
The 2008 Implementation report marks a transition to the current, 2010 In-
tegration Act. The report established the diversification and bigger volume 
of immigration to Finland as grounds for developing integration services 
to cater for a broader clientele. In addition to previous ways of understand-
ing it, the concept of integration was now increasingly connected to (fu-
ture) labour migration, necessary for a society with an ageing population. 
Unemployment and the underlying marginalization thus no longer alone 
represented the opposite of integration. Insufficient integration could also 
mean insufficient knowledge of the society despite the seemingly ‘integrat-
122 ‘Two-way integration’ is a term used in the Common Basic Principles that repeatedly appears in the 
Finnish 2008 implementation report.
123 L1295/2002 ‘Laki julkisesta työvoimapalvelusta 30.12.2002/1295’; Lepola 2000, 175–212. 
124 Valtioneuvosto (2008) ‘VNS 4/2008 vp. Valtioneuvoston selonteko Eduskunnalle kotouttamislain 
toimeenpanosta’, 22–23.
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ed’ behaviour (paid work). As we will see below, however, increased focus 
on societal knowledge was not implemented with a focus on values to the 
same extent as in France. 
The exclusion of housewives from the services provided by the Inte-
gration Act, due to them not being registered as job-seekers, was another 
important argument for broadening the coverage definition of the act. The 
Administrative Committee, the parliamentary body responsible for migra-
tion issues, concluded that, without language skills, the newcomer is at risk 
of weakened inclusion, and that integration courses should therefore, ac-
cording to an initial assessment of needs, be offered to all immigrants.125 
The assessment is not compulsory to those economically independent of 
the state, but they have the right to ask for one. With the pressed economic 
situation in the municipalities, however, it is likely that newcomers who do 
have employment continue to be regarded as ‘integrating with the help of 
work life’.126 
While the first Finnish Immigrant Integration Act was adopted before 
the Common Basic Principles, their influence can be identified in the 2010 
Act. Compared to the former purpose statement and definition of integra-
tion, the act now more explicitly stresses active participation by the immi-
grant and the two-way character of integration: 
The purpose of this Act is to support and promote integration and the 
possibilities of an immigrant to participate actively in the Finnish 
society. Furthermore, the Act aims at promoting equality and parity, 
and positive interaction between groups of people. […] In this Act: 
1) integration means interactive development of the migrant and the 
society that aims at giving the immigrant the knowledge and skills 
required in the society and work-life while supporting their possi-
bilities of preserving their own language and culture […].127 
125 Hallintovaliokunta (2010) ‘Hallintovaliokunnan mietintö 26/2010 vp’. Our emphasis. 
126 Valtioneuvosto 2008, 11.
127 L 1386/2010.
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Furthermore, there seems to be some interest amongst parliamentar-
ians in developing the Finnish integration policy in the stricter direction 
of France, Denmark and the Netherlands. When processing the Integration 
Act, the parliament adopted propositions not only related to integration but 
also regulation of entry and settlement, requiring the government to report 
in the future on a variety of issues, such as the possibility of a knowledge test 
for naturalization and the possibility of tying the Integration Assistance to 
documented progress in the language course or other education.128 In other 
words, although the integration programme does not include features such 
as immigration tests, it is seen by certain parliamentarians as a potential tool 
for restricting migration and access to benefits. 
Values and the civic integration programme
Civic integration programmes in Europe have been said to have focused 
increasingly on the national identity of the country of residence during the 
past decade. During this time, Finland has been a ‘lucky bystander’ with 
regard to tragedies such as ‘home-grown terrorism’ and honour-related vio-
lence leading to deaths; tragic events at a national scale have generally not 
been related to migrant families.129 Public debates on social cohesion and 
ethnic diversity have pertained to unemployment and, increasingly, to resi-
dential segregation – with the occasional reference to the worst case scenar-
io of the ‘French riots’. Perhaps this is partly why a canon of Finnish values 
to-be-adopted-by-newcomers is not included in the material as a specific 
topic. It does not mean, however, that values do not appear at all, they sim-
ply feature in other and less overt ways. In the material collected for this 
analysis, we identified both explicit and implicit ways of referring to values. 
If the culture of the immigrant youth’s families differs significantly 
from the Finnish, they are in a conflicting situation. In the worst 
case, the youth does not adopt the values of their own family, nor 
those of the Finnish society.130
128 E. V. vp–HE 185/2010 vp ‘Eduskunnan vastaus 239/2010 vp’.
129 Keskinen, Suvi (2009) ‘’Honour-Related Violence’ and Nordic Nation-Building’. In Complying with 
colonialism: gender, race and ethnicity in the Nordic region. Aldershot: Ashgate, 262.
130 Valtioneuvosto (2002) ‘VNS 5/2002 vp. Valtioneuvoston selonteko kotouttamislain toimeenpanosta’, 38.
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When referred to explicitly, values were often given an ambiguous or 
vague content. For example, the quote above expects the reader to know 
Finnish values at a sufficient precision; these values are merely defined by 
their potential contrast to values of the migrated families. Interestingly, 
however, the quote does not directly judge adopting the family’s values but 
does position them against the Finnish ones as bi-polar, possibly irreconcil-
able options. 
The 2012 instruction on civic integration courses by the Finnish Nation-
al Board of Education presents a notable exception to the otherwise scat-
tered text on values. Instead of shorter passages on values in a previous rec-
ommendation text, the instruction now dedicates a whole page on the ‘value 
base’ of the integration courses, and the values of Finnish public education 
in general.131 The main principle of constitutional equal rights is specified in 
the context of civic integration courses to mean regional equality (availabil-
ity of courses in all parts of the country), gender equality, equality regardless 
of means and other personal attributes. Respect for life and human rights, 
aspiration for the good, truth and humanity, promotion of justice, democra-
cy, welfare and prevention of marginalization are further mentioned. Goals 
at a more practical level include learning about the practices of the Finnish 
society, intercultural communication and respect:
The studies support the cultural traditions of the immigrants and 
helps evaluate and reform them, if they are in conflict with laws in 
effect in Finland. […] The student is encouraged to evaluate the con-
gruence and possible conflict between expressed values and reality, 
and reflect critically on the possibilities and flaws of the Finnish so-
ciety. In the studies, values and principles are articulated when pos-
sible.132
131 Opetushallitus (2001) ‘Suositus aikuisten maahanmuuttajien kotoutumiskoulutuksesta’. 23–24; 
Opetushallitus (2007) ‘Aikuisten maahanmuuttajien kotoutumiskoulutus. Suositus opetussuunnitel-
maksi’; Opetushallitus 2012.
132 Opetushallitus 2012, 10–11.
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Values presented at the beginning of the instruction are expected to 
guide the organization, planning, and implementation of the courses. In the 
actual syllabus, values belong to the theme Cultural Identity and Multicul-
tural Interaction. Here, ‘Finnish customs, values and norms’ are not further 
specified, but other items in the same section include global ethics, inter-
cultural networks, freedom of religion and cultural elements not allowed 
in Finland. Under the theme of general societal information, the students 
are introduced to the Constitution, Equality Act, Non-Discrimination Act, 
Child Protection Act, Citizenship Act, Integration Act and public right of 
access. 
Much more frequently than discussing values explicitly, passages in the 
text corpus refer to ways of being and acting that are clearly valued and 
ascribed worth without defining them explicitly as ‘values’. This is, for in-
stance, evident in the depictions of the desirable state of society, as in the 
2002 evaluation report defining the aims and effects of the Integration Act 
to include the development of a ‘pluralist, ethnically equal, reciprocal and 
tolerant society.’133 Equality, chiefly in terms of ethnicity and gender, seems 
to be the most common value item in the Finnish material. 
Equality is closely linked to the more general construction of the Finnish 
society as one governed by law and functioning through public institutions. 
This is the overall picture conveyed by the online civics material Vilma, de-
veloped in the first half of the 2000’s in a European Social Fund project with 
the latest updates made in 2010.134 Compiling a syllabus necessarily entails 
choices, and the sheer selection of topics thus indicates what is held impor-
tant in a specific context.135 The Vilma material, for example, dedicates a 
133 VNS 5/2002, 9.
134 While the instruction obliges the course organizers to include certain topics in their teaching, there 
is no fixed syllabus or teaching material for teaching civics (see Ahokas, Laura, Marjukka Weide & 
Niklas Wilhelmsson (2011) Maahanmuuttajien yhteiskunnallisen osallistumisen tukeminen julkis­
hallinnossa ja puolueissa. Helsinki: Oikeusministeriö). A couple of authoritative websites link to 
the Vilma material at http://virtuoosi.pkky.fi/vilma/, but it is not possible to find out how widely it 
has been used by civics teachers or individual students. The material is linguistically and visually 
of rather poor quality and this may have made it less popular. Vilma is divided into two levels; the 
more advanced one was used for the analysis.
135 See Saukkonen, Pasi (1999) Suomi, Alankomaat ja kansallisvaltion identiteettipolitiikka: tutkimus 
kansallisen identiteetin poliittisuudesta, empiirinen sovellutus suomalaisiin ja hollantilaisiin teksteihin. 
Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 144–152.
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chapter to ‘Rights and Responsibilities’ which includes introductions to the 
Finnish Constitution and ‘Human rights of the UN’ which is said to have 
been a model for the Finnish Constitution. The choice implies an emphasis 
on individual dignity as a value to be presented to newcomers. This atten-
tion to different systemic levels is exceptional; the material is generally very 
nationally centred. The European Union, for example, is only mentioned in 
passing. 
The system-oriented main body of the Vilma teaching material is con-
trasted by a narrative about the history of the Finnish nation, presented in 
a rather traditional manner and focusing on the wars of 1939–44. The text, 
for instance, reproduces the story of motivated and tough Finnish soldiers.136 
This contrast between the various chapters can be interpreted as an attempt 
to encompass both the values of the system – individual rights and the rule of 
law – and the values of the ‘people’ operationalized into a historical focus on 
the wars. Such an attempt can also be found within a single chapter, as in the 
case of the gender equality text, where the short introductory passage estab-
lishes that the law declares men and women equal, but that equality has not 
yet come true in all aspects of life. Interestingly, the text on equality confines 
itself to the realm of the labour market where the Equality Act is applied and 
does not take up any specific issues often related to migrant women’s work-
life in public debates and policy texts, such as the use of the headscarf.
The most ambivalent value-related element in the Finnish integration 
policy seems to be the ‘right to culture’, the feature that conceptually links 
the policy to the framework of multiculturalism. The government bill justi-
fications for the 1993 basic rights reform subordinated the right to freedom 
of religion to some other basic rights. More specifically, the justification did 
not restrict legislation on the basis of ‘generally accepted moral and ethical 
values’ requiring adaptation in religious practice. How the issue was formu-
lated in the justifications, according to Lepola, reflects an affirmation of the 
Finnish majority culture and the possibility to exclude the values of minori-
136 The representation becomes especially significant when taking into account that the biggest group of 
course participants by country of nationality are Russian citizens, whose previous home country was 
at war with Finland.
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ties.137 Lepola concluded that the emphasis on the right to one’s own culture 
was, as a rule, counterbalanced by the stress on the limits of the acceptable 
in political debates.138 In fact, as it was noted by the 2002 implementation 
report, the right to preserve one’s culture was not specified in the Integration 
Act and functioned therefore mainly as an abstract principle ideally guiding 
implementation.139 In our material, ‘right to culture’ was sometimes gener-
ously recognized, other times questioned. An example of the latter is found 
in the presentation of social norms in the brochure Welcome to Finland. In 
addition to the values explicitly named as such (safety, security, clean envi-
ronment, public service, punctuality and honesty), the book entails detailed 
advice about social conduct such as agreeing on appointments beforehand 
by telephone.140 While not informing the newcomer about any social conven-
tions in Finland would seem inconsiderate, the message conveyed through 
the many pieces of advice is that, having entered Finland, one should now 
act culturally on the Finns’ terms. Fitting together the constructions of so-
cial conformity, the constructions of valuing cultural diversity and the con-
cept of two-way integration proves difficult, since living out one’s minority 
culture with the majority population would inevitably infringe and possibly 
alter the Finnish norms and values, constructed as given. 
Above, we have shown how the values represented in the selected Finn-
ish documents include both broad and trans-nationally recognized ele-
ments, such as human rights, equality and plurality, and more specific fea-
tures related to culture. None of these values were framed as European apart 
from the passages dealing with Communications by the Commission of the 
EU. The Common Basic Principles were introduced in the 2008 report. The 
concept of two-way integration was highlighted and the Principles in gener-
al claimed to be mainly equivalent to the basis of the Finnish Integration Act 
and integration policy. It was further claimed that the concept of integration 
137 Lepola 2000, 212.
138 Lepola 2000, 269.
139 Valtioneuvosto 2002, 8.
140 Analysing the 1996 edition of ‘Facts about Finland’, a semi-official publication for business visitors 
and tourists, Saukkonen (1999) observed that, in contrast to a similar publication about the Nether-
lands, the Finnish guidebook placed greater emphasis on the traditions of everyday life.
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has become more similar between European countries since the adoption 
of the Common Basic Principles. The possible effects of the convergence on 
the Finnish policy were not reflected upon. 
Representations of the policy target groups
Cramped living wears the flat and inescapably causes more noise 
both in the stairway and in the flat. In the common meetings of au-
thorities and immigrants, especially the Somalis have criticized the 
small number of places for meetings and gatherings.141
Unemployment, low income, dependency on social security, lack of 
Finnish or Swedish skills, cultures restricting the rights of girls and 
women, physical and psychological segregation, lack of information, 
restricted interaction with the original population and discrimina-
tion in work life and elsewhere in society make one predisposed to 
marginalization.142
In the texts analysed, the construction of the target of the integrative 
measures takes place through the assessment of service needs; ‘immigrant’ 
is used as the general object of legislation and policy while it is clear that it 
is not any inbound migrant but those in the weakest socio-economic posi-
tions that the legislators are addressing. Groups are also classified in terms 
of entry status, such as refugee or returnee, and occasionally nationality 
or language groups or ethnic backgrounds may be mentioned in the texts 
such as the implementation reports, evaluating the situation of a number 
of specific groups, including elderly immigrants and immigrants with im-
pairments. The implementation reports express special concern for women, 
considered vulnerable due to their culture and/or caring for many small 
children as these may restrict the access of women to services, such as the 
civic integration course, and to interaction with the society at large. In the 
141 Valtioneuvosto 2002, 45.
142 Valtioneuvosto 2008, 45.
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Vilma teaching material, the concern for migrant women is formulated 
more indirectly by underlining that, in this society, men and women, boys 
and girls, husbands and wives have all equal rights. Work-aged migrant men 
as gendered individuals mostly remain in the blind spot of policy language; 
however, they may be implied as problematic through the discussion on 
women’s problems. 
The focus on service provision entails that integration measures can be 
seen as a privilege that the recipient should be grateful for: ‘Most immi-
grants covered by the Integration Act did not seem to know that they have 
a special status compared to other immigrants. They seemed to take the 
things [services, MW] related to job-seeking and education for granted.’143 
The integration service is, however, not an unconditional gift to the new-
comer144, neither can they claim the right to services mentioned in their 
integration plan if the authorities do not have the resources to offer them.145 
The more inclusive and out-reaching approach of the 2010 Integration 
Act is, in part, embodied by the booklet ‘Welcome to Finland’. As the Basic 
Knowledge Material stipulated in the Integration Act, the booklet is distrib-
uted to immigrants when they are in contact with authorities who register 
their residence or grant their permit. While the booklet tries to cater to all 
newcomers, it cannot possibly reach a nuanced result in its 44 pages.146 The 
focus is on informing the reader, on the one hand, about a variety of legal 
rights and restrictions as well as a range of social norms, and, on the other, 
about welfare services and entitlements. In listing all the welfare state fea-
tures one may be entitled to according to one’s situation in life, the book-
let reproduces the construction of a newcomer as someone bound to need 
some public support, and the Finnish society as a strange planet, unique 
and foreign to them. The figure of a refugee who has few personal resources 
seems continuingly to inform the way target groups are defined in the Finn-
ish immigrant integration sector.
143 Valtioneuvosto 2002, 22.
144 The 1999 Integration Act included an economic sanction mechanism for those failing to follow their 
individual integration plan. The Administrative Committee unsuccessfully suggested extending 
conditionality further to the residence permit system. (Lepola 2000, 183.) 
145 Valtioneuvosto 2008, 22–23. 
146 Ministry of the Interior (2011). Yet, some advice is repeated. As a point of reference: the Danish 
equivalent, ‘Citizen in Denmark’, comprises 170 pages.
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Comparing the French and Finnish cases:  
the role of national models
A comparison of the role and contents of national models within the French 
and Finnish integration programmes reveals some differences and many 
similarities in the basic programme justifications and the representations of 
national values and target immigrant groups. In our discussion of the com-
parison, we will focus on the way similar ideas are expressed, supported, or 
elaborated differently in the two cases.
Although the integration policy structures were not our immediate fo-
cus, we will start our discussion by detailing some of the similarities and 
differences between the integration programmes of France and Finland 
that emerged during our discursive analysis. Failure to fulfil the integra-
tion programme requirements is attached to sanctions in both countries; 
the reduction or denial of access to a specific cash benefit in the Finnish 
case, and the denial of a renewed residence permit in the French case. In 
both countries, immigrants are required to actively participate in and com-
mit to the integration process. In the French case, the immigrant engages 
with the state through a contract that details the commitments of both par-
ties. In the Finnish case, there is an engagement, though not explicitly con-
tractual, between the immigrant and the state. The discourse of the Finnish 
programmes also highlights another engagement, between the immigrant 
and the receiving society more broadly, which exemplifies the ‘two-way in-
tegration’ concept from the EU Common Basic Principles. In contrast, the 
French texts are relatively silent on the role of French society in the integra-
tion process.
Both countries share several other elements with the Common Basic 
Principles. The French and Finnish integration programmes mirror the 
Common Basic Principles’ emphasis on employment as a pathway to inte-
gration. Interestingly, it is possible to note a movement in the Finnish dis-
course from the idea that employment in itself would suffice to integrate 
immigrants, towards the idea, which is prevalent in the French case, that 
immigrants must also be familiarized with host country’s values and general 
culture in order to integrate into the nation. Like the European level dis-
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course, the French and Finnish integration programme discourses also em-
phasize freedom of religion and gender equality as values, and characterize 
the targeted populations as lacking gender equality. While we do not venture 
to forward any arguments about the overall effects of European level legis-
lation on national integration programmes, we note that in the case of the 
Finnish Integration Act reform, it may be possible to trace the influence of 
the Common Basic Principles in the policy of the late 2000’s. The direction of 
the relationship between French integration programmes and EU level rec-
ommendations is harder to intuit, given the close timing and the observed 
influence of French actors in EU immigrant integration policy-making.147
Despite policy similarities and shared concerns that reflect those of the 
EU level integration strategies, the discourses of the French and Finnish 
integration programmes remain nationally-framed. Not only do these dis-
courses claim the cultural and territorial nation as the site of integration, 
they also use national models to interpret what integration entails. Two cen-
tral differences characterize the French and Finnish national models in our 
analysis. First, there is a general contrast between French assimilationism 
and Finnish multiculturalism: the French discourse employs the image of a 
civic Republican nation that people may access by adhering to French values 
and laws, and the Finnish discourse references a type of multicultural nation 
where people have the right to maintain their own cultures and languages, 
while they are simultaneously expected to take part in the Finnish institu-
tions and work life. Second, ‘the state’ appears very differently in the two 
cases: the French state acts as a gate keeper for the nation and the main en-
tity with which immigrants are to engage during their integration, while the 
Finnish state is rarely distinguished from the broader Finnish society, which 
is the site for immigration integration. This difference can be linked to both 
the extensive Finnish welfare state, which blurs the distinction between state 
and social, and the fact that the Finnish integration process is managed with 
significant amounts of variation at the municipal level, which results in the 
distancing of the figure of the central state.
147 See, e.g., Schain 2012, 221.
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The role of these different national models can be seen in the discussions 
of employment and language acquisition as justifications for the integration 
programmes. In the French discourse, employment is presented as a path 
to integration in itself, with little explanation of why or how employment is 
important for integration. In the Finnish texts, employment is also equated 
with integration. The Finnish emphasis on employment as a pathway to in-
tegration was similarly assumed for the most part, but sometimes employ-
ment was presented as beneficial because it provided an opportunity to have 
social contact with Finns. Furthermore, in political discourse, employment 
also derives importance from providing immigrants with a way to contrib-
ute to the welfare state system that benefits them, thus legitimizing their stay 
in the country.148 The necessity of speaking the host country’s language is 
paramount in the discourse justifying the French integration programmes 
and can be linked to the importance of the French language in uniting dis-
parate populations during French nation-building. The discourse justifying 
Finnish integration programmes also emphasizes the necessity of speaking 
the host country’s language, but explicitly references the right to also main-
tain one’s own language. The maintenance of another language – an idea that 
is absent from the official French discourse – can be related to the important 
presence of a Swedish-speaking minority within Finland, as well as recent 
legislation to protect the rights of other groups, like the Roma and the Sami, 
to maintain their own language. 
The value of the freedom of religion is also refracted through the prisms 
of French and Finnish national models. Both countries highlighted immi-
grants’ religious differences, along with unequal gender relations, as some-
thing that defined their integration programmes’ targeted groups, but the 
national values of religious freedom took different forms in the discourse. 
The French value of religious freedom was expressed through laïcité, which 
theoretically separates religion from the state and the public sphere, and 
relegates it to the private sphere. In contrast, the Finnish value of freedom of 
religion was framed more as a right permitted by a state that is not devoid of 
148 See Pyrhönen, Niko (2012) ‘“This welfare of ours”. Justifying public advocacy for anti-immigration 
politics in Finland during the late 2000’s’ in this volume.
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religious ties. There was also an interesting difference in the framing of gen-
der equality as a national value in the two countries; the French discourse 
framed gender equality as a defining fact of life in France, while the Finnish 
discourse emphasized gender equality as a Finnish value, but also acknowl-
edged that this ideal was not always achieved. 
Finally, the over-all presentation of national values also indicates the role 
of national models in integration programme discourse. As evident in the 
detailed advice delivered in a similar, sometimes patronizing tone, both pro-
grammes’ discourses constructed the imagined immigrant reader of their 
manuals to the society as relatively unknowledgeable about national values 
and customs. The French discourse strongly emphasized the need to learn 
and practice French values, boldly placing the ‘values of the republic’ in 
document titles, but the majority of these values remained abstract or were 
only expressed in the form of the French laws that the programme present-
ed. While expecting migrants to respect the existing legislation, the Finnish 
documents, however, maintained an echo of mutual recognition and did not 
use the word ‘values’ as much. The Finnish discourse also differed in that in 
addition to providing similar lists of abstract concepts, it presented more 
concrete descriptions of everyday values held by the Finnish people, such as 
punctuality and honesty.
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have qualitatively explored the French and Finnish civic 
integration programmes in order to shed light on the nature and role of 
national models within discourse surrounding these programmes. While 
the broader debate over policy convergence and the continued relevance of 
national models tends to compare policies and place the countries within 
typologies of traditions and institutions of incorporation, we approached 
the idea of national models from a discursive perspective. To this end, we 
chose two cases that had roughly similar integration policy tools, despite be-
ing very different along a range of relevant factors, and we focused on how 
the policy discourses related to national identity. 
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Are national models, or constructions of unique nationhood, central to 
the discourse of incorporation in the age of policy level Europeanization and 
various processes of globalization? Based on our comparison of the French 
and Finnish cases it is easy to conclude that, despite the strengthened vol-
untary coordination between the EU-countries in the field of integration 
of third country migrants, the rhetorical frame of reference for these pro-
grammes is the nation-state. In the French case, it is the Republican secular 
central state, and in the Finnish case, the welfare state/society. While consid-
erable efforts are continuously made by the European Union to encourage 
the citizens of their member states to ‘feel European’, this does not appear to 
be a goal for the extra-EU citizens settling in the member states. Even with 
similar constructions of immigrants, increasingly similar policies, and the 
dissemination of ‘European’ identity discourses by the EU, national models 
expressed as unique national ways of incorporating migrants appear resil-
ient.
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CHAPTER 6
The EQUAL-programme in Sweden and Italy: 
A new opportunity structure for  
immigrant organisations?
roberto scaramuzzino
People who migrate and settle in a new country have always had a disposi-
tion to form associations based on a common local, regional, or national 
origin1. Participation in such organisations, and in civil society organisa-
tions in general, has been described as having a direct positive impact on 
individuals’ integration, as a result of the members being able to come to-
gether in order to promote their interests towards the state and society. Fur-
thermore, involvement within organisations has an indirect positive effect 
as they serve as ‘schools of democracy’ in which individuals have the oppor-
tunity to develop the skills and attitudes that are also important for political 
participation in society2. However, immigrant organisations, like civil soci-
ety organisations3, are highly dependent on the institutional context and the 
related institutional structures that provide opportunities for collective ac-
tions, so-called ‘political opportunity structures’. Such political opportunity 
structures are spread on different levels, from the local to the international 
in a layered multi-level system, in a scenario ‘… characterized by the coex-
1 Moya, Jose C. (2005) ‘Immigrants and Associations: A Global and Historical Perspective’. Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 31, Issue 5, 833–864.
2 Borevi, Karin (2004) ‘Den svenska diskursen om staten, integrationen och föreningslivet’. In Bengts-
son, Bo (ed.) Föreningsliv, makt och integration. Stockholm: Fritzes offentliga publikationer, 31–64; 
Kugelberg, Clarissa (2009) ’Bistånd eller styrning? Kommunen och de etniska föreningarna’. In 
Bengtsson Bo & Clarissa Kugelberg (eds) Föreningsliv, delaktighet och lokal politik i det mångkul­
turella samhället. Kalmar: Egalité, 157–196.
3 In this chapter I will make use of the term ‘civil society organisation’ as a synonym with ‘voluntary 
organisation’, ‘third sector organisation’, ‘NGO’ etc. 
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istence of all policy levels, negotiating and renegotiating constantly the new 
political opportunity structure available’4. 
Immigrant organisations struggle with the task of mobilising resources, 
finding new arenas for their activities, joining new networks of organisations 
and making their voice heard. We find them interacting with political oppor-
tunity structures at all levels: local, national, EU and UN. The way in which 
such political opportunity structures affect immigrant organisations touches 
upon an important channel for the integration of immigrants and their chil-
dren in the host society. In fact, the authorities’ attitudes towards immigrants 
and the way in which newcomers are intended to be incorporated affect the 
way in which such authorities address immigrant organisations5. 
Most studies about immigrant organisations, which focus on their in-
teraction with the institutional setting, have focused either on the local 
context6 or the national level7 or both8. During recent decades, third sector 
research has increasingly highlighted the European Union as a possible new 
opportunity structure for civil society organisations. In fact, many organisa-
tions see the European institutions as a possible source of resources and as 
a channel for influencing local, national and EU-policy9. However, the way 
4 Kazepov, Yuri (2008) ‘The Subsidiarization of Social Policies: Actors, Processes and Impacts’. Euro­
pean Societies, Vol. 10, Issue 2, 250.
5 Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu (1994) Limits of Citizenship – Migrants and Postnational Membership in 
Europe. Chicago. Chicago Ill.: University of Chicago Press for the national level; Alexander, Michael 
(2004) ‘Comparing Local Policies toward Migrants’. In Peeninx Rinus, Karen Kraal, Marco Martini-
ello & Steven Vertovec (eds) Citizenship in European Cities. Immigrants, local politics and integration 
policies. Aldershot: Ashgate, 57–84 for the local level.
6 E.g. Odmalm, Pontus (2004) ’Invandrarföreningar som intressekanaler – möjligheter och hinder på 
lokal nivå’. In Bengtsson, Bo (ed.) Föreningsliv, makt och integration. Stockholm: Fritzes offentliga 
publikationer, 99–128; Caponio, Tiziana (2005) ‘Policy Networks and Immigrants’ Associations in 
Italy: The Cases of Milan, Bologna and Naples’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 31, Issue 
5, 931–950; Kugelberg 2009.
7 E.g. Soysal 1994; Emami, Abbas (2003) Att organisera oenighet – En sociologisk studie av Iranska 
Riksförbundet och dess medlemsorganisationer. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
8 E.g. Ireland, Patrick (1994) The policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity – Immigrant Politics in France and 
Switzerland. Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press.
9 Marks, Gary & Doug McAdam (1996) ‘Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political 
Opportunity in the European Union’. Journal of West European Politics, Vol. 19, Issue 2, 249–278; 
Hooghe, Liesbet & Gary Marks (2001) Multi­Level Governance and European Integration. Lanham, 
Md.: Rowan & Littlefield; Della Porta, Donatella & Manuela Caiani (2006) ‘Europeanization from 
Below? Social movements and Europe’. Mobilization, Vol. 11, 1–20; Sánchez-Salgado, Rosa (2007) 
‘Giving a European Dimension to Civil Society Organizations’. Journal of Civil Society, Vol. 3, Issue 3, 
253–269; Sánchez-Salgado, Rosa (2011) ‘NGO Structural Adaptation to Funding Requirements and 
Prospects for Democracy: The Case of the European Union’. Global Society, Vol. 24, Issue 2, 507–527; 
Ruzza, Carlo (2011a) ‘Social Movement and the European Interest Intermediation of Public Interest 
Groups’. Journal of European Integration, Vol. 33, Issue 4, 453–469.
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in which immigrant organisations also make use of the political opportu-
nity structures offered by the EU is a topic that has not been given so much 
attention by research. The few studies present have focused on the partici-
pation in the decision-making process10 rather than the service provision 
and implementation of policy11. This is a gap that this study aims to fill by 
focusing on the participation of immigrant organisations in an EU-financed 
programme to support new methods for preventing discrimination and to 
fight against inequalities in the labour market.
The aim of this chapter is to describe the participation of immigrant 
organisations in the Swedish and Italian Equal programme and to explain 
how the different national contexts in which the programme is implemented 
affect the participation. 
The chapter will focus on the similarities and differences between the 
experiences of the Italian and Swedish immigrant organisations participat-
ing in the Equal programme. By choosing to compare the participation of 
immigrant organisations in two different national contexts in the same EU-
programme, I aim to explain how the national setting influences the way 
in which immigrant organisations interact with the structure and how this 
interaction affects their functions. In this sense I do not intend to test the 
theory that ‘context matters,’ but rather develop this theory by focusing on 
‘how it matters’. This study adopts a ‘societal approach’ to cross-national wel-
fare research, seeking ‘… to identify general factors within social systems 
that can be interpreted with reference to specific societal contexts’.12
Studying the Equal programme: methods and data
This study focuses on the Equal programme because it is one of the larg-
est European common initiatives in the field of labour market inclusion. 
Previous research shows that participation in Equal has given some civil 
10 E.g. Ruzza, Carlo (2011b) ‘The international protection regime for minorities, the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis and the EU: new challenges for non-state actors’. International Journal on Minor­
ity and Group Rights, Vol. 18, Issue 2, 219–234.
11 See Sanchez-Salgado 2010 for a distinction.
12 Hantrais, Linda (1999) ‘Contextualization in cross-national comparative research’. International 
Journal of Social Research Methodology, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 93–108.
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society organisations the possibility to finance new activities that might be 
positive for their target groups and strengthen the position of the organisa-
tions within society. Equal has, in this sense, contributed to adding another 
layer to the political context of civil society organisations, besides the na-
tional and the local setting13. However, participation requires administrative 
and organisational skills and competences which are not always easy to find 
in small civil society organisations14. Immigrant organisations, in particu-
lar, often rely on the efforts of non-professional volunteers and are usually 
strongly dependent on time-limited public funding15.
The national Equal programmes are designed through negotiation be-
tween the commission and single member-states. It is the single member 
state that chooses which concrete projects are to be carried out and has the 
responsibility for the implementation16. Equal can be seen as an expression 
of the EU common social welfare agenda based on policies of anti-discrim-
ination and labour-market integration targeting a range of disadvantaged 
groups, not only migrants. It follows a specific ideology which emphasises 
the role of civil society: ‘The EU:s new outlook on integration conforms 
to Third Way ideology in its heavy emphasis on the prominent part to be 
played by “civil society” ’17.
One of the main principles of the programme is that the activities to be 
funded by the programme should be implemented by so-called Develop-
ment Partnerships (DP) involving: public organisations, private enterprises 
and civil society organisations. Furthermore, the guidelines state the prin-
ciple of empowerment, i.e. that ‘…those involved in the implementation of 
activities should also take part in the decision-making’18. Hence, the guide-
13 Scaramuzzino, Roberto, Cecilia Heule, Håkan Johansson & Anna Meeuwisse (2010) EU och den 
ideella sektorn – En studie av det svenska Equalprogrammet. Malmö: Hälsa och samhälle, Malmö 
högskola.
14 Sanchez-Salgado 2010.
15 Odmalm 2004.
16 Scaramuzzino et al. 2010; Sanchez-Salgado 2011.
17 Schierup, Carl-Ulrik, Peo Hansen & Stephen Castles (2006) Migration, Citizenship and the European 
Welfare State –A European Dilemma. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 57.
18 Commission of the European Communities (2000) Communication from the Commission to the 
member states establishing the guidelines for the Community Initiative EQUAL concerning transna­
tional co­operation to promote new means of combating all forms of discrimination and inequalities in 
connection with the labour market. Brussels, 14.04.2000 C (2000) 853, 6.
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lines motivate an expectation that immigrant organisations should, at least 
to some extent, be participating in the DPs that implement activities in the 
field of integration. 
To be able to identify immigrant organisations among the hundreds 
of organisations that have participated in the Swedish programme and the 
thousands that have participated in the Italian programme, an operational 
definition was needed. Therefore, immigrant organisations have been de-
fined in the following way based on the organisations’ self-presentation in 
the official documents of Equal or on the internet:
1. The organisation is a voluntary organisation, 
2. Most of the members of the organisations are immigrants or immi-
grant organisations (in the case of umbrella organisations19),
3. Experience of migration is part of the organisational culture and 
identity. 
From the list of all participating organisations in the Swedish and Italian 
Equal programme it was possible to identify 31 organisations for Italy and 
21 for Sweden participating in development partnerships distributed among 
all five themes/objectives of the Equal programme20. The organisations can 
be divided into the following categories based on the social composition and 
the identity of the organisation: 
• Ethnic organisations (representing one foreign national or ethnic 
group), 
• Inter-ethnic organisations (representing more than one foreign na-
tional or ethnic group), 
• Hybrid organisations (representing immigrants but with a signifi-
cant component of members from the host society). 
19 Umbrella organisations or meta-organisations are organisations based on the membership of other 
organisations and not of individuals, see Ahrne, Göran & Nils Brunsson (2005) ‘Organizations and 
meta-organizations’. Scandinavian Journal of Management, Vol. 21, Issue 4, 429–449 for a distinction.
20 The Equal programme was developed around five different themes/objectives: increasing employ-
ability, encouraging inclusive entrepreneurship, facilitating adaptability, promoting gender equality 
and integrating asylum seekers.
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The definition included local and national organisations, umbrella or-
ganisations, regular membership-based associations, cooperatives, social 
economy enterprises, trade unions, political organisations, religious asso-
ciations etc. These categories correspond to the types of organisations that 
are usually considered as immigrant organisations in most international 
studies and research21.
With the information available, it was possible to trace, contact and per-
form interviews with representatives for 22 organisations; 10 for Sweden 
and 12 for Italy. The interviews were performed face-to-face, by phone and 
by e-mail, with the persons who had been involved in the work with Equal 
for all of these 22 organisations. The interviews were conducted in Swedish 
and Italian, sometimes using English as an aid. They were semi-structured 
by a guide with questions about the organisations’ regular activities and 
about the experience of participating in the Equal programme.
Theoretical framework
The Equal programme is studied as an example and expression of the EU as 
a political opportunity structure for civil society organisations. The political 
opportunity structure approach stresses ‘…the importance of the broader 
political system in structuring the opportunities for collective action and 
the extent and form of the same,’22 and has been used by European schol-
ars in cross-national comparisons of social movements23. Differences in the 
political characteristics of the national contexts have been put forward to 
21 E.g. for the Nordic countries Mikkelsen, Flemming (2003) ’Invandrerorganisationer i et integration-
sperspektiv’. In Mikkelsen, Flemming (ed.) Invandrerorganisationer i Norden. København: Nordisk 
ministerråd, 11–26; Hagelund, Anniken & Jill Loga (2009) Frivillighet, innvandring, integrasjon – En 
kunnskapsoversikt.Oslo: Senter for forskning på sivilsamfunn og frivillig sektor. Rapport 2009:1; for a 
global historical perspective, Moya 2005 ,833–864; for Italy, Pirni, Andrea (2006) ‘Immigrati e asso-
ciazionismo: lo stato della ricerca’. In Recchi, Ettore (ed.) L’arcobaleno della partecipazione. Immigrati 
e associazionismo in Toscana. Firenze: CESVOT, 9–32.
22 McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald (1996) ‘Introduction: Opportunities, mobiliz-
ing structures, and framing processes – toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social move-
ments’. In McAdam Doug, John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald (eds) Comparative Perspectives on 
Social Movements – Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2.
23 E.g. Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak & Marco G. Giugni (1992) ‘New 
social movements and political opportunities in Western Europe’. European Journal of Political 
Research, Vol. 22, Issue 2, 219–244.
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explain differences in the structure, extent and results of comparable social 
movements24. In the last decade, the use of the concept ‘political opportu-
nity structures’ has become more common also in migration studies with a 
focus on immigrant organisations.25
The concept of political opportunity structure is not easy to simply 
transfer from classic social movement research to the study of immigrant 
organisations, which are often more static and less ideological than social 
movements and the organisations they give birth to (as for example Hu-
man Rights groups and organisations)26. Immigrant organisations are not 
necessarily connected to social movements and are often multifunctional 
and resemble more community-based and/or interest-organisations27. The 
functions of immigrant organisations, which have been described and cate-
gorised in different ways in previous research28, often include functions that 
are more connected to the social or cultural sphere than to the political one.
The definition of the concept of political opportunity structure as adapt-
ed for immigrant organisations is formulated by Bengtsson in the following 
way: ‘Structural and institutional conditions – including consistent actor 
constellations – that provide opportunities for politically and non-politi-
cally oriented collective action, within civil society, with direct or indirect 
political impact.’29
24 McAdam et al. 1996.
25 E.g. Hooghe, Marc (2005) ‘Ethnic Organisations and Social Movement Theory: the Political Op-
portunity Structure for Ethnic Mobilisation in Flanders’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 
31, Issue 5, 975–990; Bengtsson, Bo, Clarissa Kugelberg & Gunnar Myrberg (2009) ’Föreningsliv, 
delaktighet och lokal politik i det mångkulturella samhället – ett inledande perspektiv’. In Bengtsson 
Bo & Clarissa Kugelberg,(eds) Föreningsliv, delaktighet och lokal politik i det mångkulturella samhäl­
let. Kalmar: Egalité.
26 Bengtsson, Bo (2010) ‘Political Opportunity Structure and Ethnic Organization: How Political, What 
Opportunities, Which Structures’. In Bengtsson, Bo, Per Strömblad & Ann-Helén Bay (eds) Diversity, 
inclusion and citizenship in Scandinavia. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 241–268.
27 See for a description of the typology Wollebæk, Dag & Per Selle (2008) ‘A social democratic model 
of civil society?’. In Jobert, Bruno & Beate Kohler-Koch (eds) Changing images of civil society: from 
protest to governance. London and New York: Routledge; Lundberg Erik (forthcoming) ‘En försum-
bar arena? Organisationslivet och remissväsendet 1964–2009’. Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift.
28 Bäck 1983; Rex, John & Sasha Josephides (1987) ‘Asian and Greek Cypriot Associations and Identity’. 
In Rex, John, Daniele Joly & Czarina Wilpert (eds) Immigrant Associations in Europe. Aldershot: 
Gower 11–41; Emami 2003; Pirni 2006.
29 Bengtsson, Bo (2007) ‘Ethnic organisation, integration, and political opportunity structures – some 
theoretical considerations’. Article submitted to Comparative Studies of Political Integration in a 
Multicultural Europe. Elsevier Science, Comparative Social Research, Vol. 25, 27. Online. Available 
HTTP: <http://www.ibf.uu.se/PERSON/bosse/csrarticle.pdf.>.
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Both the political opportunity structure approach and the resource mo-
bilisation theory highlight the importance of the context for explaining the 
mobilisation of different groups and the development of processes of self or-
ganisations. However, the resource mobilisation theory shifts the focus from 
the structures to the collective actors that interact with them. It is thus an 
important perspective that complements the political opportunity structure 
approach in the theoretical framework for this study. The political oppor-
tunity structure approach as an analytical tool highlights the way in which 
the structures provide opportunities as well as constraints to the immigrant 
organisations, while the resource mobilisation theory highlights the strate-
gies that the immigrant organisations choose in relation to such structures. 
The resource mobilisation approach stresses that in order for social move-
ment organisations to achieve their aims and goals, they must have access 
to resources. Such resources are in the hands of individuals and of other 
organisations and can include legitimacy, money, properties and labour30.
Most organisations in this study describe their relationship with their 
environment and especially their interaction with political opportunity 
structures in terms of the organisations being affected by the structures. 
Their own rational strategies in coping with possibilities and constraints are 
much less of a focus in the empirical data. Nonetheless, the organisations 
make strategic choices, which are often implicit in the data. The choice of 
complementing the political opportunity structure approach with the re-
source mobilisation perspective is made with the purpose of treating the 
immigrant organisations in this study as actors that make choices in relation 
to their environment and are not only a product of it. 
Rosa Sánchez-Salgado also argues in favour of the importance of fo-
cusing on the civil society organisations’ response to political opportunity 
structures in her article about the efforts by EU-institutions to give a Euro-
pean dimension to civil society organisations. She writes that: 
30 McCarthy, John D. & Mayer N. Zald (1977) ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial 
Theory’. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, Issue 6, 1212–1241.
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Even if it can be maintained that the institutional environment has 
a significant impact on voluntary organizations, the size and orga-
nizational characteristics of each voluntary organization also have 
implications for the use of political opportunities […] Consequently, 
the effort to analyse the impact of European incentives has to take 
account of voluntary organizations’ willingness and capacity to use 
existing opportunities.31
In this study I will thus use the political opportunity structure and re-
source mobilisation approach to analyse the use that immigrant organisa-
tions make of the opportunities offered by the Equal programme and the 
way in which the programme as a structure shapes the organisations’ op-
portunities. In this sense it is a study of the implementation of Equal at the 
micro-level32 through specific types of organisations, and of the usage of 
Europe33 by the same organisations.
The two national contexts
Sweden and Italy as national contexts in the cross-national comparison are 
compared following the most­different logic34. The countries are compared 
as representing national contexts in which many crucial dimensions, such as 
the organisation of the welfare system, the integration policy and the roles 
and functions of immigrant organisations, are assumed to be different based 
on previous research.
The organisation of the welfare state, and especially the division of re-
sponsibilities among the state, private enterprises, and civil society, is a rel-
evant part of the context because it indicates which role organised civil soci-
ety has in the production of welfare. The Swedish system relies on the public 
31 Sánchez-Salgado 2007, 256.
32 Sánchez-Salgado, Rosa (2012) ‘From “Talking the Talk” to “Walking the Walk”: Implementing 
Europe’s guidelines on employment through the European Social Fund’’. Paper presented at the 19th 
Conference of Europeanist in Boston, March 22–24, 2012.
33 Woll, Cornelia & Sophie Jacquot (2010) ‘Using Europe: Strategic action in multi-level politics’. Com­
parative European Politics,Vol. 8, Issue 1, 110–126.
34 Cfr. Blomberg, Helena (2008b) ’Komparativ välfärdsforskning’. In Meeuwisse Anna, Hans Swärd, 
Rosmari Eliasson-Lappalainen & Katarina Jacobsson (eds) Forskningsmetodik för socialvetare. Stock-
holm: Natur och kultur.
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sector and offers a wide range of risk coverage with generous entitlements. 
The Italian system shows great inequalities in protection and entitlements, 
both between regions and social groups, and strongly relies on private solu-
tions to social problems, especially through the family35. Thus, the welfare 
systems rely on different logics; the Swedish model is based on the public 
sector taking major responsibility in the provision and production of the 
welfare service while the Italian model relies much more on the family and 
organised civil society. Also, the third sector in the two countries shows 
some differences. While both have a strong third sector, the Swedish one is 
more oriented towards advocacy and expressive functions, and the Italian 
one is more oriented towards service production36.
Sweden has a relatively long experience of large-scale immigration dat-
ing back to the end of World War II. Large scale immigration to Italy is a 
newer phenomenon that started during the 1980’s37. The integration poli-
cies of the two countries are also different. A comparison between Italy and 
Sweden38 based on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) shows 
that Sweden clearly positions itself close to the multiculturalist model (cfr. 
Mats Wickström’s chapter in this volume) as a state with a policy inspired by 
a civic territorial definition of citizenship and a pluralist view on cultural is-
sues. Italy appears to be further from the multiculturalist model; the ‘equal-
ity of individual rights’ is less oriented towards a civic-territorial interpreta-
tion of citizenship and more towards an ethnic one. These differences are 
especially significant, as they manifest in political participation with more 
limited electoral rights and political liberties, and access to nationality with 
stricter eligibility rules, conditions and a weaker security of status39.
35 Kazepov 2008.
36 Salamon, Lester M., Wojciech S. Sokolowski & Regina List (2003) ‘Global Civil Society- An 
Overview’. In Salamon, Lester M. (ed.) Global Civil Society – Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector. 
Bloomfield, Conn.: Kumarian, 1–92; Kazepov 2008.
37 Scuzzarello, Sarah (2010) Caring Multiculturalism – Local Immigrant Policies and Narratives of 
Integration in Malmö, Birmingham and Bologna. Lund Political Studies, 159.
38 The comparison follows the dimensions ‘equality of individual access to rights and citizenship’ and 
‘cultural difference and group rights’ as in Koopmans, Ruud, Ruud Statham, Marco Giugni & Flor-
ence Passy (2005) Contested Citizenship – Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe. Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press.
39 Scaramuzzino, Roberto (2012) Equal Opportunities? – A cross­national comparison of immigrant 
organisations in Sweden and in Italy. PhD dissertation, Malmö Högskola.
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The immigrant organisational field also differs between the two coun-
tries. The definition of immigrant organisations in Sweden has included 
almost only so-called ethno-national organisations. These organisations 
are built upon a collective identity connected to the group’s national or 
ethnic background. The focus of research on these kinds of organisations 
has corresponded to an interest by politicians for the social and cultural 
dimensions of integration and for the social and cultural functions of im-
migrant organisations40. This, together with a state-subsidy system based on 
the culture-preserving function of organisations, has led to what Carl-Ulrik 
Schierup calls the ‘ethnization’ of immigrant organisations41. 
In Italy, the definition, both in research and in the political debate, is 
much broader. In the study of immigration and the third sector in Tusca-
ny42, for example, we find three categories of immigrant organisations: mo-
no-national or mono-ethnic (one national or ethnic group), multi-national 
(more than one national group: for example an organisation for immigrant 
women), and mixed multi-national (both immigrants and nationals). When 
looking at immigrant organisations in the region of Tuscany, it is found 
that about 50 per cent were mixed multi-national, while the rest were fairly 
equally divided among mono-national and multi-national43. 
Immigrant organisations in Sweden have been described as serving four 
different functions in their activities: the cultural function aimed at preserv-
ing their own culture, the political function aimed at affecting the receiving 
country politics, the adaptation function aimed at bringing their own group 
and the larger society closer to each other, and the home-related function 
aimed at affecting the politics of the country they came from44. Looking 
at the activities of the national organisations and the local organisations in 
40 Schierup, Carl-Ulrik (1991) ‘The Ethnic tower of Babel – political marginality and beyond’. In 
Ålund, Alexandra & Carl-Ulrik Schierup (eds) Paradoxes of multiculturalism. Aldershot: Gower, 
113–136; Dahlstedt, Inge (2003) ’Invandrarorganisationer i Sverige’. In Mikkelsen, Flemming (ed.) 
Invandrerorganisationer i Norden. København: Nordisk ministerråd, 27–94
41 Schierup 1991; Schierup, Carl-Ulrik (1994) ‘Multi-Culturalism and Ethnic Mobilisation: Some theo-
retical Considerations’ in Rex, John & Beatrice Drury (eds) Ethnic Mobilisation in a Multi­Cultural 
Europe. Avebury. Aldershot, 38–47.
42 Recchi, Ettore (ed.) (2006) L’arcobaleno della partecipazione. Immigrati e associazionismo in Toscana. 
Firenze: CESVOT.
43 Recchi (ed.) 2006.
44 Bäck, Henry (1983) Invandrarnas riksorganisationer. Stockholm: LiberFörlag/Allmänna förl.
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Malmö, Inge Dahlstedt finds that the cultural function is the strongest one, 
followed by the adaptation/integration function. Political and home-relat-
ed functions are much weaker, especially for local organisations45. These 
Swedish studies are based on a definition that includes mono-national or 
mono-ethnic organisations. Italian studies show an interesting division of 
functions between the mono-ethnic organisations and the pluri-national 
organisations, where the first group (mono-ethnic) are much more oriented 
towards cultural activities both directed towards their own group and the 
wider society. The second group (pluri-national), on the other hand, is more 
oriented towards mutual aid and assistance as well as political and union 
representation46.
Overall, Sweden is often described as having one the largest proportions 
of organised immigrants in Europe,47 not least as a product of the specific 
support system for ethnic organisations that has strengthened many or-
ganisations in Sweden, especially in their administrative capacity, which is 
a precondition for many other activities.48 In Italy, public support plays a 
much more marginal role for mono-ethnic organisations, and these organ-
isations can rely on many fewer resources (they are mostly self-financing) 
and administrative capacity. Instead, pluri-national and hybrid organisa-
tions seem to have access to more public funds and are able to rely on stron-
ger organisational capacity49. The differences in the funding system towards 
immigrant organisations in the two countries could be explained as depend-
ing on the differences in the view on cultural pluralism in the two countries, 
as described above.
45 Dahlstedt 2003.
46 Salis, Ester & Cecilia Navarra (2010) Una Comunità di Associazioni – Rassegna della letteratura 
sull’asociazionismo senegalese in Italia. FIERI working papers December 2010.
47 Schierup 1991, Soysal 1994, Odmalm 2004.
48 Danielson, Anna, Pär Zetterberg & Erik Amnå (2009) Bidrag till vad? – En kunskapsöversikt över 
effekter och metoder rörande statliga bidrag till ideella organisationer. Rapport till Ungdomsstyrelsen.
49 Colloca, Carlo (2006) ’Le attività e le risorse’. In Recchi, Ettore (ed.) L’arcobaleno della partecipazione. 
Immigrati e associazionismo in Toscana. Firenze: CESVOT, 47–62; Marsden, Anna & Alberto Tassi-
nari (2010) ‘L’Associazionismo degli stranieri in Toscana. Il caso dell’area fiorentina e pratese’. In Car-
chedi Francesco & Giovanni Mottura (eds) Produrre cittadinanza – Ragioni e percorsi dell’associarsi 
tra immigrati. Milano: Franco Angeli, 179–193.
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Participation of immigrant organisations in Equal
Organisations and activities
This section will start by analysing which types of immigrant organisations 
have actually participated in the programme. The following table shows 
the two populations of immigrant organisations in the two national pro-
grammes divided into categories. The columns show which organisations 
are based on individual membership and which are umbrella organisations. 
The rows show different types of immigrant organisations based on the or-
ganisational identities (see introduction):
Table 1. Type of participating immigrant organisations50
Individual  
membership
Umbrella Total
Sweden Ethnic 7 8 15 (71%)
Inter-ethnic 4 2 6 (29%)
Hybrid – – –
Total 11 10 21 (100%)
Italy Ethnic 11 – 11 (35%)
Inter-ethnic 7 3 10 (33%)
Hybrid 10 – 10 (32%)
Total 28 3 31 (100%)
Despite the fact that the number of participating immigrant organisa-
tions in Sweden was smaller than in Italy, the participation was actually 
higher in relation to the total number of organisations that participated in 
the programs (481 organisations participating in the Swedish programme 
and 8.597 in the Italian51). The fact that the presence of immigrant organisa-
50 The organisations included in the table are those that have been identified as immigrant organisa-
tions, according to my definition, among lists of all participating organisations in the Swedish 
programme (Scaramuzzino et al. 2010) and the Italian programme (Compendium Iniziativa Comu-
nitaria Equal I & II).
51 European Common Database (ECDB) ‘Average number of partners in a DP per CIP’ (Figures: round 
I Jan. 2003, round II Sep. 2008).
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tions in the Swedish Equal programme has been stronger in relative terms 
than in the Italian one might be a consequence of the more developed im-
migrant organisational sector in Sweden.
From the table we see that the typologies of immigrant organisations 
participating in the national programmes are different. A larger number of 
umbrella organisations participate in the Swedish programme than in the 
Italian. This is consistent with the Swedish immigrant organisational land-
scape, which has been created through state subsidies directed towards na-
tional ethnic umbrella organisations.52 In Italy, the umbrella organisations 
are mostly interethnic regional organisations. This is also consistent with 
the devolution of social welfare and integration policies to the regional level 
in Italy,53 as well as the lack of representation of immigrant organisation at 
the national level.54 
Interethnic organisations appear to have a relatively strong position in 
both programmes. In both Sweden and Italy they represent almost one third 
of the participating immigrant organisations. While this is consistent with 
the image of the Italian organisational field we get from previous research, 
it is remarkable when it comes to Sweden. In fact, inter-ethnic organisations 
are almost invisible in the research on immigrant organisations. However, it 
is hard to tell if this depends on the relative absence of these organisations in 
the Swedish landscape or on the way of defining immigrant organisations in 
Sweden. In Italy we also find the same share of hybrid organisations which is 
also consistent with the image of the organisational field we get from previ-
ous research.
These figures present, as mentioned before, the total population of par-
ticipating immigrant organisations identified among all participating or-
ganisations in the two national programmes. This study though is mostly 
based on interviews with representatives of 10 immigrant organisations in 
Sweden and 12 in Italy. The rest of the chapter will be based on these data.
52 Schierup 1991; Schierup 1994.
53 Cfr. Kazepov 2008.
54 Valeri, Mauro (2010) ‘Le Associazioni, il vuoto di rappresentanza e i nuovi tipi di aggregazioni’. In 
Carchedi, Francesco & Giovanni Mottura (eds) Produrre cittadinanza – Ragioni e percorsi dell’asso­
ciarsi tra immigrati. Milano: Franco Angeli, 41–59.
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The projects that were financed by the Equal programme, in which the 
immigrant organisations were involved, include a certain variation. All had 
a perspective oriented towards inclusion in the labour market, in accor-
dance with the aims of the programme, but the projects focused on different 
aspects of this inclusion. Many projects aimed at fighting discrimination by 
producing information on immigration, racism and discrimination. 
Beside projects focusing on knowledge production and discrimination, 
we find projects directly focusing on producing new services for immi-
grants. These projects usually had a double aim: to find new ways of helping 
immigrants by starting new services, and to fight unemployment among 
immigrants by employing immigrants in the project. These activities have 
been usually performed through other organisational forms such as coop-
erative or social economy enterprise, even when the participating organisa-
tion was an association.
Another type of activity that we find among the participating immigrant 
organisations is within the field of education and training. These organisa-
tions have performed activities aimed primarily at helping and coaching 
people in finding a job, a position as a trainee or an education programme. 
Some immigrant organisations have only worked as an intermediary be-
tween the labour market, the education system and the immigrant groups 
by matching people with different positions, while others have arranged 
courses themselves and provided coaching.
There are thus three main types of activities that the immigrant organ-
isations have performed within the Equal programme: knowledge produc-
tion and information directed towards wider society (e.g. about own culture, 
discrimination), social welfare service production, and education, training 
and coaching aimed at strengthening the individual’s position on the labour 
market. The next table shows the distribution of the activities performed 
among these three types.
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Table 2. Type of activities performed by the organisations
Sweden Italy
Knowledge production and information 2 (20%) 3 (25%)
Social welfare service production 4 (40%) 5 (42%)
Education, training and coaching 4 (40%) 4 (33%)
The table shows very similar profiles for the immigrant organisations 
in the two Equal programmes. As a political opportunity structure, Equal 
seems to imply certain conditions for access and participation. One of these 
is that the organisations needed to perform activities directed towards goals 
and methods that define integration and social inclusion, mostly in terms of 
labour market inclusion. Many immigrant organisations that participated 
in the programme had no or very few experiences of performing such ac-
tivities. In fact, other activities connected to the more cultural or political 
aspects of integration, to which most of the regular activities of the organisa-
tions in the study relate, were not supported by the programme. 
The social service production and the social economy enterprise as an 
organisational form appear however to offer possibilities to add a more 
communitarian perspective to the activities, which otherwise focused on 
integration and social inclusion in terms of labour market inclusion. A 
Swedish organisation, for example, received financial support from the pro-
gramme, to start a service providing elderly care in the mother tongue. The 
interviewee describes the situation of elderly people from their ethnic group 
as very dramatic with people dying in their homes ‘[…]as a consequence of 
segregation and isolation. They have no possibility to reach the public mu-
nicipal elderly care or help and support services’. The two-ended objective is 
very clear in the description: ‘We have as one of our aims this with employ-
ment, but it’s only one of them and the user’s perspective is the other’. The 
interviewee sees that the foreign-born population in the own ethnic group 
is rapidly ageing, while the public service shows little interest in meeting its 
needs in terms of being able to handle the contact with the municipal au-
thorities and provide elderly care in their own mother tongue. The second 
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aim is described as follows: ‘our members are all clients at the employment 
office (laughs) […] In the existing structures there is a certain discrimina-
tion […] To have another mother tongue, which otherwise counts as a defi-
ciency, in our activity becomes an advantage’.
The activities immigrant organisations have been involved in are quite 
important when analysing the interaction of the organisations with the po-
litical opportunity structure. We can interpret these activities as a way in 
which the political opportunity structure affects the organisation by shaping 
their activities in directions that are consistent with the aims of the pro-
gramme. We could also see them as strategies for the organisations to reori-
ent their activities in order to mobilise resources. In some cases it is more a 
form of selection as the organisations have been chosen because they were 
already performing these kinds of activities. The empirical data show ex-
amples of all three types of processes.
The following parts will present and discuss the way in which immi-
grant organisations describe and evaluate their access and participation in 
the programme and its consequences for the organisation. It is important to 
remember that the views, opinions, and evaluations expressed by the organ-
isations’ representatives are, however, dependent upon their expectations. 
Participants’ satisfaction is not principally determined by the amount of re-
sources that they received and the influence that they were able to exercise 
in the partnerships. Rather, it is a function of whether there was a discrep-
ancy between the expected and the actual conditions and outcomes of the 
participation, when comparing with the conditions of other organisations 
working in the same partnership and comparing with working in other 
projects and partnerships.
Entering the partnerships
Another important dimension of the participation in the programme is how 
immigrant organisations have accessed the partnerships in which they have 
performed their activities and the perceived conditions. A major concern 
here is whether the organisations have been the initiators of the partnership 
or invited afterwards, and why. Another important issue is what resources 
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(money, skills, networks etc.) were required in order to access the partner-
ships and afterwards, continue in the programme.
Only in a few exceptional cases is the partnership described as a result 
of the immigrant organisations’ own efforts and ideas. Most organisations 
have entered the partnership by invitation from a larger, stronger organisa-
tion from the public or the third sector, as described by a representative of 
an Italian immigrant organisation:
One large international organisation, a centre for migration knowl-
edge met together with some Italian associations. But they couldn’t 
do these projects without the immigrants, so they called us because 
they knew us already. So then we entered the partnership. Because 
without us, it wouldn’t be possible and that’s why we have entered.
This is a quite common way of describing the access to the partnership 
by ethnic organisations, especially the Italian ones, i.e. being invited by an 
already formed group of organisations. This representative is not alone in 
describing the reason for getting access to the partnership as a way for the 
other organisations to ‘include the immigrants’ through an ethnic organisa-
tion. In this way, immigrant organisations have become the link between 
their partnership and immigrant groups that were targets for the activities 
and among whom they sometimes hired people for working in the projects. 
Thus, not only did immigrant organisations assume a representational role 
for immigrants in the partnerships, they also guaranteed that individual im-
migrants were recruited and included in the activities. Considering the fact 
that many immigrant communities are loosely organised, it is possible that 
some participating immigrant organisations that are more structured, vis-
ible and ‘connected’ functioned as a link between the development partner-
ships and other immigrant organisations that are too loosely organised to 
become a regular partner. Previous studies of the Equal programme support 
such a hypothesis.55 
55 Scaramuzzino et al. 2010.
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As a political opportunity structure, Equal thus seems to be open for im-
migrant organisations that are already connected to networks that include 
strong public or third sector organisations. Among the Swedish immigrant 
organisations, it was common for the organisation to have been already in-
cluded in a network of organisations that were collaborating in common 
projects. Access to the programme in these cases came through being part 
of the network of organisations jointly deciding to apply for Equal-funding 
as a partnership. In other instances, the immigrant organisations were not 
already partners in the preparatory phase, but were contacted by the part-
nership and offered access when the process had already been running for a 
while, especially in the Italian programme.
Some interviewees describe gaining access to the partnership as a result 
of the partnership being interested in their knowledge about immigrants 
and their needs. One of the representatives for a Swedish organisation de-
scribes how the partnership came into contact with them as their organisa-
tion was starting to gather information about the target groups. ‘It was the 
partnership which came in contact with our organisation. We had already 
started a project with Objective 356 money […] We had made a mapping to 
see which needs our ethnic group had’. The immigrant organisation thus be-
came an important source of ‘inside’ information for the partnership about 
the needs and perceptions of potential users.
Many of the immigrant organisations which gained access to the Swed-
ish Equal programme already had experience with running EU-financed 
projects, and all had previously been granted public financial support for ac-
tivities, had some kind of administrative office, and at least one paid staff. In 
contrast, while many Italian organisations had extensive experience with re-
ceiving public funds from the municipality, the province, and the region for 
most of them, Equal was their first experience with running an EU-financed 
project. Among the participating immigrant organisations in the Italian 
programme, there seemed to be some differences between different types of 
56 Programme financed by the EU structural funds ‘…to support the adaptation and modernisation of 
education, training and employment policies and systems in regions that were not included in Ob-
jective 1’ (regions whose development is lagging behind). Online. Available HTTP: <http://europa.
eu/legislation_summaries/regional_policy/provisions_and_instruments/g24207_en.htm>.
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organisations. Both the hybrid organisations and the cooperatives could rely 
on strong networks, relatively abundant financial resources, and offices with 
paid staff, whereas the ethnic organisations seem to have relied to a larger 
extent on fewer resources and almost only voluntary non-paid work.
Two interconnected factors that seem to play a major role in how the 
organisations are able to access the opportunity structure are the type of 
organisation and its starting conditions in terms of resources, competences, 
and contacts. In Sweden, the interviewees’ descriptions of access to the pro-
gramme are more similar, which could be explained by the more similar 
starting conditions of the organisations. The greater variation in descrip-
tions of access in Italy could, on the other hand, be connected to the larger 
gap between the organisations’ starting conditions. There is, for example, 
a huge difference between some ethnic organisations’ very poor starting 
conditions and those of the stronger trade-union affiliated hybrid organisa-
tions. It is quite common that the weaker organisations felt that they were 
invited to join the partnership because the partnership needed to include 
representatives for immigrant groups, get in contact with these groups, and 
gather information about them, rather than because there was a real desire 
to cooperate with them in the activities. Consequently, this could affect their 
view on the participation.
Participation in the partnership
In addressing the dimension of ‘participation,’ I intend to explore the condi-
tions under which the organisations’ representatives perceive to have par-
ticipated in the partnership and hence, in the programme. My focus here 
lies mostly on the challenges the organisations face in the participation.
When it comes to the actual participation in the partnership and the 
programme, there were different experiences among the immigrant organ-
isations as expressed by their representatives. Many of the Italian immigrant 
organisations find the administrative burden of the participation almost too 
heavy to bear for the organisation. 
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It was very hard from the administrative point of view. I don’t want 
to blame anybody, but the rules for the accountancy were not clear, 
it was like every time we made the accountancy, the department 
showed up with a new rule […] the administrative part engaged a 
considerable amount of resources, our resources which were taken 
from our ordinary activities.’
Among weaker Italian ethnic organisations, the lack of financial re-
sources is described as a major obstacle to the participation. A representative 
for one of these organisations explained that the participant organisations 
needed to be able to guarantee financial coverage for 70–80 thousand Euros, 
which was impossible having a small budget. The interviewee sees this as 
one of the main reasons why immigrant organisations cannot grow even 
when resources are available, i.e. because of the poor starting conditions in 
terms of lack of resources. This was also the case in the Equal programme: 
Few immigrant organisations fulfil the criteria for the application, 
because they don’t have the funds. In our partnership there was sup-
posed to be many associations. At the first Equal meeting we had, 
there were many immigrant associations. Then gradually with the 
criteria that were set up, many of them left because they couldn’t 
solve the problem of having the budget that the participation re-
quired.
These two types of obstacles in the participation, the administration and 
the budget, are both related to the resources of the organisations and were 
not present in the interviews with the Swedish representatives. This could 
partly be explained by two factors. On the one hand, it could be related to the 
national administration of the Equal programme, as many of the conditions 
for participation vary across national programmes, since they were set up by 
the national governments. It is possible that the Swedish authorities, follow-
ing a tradition of user-friendly bureaucracy, have been able to simplify, to a 
higher degree, the administrative burden that lies on the organisations. On 
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the other hand, the relatively stable situation of the Swedish organisations, 
and the fact that they had a longer experience of handling public funds in 
comparison with some of the weaker Italian ethnic organisations, could also 
explain these differences.
A common experience for some Swedish and Italian immigrant organ-
isations is the difficulty of making themselves heard in the partnership. ‘Ev-
ery month we sat in meetings with the steering group. Honestly, we felt that 
it didn’t give us so much. It was talk, talk, talk and in the end, when it came 
to a “real” level, it was up to us alone to bear the project and carry it on’, says 
a Swedish representative. The same representative mentions a commonly 
expressed obstacle to communication; the administrative language that was 
spoken in these meetings:
Because the others were people from the municipal authorities, they 
have another language, a bureaucratic language. We in the associa-
tion are not used to it. We want more substance: ‘what shall we do 
now?’, ‘how are we going to do that now?’ That’s how we thought in 
our association. That’s the way we many times felt that we were talk-
ing passed each other.
An Italian representative expresses the lack of influence as a conse-
quence of the general weakness of the organisation at the moment of par-
ticipation: ‘I don’t think that we were one of the partners that had a voice in 
the partnership: we played our role and that’s it’ said the interviewee. This 
could also be seen as a strategy of the organisation to enter the partnership 
and play a role according to the possibilities offered in relation to the start-
ing conditions.
Another strategy adopted by participant immigrant organisations to in-
fluence the partnership was to be very insistent from the beginning that 
their perspective be included in the project. Another representative for 
an Italian organisation explains, ‘The pathetic thing is that the first issue I 
raised during the first meeting was how we can speak about women without 
talking about the work of the foreign women, which are massively present 
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in the Italian families’. It took this particular organisation one and a half 
years to make the other participants start to focus on this issue. The repre-
sentative felt that many other participants found their insistence very an-
noying: ‘...it looked like I was some kind of maniac about this issue and that 
I was not being open enough for encounter on other levels […] I think I was 
being perceived like that’. The representative also found some allies in the 
partnership in researchers from the university that started to reiterate their 
perspective giving ‘[…] a scientific base to my spontaneity’ as expressed by 
the interviewee. Being insistent about the importance of their perspective 
and finding allies among the participants proved to be a successful strategy 
for this organisation.
Overall, the Swedish organisations were more satisfied with the condi-
tions of participation than the Italian organisations. Some representatives 
for Italian cooperatives and some hybrid trade-union affiliated organisa-
tions, however, described their participation as characterised by the same 
conditions as other organisations in the partnership, which few other Swed-
ish or Italian ethnic organisations would agree with. 
As a political opportunity structure, the Swedish Equal programme ap-
pears to provide fewer barriers for the participation of immigrant organisa-
tions than the Italian programme, which seems to offer harder conditions 
for participation. At the same time, the Swedish organisations more often 
describe their position as subordinate than the Italian organisations, with 
the exception of the Italian ethnic organisations. In understanding this ap-
parent contradiction, it helps to remember that the ability to take advantage 
of an opportunity is affected by many factors that may also influence the 
way the representatives value the significance of the participation for the 
organisation, not least the initial expectations but also the way in which the 
partnerships are organised.
It also seems that Equal, as a political opportunity structure, offers bet-
ter conditions of participation to the more structured and better connected 
organisations, even if it is difficult to measure the level of satisfaction among 
the interviewees. Overall, the starting conditions for Swedish immigrant or-
ganisations, as we have seen, seem to be more even, which could explain 
the EQUAL-programme in sweden and italy: A new opportunity structure for … 
239
why the Swedish representatives’ evaluations of their participation are more 
similar to each other. It seems also probable that the Italian ethnic organisa-
tions’ weaker starting conditions, compared with inter-ethnic and hybrid 
organisations, affect their experience and explains the major differences in 
the evaluation of the participation by the Italian organisations.
Besides the lack of resources, one of the major obstacles that the organ-
isations experience in interaction with the other organisations in the part-
nership is the lack of linguistic and cultural competence. Some interviewees 
describe the participation as challenging because of the bureaucratic lan-
guage and because of the administrative skills and resources required to 
participate. A handful of interviewees, mostly from ethnic organisations, 
also mention the discriminatory structures in society which made their par-
ticipation in the programme and the implementation of the activities dif-
ficult because of ethnic or gender-based stereotypes: ‘And then women are 
always unfortunate… because you see how it is here for immigrant women. 
They are victims of trafficking and prostitution. All these things… exploited 
at the workplace, raped. They can’t act because they are already stereotyped 
as weak’.
One of the reasons why Italian hybrid organisations seem more positive 
about their experience of participation might be their possibility to access 
both Italian and immigrant representatives and their cultural and social 
competences: ‘the thing is that to run an association is something, as you 
can imagine, that requires also a certain capacity to handle bureaucratic 
mechanisms of applications, authorisations, permits, financing that, in my 
opinion, require a considerable capacity to handle the Italian bureaucracy. 
And I realise that in this game those who have a different culture than ours, 
the Italian one, have to struggle. Thus they risk losing a bit of enthusiasm on 
this. This is something that I realise is valid in general for the immigration 
in Italy’, says a representative of an Italian hybrid organisation.
Overall, the fact that the participation of some immigrant organisa-
tions in the Equal programme was subordinated to the interests and will of 
stronger public and civil society organisations to include them, could actu-
ally have led to a weaker position for these immigrant organisations in the 
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partnership and a more limited possibility to affect the projects, which, in 
turn, could be an explanation for their more negative perception of their 
participation.
Consequences for the organisations
The last dimension in this analysis is connected to what happened after the 
end of the Equal programme and focuses on how the experience of partici-
pation has had durable effects on the organisations.
In spite of the different obstacles, all of the interviewed representatives for 
immigrant organisations saw the participation in the Equal programme as 
a positive experience for the organisations. A commonly described achieve-
ment is connected to the activities made possible through the programme; 
to have had the possibility to experiment with new methods of working with 
the target group, or to develop a regular activity with new target groups. 
It has often meant also the possibility of hiring people and paying wages, 
which was especially important for those organisations that usually rely only 
on voluntary work. Some interviewees also mention personal growth and 
capacity building; how they have learned how to handle the accountancy for 
larger projects and the pay rolls, and work in partnership with larger organ-
isations, and how their knowledge about other groups, discrimination, and 
the host society has increased.
It has given the opportunity to test our capability and expand our 
knowledge; to clarify our role against the public sector […] it has also 
had the value of making us recognized in the regional panorama. We 
have become, in the eyes of others, a serious and reliable discussion 
partner in all the issues that we, since Equal, have been confronting 
and handling jointly with the other actors in the regional migration 
panorama.
Another representative expresses his satisfaction with having had the 
opportunity: 
the EQUAL-programme in sweden and italy: A new opportunity structure for … 
241
[…]as an association and as president of an association to talk to 
politicians and people located very high in the administration. I took 
advantage of the situation for talking not only about Equal but also 
of the conditions of our group and about rights […] It has given me 
the opportunity to express my views.
Of course, the evaluation of the consequences for the organisations is 
highly dependent on whether the organisation has been able to continue 
or even make permanent the activities they have experimented with. One 
Swedish interviewee described with disappointment what happened when 
Equal ended and the funds ran out: ‘The association exists and goes on and 
we try to keep things rolling all the time but it’s more difficult because it’s 
not possible to volunteer all the time. Moreover, you can’t claim that people 
should come here and help all the time’.
It is clear that for the larger organisations, Equal has been one project be-
side many others, although even the most established immigrant organisa-
tions value Equal as one of the largest projects they have ever participated in, 
in terms of the budget, the number of organisations involved, and, not least, 
the trans-national dimension. For most of the smaller organisations, which 
were not so established at the beginning of the project, the participation has 
meant a huge boost of budget, resources, contact networks, activities, and 
knowledge. For some organisations, participation has also meant access to 
other collaborations and partnerships, and through these participations, ac-
cess to new funds. For others, Equal remains a ‘golden age’ in the history of 
the organisation and they express a disappointment for the waste of knowl-
edge and experience caused by the ending of the activity.
Equal seems to be a political opportunity structure that allows certain 
access to opportunities for Swedish and Italian immigrant organisations. 
For some medium-sized organisations, it has been a huge opportunity to 
strengthen their positions in relation to other organisations. Some smaller 
organisations, on the other hand, seem to have had rather small possibilities 
to influence the partnership and gain access to resources through partici-
pation. They have not been able to replace the lost financial support with 
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new resources after the end of the programme. For these organisations, the 
opportunity structure has been temporary in its effect. For the larger or-
ganisations, which were not as dependant on Equal for their survival or for 
their development, it has meant a new experience in their organisational 
curriculum vitae. This pattern seems to be valid both for the Swedish and 
the Italian organisations.
Participation in the Equal programme also provided immigrant organ-
isations with the opportunity to work with new activities that express other 
functions and roles in the welfare and integration systems than the tradi-
tional ones, which are more directed towards cultural or political activities. 
Many of the organisations in the study, especially the ethnic ones, have a 
strong focus on cultural activities in their regular activities. For these organ-
isations, the Equal programme opens up the possibility to work with issues 
connected to discrimination, labour market participation, welfare services, 
etc., which are more common among hybrid organisations, especially in the 
Italian context.
Conclusions and discussion
The study shows that Equal might have been a significant new political op-
portunity structure for immigrant organisations in Sweden and Italy, even 
if participation included very few organisations, and the conditions expe-
rienced for participation and outcome were different among the organ-
isations. The most important opportunity that participation in the Equal 
programme offered the Swedish and Italian immigrant organisations was 
resource mobilisation. Resources, such as money, knowledge, networks of 
organisations, and legitimacy in their own group and in the wider society, 
are all mentioned by the representatives. As a political opportunity struc-
ture, Equal seems to have been open for organisations that already have a 
certain organisational strength to handle the participation, which is con-
sistent with previous research on the access of civil society organisations to 
the European level of opportunity structures.57 Even if we find examples of 
57 Cfr. Lundberg, Erik, Pia Brundin, Erik Amnå & Emanuela Bozzini (2011) ‘European civil societies 
and the promotion of integration, Leading practices from Sweden, Great Britain, the Netherlands 
and Italy’. In Boje, Thomas P. & Martin Potucek (eds) Social Rights, Active Citizenship and Gover­
nance in the European Union. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden; Sanchez-Salgado 2010.
the EQUAL-programme in sweden and italy: A new opportunity structure for … 
243
immigrant organisations that were able to obtain an independent position 
in their partnership, many, especially ethnic organisations, described their 
position as very dependent on stronger actors. In general, the findings sug-
gest that the organisations had a quite deterministic view on their possibili-
ties to participate, which is more consistent with the political opportunity 
structure approach than with resource mobilisation theory.
The fact that the activities carried out by the immigrant organisations in 
the two national programmes were quite similar is remarkable, especially 
considering that the role of civil society organisations in the two social wel-
fare systems is very different. It could mean that the programme has been 
able, in some way, to stimulate projects at the national and local level with 
similar activities, even if the methods and the target groups were sometimes 
different. This could actually mean that the Equal programme has, to a cer-
tain extent, contributed to a Europeanization of the national civil societies 
and of the national social and integration policies.
The way in which the national contexts seem to affect participation is 
by shaping different immigrant organisational fields. The relative strength 
of the Swedish ethnic organisations, which have been granted subsidies for 
some decades now, as well as access to several forms of consultation bodies, 
might have been an important factor, allowing them a stronger participation 
to the European programme than their Italian counterparts. The weaker po-
sition of the Italian ethnic organisations in the organisational field also gave 
them a weaker participation in the programme. The Italian hybrid organisa-
tions, through their access to other strategic resources in terms of personnel, 
money, and connection to other networks, found a much stronger position 
in the partnerships. Overall, the marginal position that immigrant organ-
isations have in both countries’ national welfare and integration systems, 
should be seen as an important factor impeding their access and full partici-
pation to the programme.
Other factors, which might have played their role in shaping the par-
ticipation of immigrant organisations in the Swedish and Italian Equal 
programme, include the internal functioning of the partnerships and their 
different profiles, as well as the internal processes inside the organisations. 
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The theoretical approach adopted for this study explains organisational 
processes through their institutional environment. Further studies focus-
ing more on the interaction inside and between organisations could shed 
some light on other factors affecting immigrant organisations’ use of the 
political opportunity structures available. Furthermore, the fact that other 
organisations not representing immigrants, but working with integration is-
sues (i.e. human rights organisations), are not included in the study makes 
the results not necessarily extendable to cover the whole of the organised 
civil society that participated in the programme. The fact that Italian hybrid 
organisations seem to follow a partly different pattern shows that the fact 
that the organisations are not only for immigrants but by immigrants is an 
important factor. It might be interesting to compare these results with the 
participation to the Equal programme by other organisations by and for dis-
criminated and/or marginalised groups and see if they have perceived their 
participation in the same way.
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